Caolan Robertson

Aug 23, 2026

Zelenskyy just said elections now could “destroy” Ukraine,

He said it would be “a tsunami for the state which will split Ukraine.” And that the country’s focus should be on staying united, ending the war and preserving an independent Ukraine.

He said Ukrainian forces have already reclaimed 900 km² this year & the priority now is the soldiers taking back Ukrainian land, not a political campaign that could divide the country while they are still fighting for it.

He also said Ukraine’s Defence Ministry asked him to secure political approval for Starlink to operate over Russian territory for Ukrainian military purposes, and that he had initially been told SpaceX was on board. He then took the proposal directly to Trump and secured more than a billion in European financing. But at a later meeting, Trump told him Musk had refused and, according to the president, said: “You told me that Musk had confirmed it.” He said Musk regarded the idea as an “escalation,” although subsequent lobbying by Trump, Macron and others has produced “different, more encouraging feedback.”

At the same time, Zelenskyy said Russia and China are developing their own alternative to Starlink, with Moscow believing it could be ready by December 2026. Ukraine is already testing a separate European project. It seems Kyiv is actively preparing for a world in which it cannot rely indefinitely on Musk’s network.

There was also a major development on air defence. He said Raytheon is discussing the creation of a Ukrainian missile for the Patriot system, with Ukrainian company Fire Point selected as the potential partner and an initial technical meeting already held. That matters because the supply problem is severe, according to the figures he gave, Ukraine received 675 Patriot missiles in 2023, 364 in 2025, and is currently projected to receive only 264 in 2026, despite Russian missile attacks increasing.

On Fedorov, he described a serious breakdown between the Defence Ministry and military command, saying the two sides had reached the point where they were effectively only discussing matters in his office. Despite that, he said he offered Fedorov four different positions to remain in the team. All four were rejected. “Well, that is his choice.”

And on Russia’s next manpower push, he said Moscow plans another 300,000 troops, many likely destined for the Kostiantynivka–Sloviansk–Kramatorsk axis. His response was uncompromising: “We will destroy them. Putin will lose them all.”

This was at a meeting with journalists this weekend. Thanks for reading 🔥

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I was the last person to interview Fedorov & could tell he was holding back. His video the next day backfired because the majority of Ukrainians don’t want elections during the war. People are worried that he’s now flying to America to meet Musk – who also demanded elections.

But the bigger picture isn’t here in Kyiv.

Ukraine’s entire existence is still at risk. Russia is not going to stop unless it’s forced.
Long range strikes are having a crippling effect on its economy. And it’s why the most important person I interviewed this year is actually Robert Brovdi who is spearheading that campaign. He represents the big picture above all of this – a focus on the strategy for Ukraine to defeat Russia and win.

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Boris Bondarev

@borisbondarev

Russian ex-diplomat, expert on Russia’s foreign policy, non-proliferation, arms control and global security. Now a political emigre trying to figure out what should be done to stop the war and get rid of Putin and his clique

I do not usually comment on the inner workings of Ukrainian politics, but a few weeks ago, during one of my livestreams, I was answering a question and offered a hypothesis about why Mykhailo Fedorov had been dismissed as Ukraine’s defence minister. It seemed to me that the issue may well have involved not only substantive disagreements, but also his inability to build workable relationships with the people he was supposed to lead.

This is a fairly common problem among young executives who rise to the top too quickly. A person gets used to thinking of himself as the most modern, the most energetic and the smartest person in the room, and starts behaving as though that alone were enough to run a large state institution. Yet a defence minister has combat generals, senior bureaucrats and heads of enormous organisations working under him — people who may well be less cutting-edge and more conservative. But they have military experience, management experience and experience of bureaucratic infighting under the specific conditions of their own institution and professional sphere, which a young leader simply does not possess.

And if you enter such a system convinced that you are now going to explain to all these old farts how the job should really be done, you soon discover that they know a thing or two themselves. At the time, I suggested that Fedorov had ultimately simply been eaten alive by the people he was trying to manage because he had failed to turn them into his allies.

Fedorov’s subsequent behaviour gives me reason to think that there was indeed a considerable amount of truth in that version.

After his dismissal, he said that he had no interest in returning to the government in any other capacity: the only position that interested him was defence minister. That raises a simple question: are you working for Ukraine or for your own ego? If your country is fighting a difficult war, and if you genuinely believe that you are capable of making a major contribution to it, why can that contribution be made only from one particular chair? Why does public service end the moment you are offered a position that, in your own estimation, does not match your stature?

Even more revealing is his sudden interest in presidential elections. While Fedorov was inside the government and held one of the most important posts in the country, the urgent need to hold elections did not seem to trouble him very much. The moment he lost his job, however, it turned out that Ukraine needed elections as soon as possible and that Ukrainian democracy was in danger.

As long as the system gives you enormous power, everything is fine. The moment it takes that power away, you declare yourself its critic and start demanding a political reset.

This points both to a specific personal grievance that is becoming a motive for political behaviour and to a degree of political immaturity that allows personal resentment to dictate one’s words and actions. A statesman must be able to distinguish his own defeat from the defeat of the state, and the loss of his own office from the need to overhaul the country’s entire political system immediately.

Fedorov may indeed be an outstanding specialist in modern technology. His contribution to the digitalisation of the state, the development of unmanned systems and the modernisation of Ukraine’s defence may well have been enormous. None of that contradicts the fact that he is considerably weaker as a politician and as a leader.

Inventing a new system and making a complex state machine actually work are two different things. And being able, after dismissal — perhaps even an undeserved one — to retain a sense of proportion, continue working towards the common goal and refrain from turning your own career trauma into a problem for the state is a separate political quality altogether.

So far, Fedorov has been demonstrating that quality rather poorly.