There is hope that U.S. military aid to Ukraine will reach a new level. The Trump administration is considering a decision to provide Tomahawks. The Ukrainian delegation in the U.S. is currently discussing “military-technical issues” with the Americans, which clearly includes the range of weapons. But it is important not to misjudge what is critically necessary for Ukraine to receive from the U.S. And the question is not as simple as it might appear

Contents

1. Why Tomahawks aren’t a wunderwaffe

2. How to deny Russia air superiority — and with what

3. What’s needed for mid‑strike and deep‑strike

4. Tomahawks or AI: which matters more in modern combat

A wave of reports about the Trump administration discussing the possible supply of Tomahawk cruise missiles to Ukraine has flooded the Ukrainian information space with optimism about receiving a ‘“miracle” weapon that could secure victory. The desire to find any positive amid the horrific Moscow strikes on Ukrainian cities is understandable. However, can Tomahawks really change the current balance of forces in the war with Russia? And should Ukrainians place their hopes on miraculous weapons from Western partners that might instantly give them an advantage?

Why Tomahawks aren’t a wunderwaffe

Sea-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles, with a range of 2,500 km, date back to the Cold War and at the time truly gave the U.S. and its NATO allies an operational-strategic advantage over their adversaries. Much later, after the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty was dismantled, a land-based Tomahawk variant appeared on the Typhoon launcher. It is this land variant that is likely being discussed when people talk about Tomahawk supply  to Ukraine.

However, is the Typhoon a unique system that would instantly give Ukraine trump cards in the confrontation with Russia? Actually, no. From the first day of the full‑scale aggression, Russia has used hundreds of sea‑launched Kalibr missiles against Ukraine which, despite many differences, can be considered similar to Tomahawks. Did this give them a strategic or operational‑tactical advantage over Ukraine? Definitely not. Kalibrs are shot down just as effectively as other cruise missiles and, while they are certainly a dangerous long‑range strike tool, they clearly do not constitute a means to turn the tide of the war. The same applies to Tomahawks. Of course, any additional tool for striking the enemy is important — and a precision cruise missile with a 2,500 km range is, without doubt, a major boost to any army’s combat capabilities. However, when assessing the need for specific combat capabilities, the Ukrainian Defense Forces have more urgent priorities — especially given the current situation on the front.

How to deny Russia air superiority — and with what

For Ukraine, the most important priorities now are reducing Russia’s offensive capabilities, substantially destroying the Russian Armed Forces’ operational‑strategic reserves, and creating conditions for a shift to more proactive (including offensive) actions. Yes, Tomahawks can help with this task to some extent. However, the key is to deprive Russia of air dominance and create conditions for the Ukrainian Armed Forces to seize the air initiative. To achieve that, several concrete steps must be taken.

First and foremost, finally get the long‑range airborne early‑warning aircraft that were promised to Ukraine more than a year and a half ago. Arm Ukraine’s F‑16s with long‑range air‑to‑air missiles and physically deny Russian aviation (primarily the Su‑34) the ability to strike Ukrainian positions and cities with guided bombs. At the same time, the Ukrainian Air Force must receive mass batches of domestic KAB precision bombs to begin systematically targeting Russian forces on the front. That would immediately change the combat paradigm for both Russians and Ukrainians. Depriving Russian forces of the freedom to operate in the frontline sky is what the Ukrainian Defense Forces lacked during the 2023 counteroffensive. Conversely, the mass use of KABs and attack aviation to push through Ukrainian defenses is what has allowed Russia to continue offensive operations since December 2023. In other words, even without loud talk about Tomahawks, the U.S. and Ukraine’s European partners can provide it with real capabilities to significantly change the situation on the front.

What’s needed for mid‑strike and deep‑strike

Next — Ukraine’s Defense Forces urgently need massed, powerful mid‑strike tools. For example, if the recently announced U.S. ERAM missiles with a 400 km range — some 3,000 of them — are indeed delivered to the Ukrainian Armed Forces on a steady schedule, they would give Ukraine added capacity to systematically destroy the Russian Armed Forces’ military infrastructure both on occupied territory and, in part, inside Russia.

Moreover, the U.S. could supply excellent JASSM missiles with ranges up to 500 km, which would be ideal for Ukraine’s F‑16s and would genuinely serve as a tool to destroy Russian military infrastructure and operational‑depth reserves.

To “clean out” command posts, communications and control nodes, ammunition depots, logistics centers, and locations where enemy personnel and weapons systems are deployed even deeper, you need deep‑strike rocket weapons. This is exactly where Tomahawks could be useful. Again, to avoid dependence on the political moods of friends and partners, it would be better for these rocket systems to be Ukrainian‑made. If the high‑profile announcements about Flamingo and other promising Ukrainian missile developments move from the informational to the practical realm, Ukraine will indeed be able to independently fill the niche of deep‑strike missiles. After all, the declared specifications and potential production rates of Flamingo make it possible to talk about a real ability to effectively affect the strategic depth of Russia’s war machine.

It’s clear that at this stage of the war, American and other partner weapons will no longer have the same effect on the front as HIMARS did in 2022. Ukraine’s defense industry has the capacity to independently create the conditions to shift the balance of forces at the tactical and operational‑strategic levels.

Of course, any strengthening of Ukraine’s capabilities by its partners would be very welcome. The Ukrainian delegation currently in the United States, negotiating the specific types of weapons the U.S. could sell to Ukraine with European funding, could indeed achieve results that will have a direct impact on the front.

Tomahawks or AI: which matters more in modern combat

For the full picture, it’s worth adding a few words about an area where Ukrainians can already teach Americans and share their experience and technologies: robotic systems and drones. The modern “transparent” battlefield – filled with UAVs and reconnaissance systems – has become a continuous zone of near‑guaranteed destruction. Technological advantage on every meter of the front matters at least as much as obtaining “magical” Tomahawks. Victory goes to whoever closes the kill‑chain fastest – from detection to decision to destruction – and that’s measured in seconds. Technological pressure changes tactics faster than doctrine can keep up. Artificial intelligence onboard a drone takes on target recognition, trajectory selection, and proposing firing solutions, while humans retain control over the rules of engagement. The network‑centric model with a single “decision‑making center” is being replaced by a federated logic: multiple nodes simultaneously carry out tasks according to the commander’s intent, autonomously and with minimal delays.

Against this background, it is already naive to rely on Western “miracle weapons” from the Cold War era. What matters is the ability of Ukraine’s defense industry and Armed Forces to operate at the cutting edge of technological solutions and breakthroughs and to rapidly implement them on the battlefield.

This piece was prepared in cooperation with the Consortium for Defense Information (CDI), a project that unites Ukrainian analytical and research organizations and aims to strengthen information support and analytical capacity in the fields of national security, defense, and geopolitics.

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