25.10.2025 

The so-called “circle zone” around the front line is expanding. Enemy drones and missiles have begun to reach much further due to technical improvements. In particular, drone-mothers are appearing that can carry UAVs to a distance of 50-60 km and drop them, acting as a repeater. Sometimes enemy DRGs place drone-bookmarks. However, Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) equipment is also significantly improved.

Currently, Ukraine is creating an echeloned sky defense system: the first level is engineering lines and technical obstacles, the second is mobile solutions, automotive electronic warfare systems and personal systems with detectors, and the third is tactical long-range electronic warfare systems at a range of 5-20 km.

However, the ideal protection for Ukraine’s energy facilities is a combination of air defense, electronic warfare, and interceptors . And what about a “shield” for large cities, for the capital? A “digital shield” is already operating around Kyiv, which suppresses more than half of enemy drones. At the same time, deploying such “shields” on a large-city scale is very expensive, so such systems are being implemented gradually and in an optimized manner: first, priority is given to large centers, and the rest – in stages according to budgetary capabilities. The first to be protected are Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odessa, Dnipro, and Lviv.

This was stated by the co-founder of Contra-Drone company Timofey Yurkov in an exclusive interview with OBOZ.UA.

– Today, there is increasing talk of “expanding the ‘no-go zone’ around the front line. What does this mean in practice – how far can the enemy now reach with drones and missiles?

– The drone “kill zone” is increasing almost weekly – due to the emergence of drones with larger fiber optic coils and more powerful transmitters for both video and control.

If earlier video transmitters (VTX) had a power of 1.5-3 watts, now it is at least 5, and more often 10 watts. The same goes for fiber optic coils: previously 5, 7, 10, 15 km was something unrealistic, but now there are models with a fiber optic length of 35 km. Because of this, the distance that a drone can fly increases many times over.

In addition, there are drone-mothers that can carry UAVs over long distances – 50 and 60 km – and drop them there, acting as a repeater. But this is an expensive pleasure, so there are not many of them on the front now. There are also DRG groups that place drone-bookmarks. This is, in fact, a drone that stands on the road. At the same time, there is a repeater in the sky that transmits the image to the operator. As soon as he sees that the target is moving along the road or near it, the drone rises and tries to hit it.

– How does all this change the approach to security?

– If we are talking about a long distance and the drone is controlled not from a control station with a powerful antenna and dBi gain, but from a repeater, then usually the EW works better than “at zero”. In the immediate vicinity of the positions, the EW, which works at 50-70 meters, gives a good result. At longer distances, somewhere 10-15 kilometers from the front, the drones are jammed already at 200-300 meters, and they simply do not reach.

As for fiber optics, the situation is more complicated, because it is not jammed. But it is also much less maneuverable, worse controlled, operators take much longer to learn how to work with it. Therefore, other methods are used to combat such solutions: in some areas, physical countermeasures are used. For example, they are destroyed using pump-action rifles (shotguns, special cartridges) or devices with a Kevlar mesh, which allow you to shoot down a fiber-optic drone when it approaches 20-30 meters.

– An echeloned sky defense system – how can it work in practice, in our conditions? What role do electronic warfare (EW) systems play in this system?

– In fact, it is difficult to implement a full-fledged echeloned system in all existing areas of the front today. But if we talk about potential preparation, the logic is approximately as follows. The first level is engineering lines and technical obstacles that complicate the use of fiber-optic drones; these are simple and relatively cheap means that distort or physically damage their channels.

The second level is mobile solutions: automotive electronic warfare systems and personal systems along with personal drone detectors. And the third is tactical, long-range electronic warfare systems capable of operating at long distances: 5, 7, 10, 15, 20 km.

– So the role of electronic warfare in the echeloned sky defense system will still remain central?

– Absolutely. If we are talking about long-range reconnaissance and attack means – 40, 50 or 100 km – then they do not depend on fiber optics, so it is only effective to suppress them.

The same applies to the Shahed: currently about half of such devices are jammed with electronic warfare. If there were no electronic warfare, their number would be greater and it would be much more difficult to shoot them down. When the Shahed loses communication or GPS navigation, it cannot maneuver effectively – therefore, it becomes more vulnerable.

– In the current war, what is more important – shooting down a drone or making it simply “go blind” and lose orientation?

– If we are talking about an echeloned system for combating drones, then, of course, it is better to suppress them with electronic warfare systems 70-80 kilometers from the city. In this case, the UAVs will not even fly into the settlement, but will fall somewhere far away in the fields or forests.

It is especially important to jam fake targets so that they do not come even close to the air defense. Because when a swarm of “Shaheeds” is flying and half of them are “deceptions”, missiles are often spent on fake targets, while the real ones fly further into the city.

– What countermeasures against drones could be useful during Russia’s recent drone attacks on European countries? What could Europeans learn from Ukrainians?

– First of all, these are effective electronic warfare (EW) means, which today cut off about 50–60% of drones. The second is interceptor drones; they already destroy about 20–25% of enemy UAVs and are constantly being improved. Ukraine is working hard on this, so the number of such solutions is growing.

But it is important to understand: the Russians are also learning. For example, it has already been noticed that some “Shaheeds” have a camera on the tail and front and artificial intelligence. AI can detect an interceptor drone, and in this case the drone begins to actively maneuver. Then it is much more difficult for the operator to destroy it. Therefore, the situation changes literally every month: the enemy is looking for a response to each of our new technologies.

– How do you assess the level of Ukrainian electronic warfare compared to Western systems?

– Western partners have effective systems – that’s a fact. However, the question is different: such complexes often cost 5-7 million euros per unit. To protect against even a small attack by the “Shaheds”, hundreds of such installations are needed. For example, several thousand effective units were needed to defend Kyiv. So, purchasing 500-700 means necessary for protection, spending millions on each, would cost 20 times more than making a countermeasure system like we have now.

We have a different philosophy: to make solutions cheaper, but suitable for mass use. The cost of our Ukrainian analogues of expensive Western systems can be 100-150 thousand dollars. They may lose a little in power, but they can be supplied in large quantities and quickly. The effect of a large number of cheaper systems sometimes exceeds the effect of several expensive platforms.

In addition, there is another important point: Western systems often do not adapt to real combat conditions. We learn and change under the pressure of combat – we quickly introduce firmware, change antennas, adapt to new frequencies. It is useful for Europeans to borrow this speed and approach to scaling.

– Another relevant topic is energy protection. How can electronic warfare (EW) systems protect energy facilities? Does each such facility require separate protection? What should be the ideal protection?

– Perfect protection in its pure form does not exist today. The supposed “ideal” is a combination of air defense, electronic warfare, and interception; these systems should work as a single network.

To suppress one “Shahed”, it is necessary to simultaneously affect its communication channels and navigation – LTE, GSM, GPS, etc. In practice, this requires about 20-22 different means of suppression, placed so that they affect the device from several directions. It would be ideal to have an echelon of protection: a long-range line – at 10 km, an average line – at 2 km, and direct protection at the object itself. Such a scheme really allows you to effectively disrupt the enemy’s navigation and communication channels, but it is very expensive.

– What is the approximate cost of such protection?

– It depends on the type of facility. The larger the area and the more complex the infrastructure, the more expensive it is. For example, a nuclear power plant is hundreds of hectares, many critical units, cooling systems, reactors; its comprehensive protection will require very large investments – we are talking about tens of millions of dollars, perhaps more. On the other hand, it is much easier and cheaper to protect a small oil depot: with fewer resources, you can get an acceptable level of security.

– Is it possible and advisable to create a “digital shield” around entire cities, including the capital? How realistic is this purely technically?

– Technically, yes, such a “shield” is already operating around Kyiv. During attacks by the “Shaheeds,” more than half of the drones are suppressed thanks to it. But it is very expensive: deploying such systems on a large city scale is a matter of tens of billions of hryvnias, perhaps even more.

– Is work underway to create such “shields” for other cities?

– Yes, the work continues, and it is being carried out comprehensively and optimized. But it is taking place within the limits of budgetary possibilities and priorities. Large cities – Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, Dnipro, Lviv – are receiving more powerful solutions. Smaller settlements are being protected gradually: optimized and in stages, so as not to waste resources in vain. The main thing is to correctly allocate funds and create elements of protection where they give the greatest effect.

Most of our issues are about finances. If resources were unlimited, we could deploy ideal systems everywhere. But the reality is: we need to combine technologies, optimize distribution, test and quickly implement solutions – and then even a limited budget will bring real protection.

https://war.obozrevatel.com/ukr/u-genshtabi-pidtverdili-urazhennya-ryazanskogo-naftopererobnogo-zavodu-stalas-masshtabna-pozhezha-foto-j-video.htm