02/06/2025 

The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine daily records a decrease in the number of combat clashes on the front. Does this mean that the Russian occupation army is preparing for a pause? It is too early to draw such conclusions, since the front is quite “segmented” – in priority areas for the enemy, its activity is still high. However, due to huge losses, the enemy may really need a pause.

If such an operational pause really happens, the Defense Forces will be able to use it to conduct a rotation, bring in additional forces and resources. But regardless of the enemy’s activity, the Ukrainian army faces another important task – to solve mobilization problems.

This opinion was expressed by military expert Vladislav Seleznyov in an exclusive interview with OBOZ.UA.

– The latest report of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for February 4 reports that the number of combat clashes has decreased to 80. Two days earlier, 97 battles were recorded. Do you think that the enemy’s activity is decreasing? If so, what could this be due to?

– As for the dynamics on the battlefield, it is characterized by a certain segmentation. There are sections of the front where there is no need to talk about stagnation, for example, we are talking about the Pokrovsky direction, about the battles taking place in the Kurakhiv direction. The battles in the area of ​​Chasovye Yar and Toretsk are also ongoing. Therefore, I would not risk talking in general about serious stagnation on the battlefield.

Here, for me, another factor is more significant – the number of KABs that the enemy used in the past day (February 4. – Ed.). There were 124 of them. Moreover, more than half of them flew over the territory of the Kursk region of the Russian Federation. Obviously, if it were not for the fighting there, these KABs would have flown to our territory – to the Sumy region, Chernihiv region, Kharkiv region. Here, the enemy uses the factor of fire impact to literally destroy houses, social infrastructure facilities near the Kursk region of the Russian Federation.

I would not say that the offensive potential of the Russian army has been depleted. Perhaps some decrease in activity may be due to the fact that the enemy has suffered serious losses and now needs at least a short-term operational pause, but the number of combat clashes is still considerable. Therefore, it is still premature to talk about stagnation on the battlefield.

– If there really were a pause, in your opinion, would the Ukrainian Defense Forces be able to take advantage of it?

– Of course, this is a very important factor that will allow us to perhaps carry out some measures regarding the rotation of units that have been on the front line for a long time. This time will allow us to raise additional forces, means and resources for those units that are performing combat missions.

That is, the operational pause factor would be favorable for us. But there is no operational pause. We were expecting it in early October last year, but it did not happen. 80 combat clashes are also a lot. Of course, it is not 250, as it was in mid-November last year, but it is 80 combat clashes. Many areas of the front continue to be quite active.

– Questions about personnel, mobilization. In your opinion, within what time frame can we realistically significantly improve the situation with the manning of our units?

– Of course, this will not happen instantly. First of all, we need to seriously change the approaches to information support for events related to mobilization. There is such a thesis: if you do not know how to act – act according to the law. We open the Law of Ukraine “On Mobilization and Mobilization Training” and read that mobilization is not exclusively handled by the Central Committee of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. This is a state event, which is managed by the Ukrainian government headed by the Prime Minister, in which representatives of local self-government bodies also participate.

There is an exceptional list of officials who are to one degree or another related to mobilization. I don’t understand why the CCC was made extreme in Ukrainian society. This is an absolute distortion of the processes that should be implemented within the framework of mobilization procedures. This is fundamentally wrong. Therefore, returning to the sources, to clear and unquestioning compliance with the norms of Ukrainian legislation in terms of mobilization, I think, will serve as a good basis.

Next, we need to transform our training centers and training grounds, where training takes place. Syrskyi claims that the training period has been increased by 1.5 times – from 30 to 45 days. But I would look at the root – at the substantive part of these training programs. Are enough knowledge, skills, and abilities taught to our citizens who are called up? Are the experts who organize this process effective and professional enough? Is this process well-established? Is this time being used rationally?

And then there is the issue of organizing the opportunity for the most effective commanders to show themselves on the battlefield. After all, it is no secret that there are units to which there is literally a queue of those wishing to serve there, and there are units that have a bad reputation. Accordingly, personnel policy should be aimed at ensuring that combat units are led by those effective officers who have the appropriate knowledge and skills. And transfer to positions not related to personnel those commanders who do not have authority and are not effective enough on the battlefield, in particular in terms of preserving the lives and health of subordinate personnel.

Undoubtedly, the resource factor also remains relevant. A sufficient number of weapons and ammunition for these weapons are necessary for the Ukrainian army to be effective.

To summarize: the transformation of the Ukrainian army will not happen tomorrow, but these issues must be addressed not just today, but starting from yesterday, qualitatively and systematically transforming both the military command system and the support system in the Ukrainian army, and it is worth starting with the mobilization and mobilization training system.

https://war.obozrevatel.com/ukr/armiya-rf-zmenshue-kilkist-atak-i-skidae-kabi-na-svoyu-teritoriyu-seleznov-poyasniv-scho-tse-oznachae.htm