The meaning of a signal is determined not by the intention of the sender, but by the way it is interpreted by the recipient

BORIS BONDAREV

Russian ex-diplomat, expert on Russia’s foreign policy, non-proliferation, arms control and global security. Now a political emigre trying to figure out what should be done to stop the war and get rid of Putin and his clique.

AUG 26, 2026

The visit of CIA Director John Ratcliffe to Moscow is yet another manifestation of the same recurring pattern in Western diplomacy. The purpose of the visit is still unclear, but numerous commentators have already rushed to speak of some kind of “warning” that Ratcliffe allegedly brought to Putin — whether about the inadmissibility of aggression against European countries, a request to reduce escalation, cooperation against Iran, and so on. In any case, the United States is once again making the same old mistake: demonstrating its interest in contacts and possible agreements with a party that reads this as an invitation to set its own terms.

Time and again, the West tries to seize the diplomatic initiative precisely when it should be seizing the strategic initiative. Instead of creating a situation in which Moscow itself needs negotiations, Washington is the first to propose talks, the first to send envoys, and the first to reveal what it fears.

In November 2021, Biden sent CIA Director William Burns to Moscow to warn the Russian leadership that the United States knew about preparations for an invasion of Ukraine and that war would have severe consequences. The Americans regarded this as a demonstration of awareness and resolve. The Kremlin read the signal differently: the United States was so eager to prevent war that it was sending one of its most senior national-security officials to Moscow to persuade Putin to abandon it. The discussion concerned consequences after an attack, not a willingness to physically prevent the attack from taking place. Putin was given an opportunity to assess the price of war and decided that he could afford to pay it. On February 24, the war began.

Lloyd Austin’s conversation with Sergei Shoigu in October 2022 reproduced the same mistake even more vividly. Austin initiated the first call on October 21; the Pentagon openly explained the need for such contacts by citing the importance of maintaining communication with Moscow, managing escalation, and preventing miscalculation. In his conversation with the Russian defense minister, Austin warned that the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine was unacceptable. Washington believed it was drawing a firm red line. Moscow read the signal differently: Ukraine could be bombed with conventional missiles, its energy infrastructure could be destroyed, its territory seized, entire cities wiped off the face of the earth, countless war crimes committed, and the war continued indefinitely — as long as the nuclear threshold was not crossed. Thus, while believing that they were restraining Russian appetites, the Americans were in fact giving Moscow carte blanche to wage the war by virtually any other means.

The autumn of 2022 was particularly revealing. The Russian army had just suffered a rout in the Kharkiv region and was then forced to abandon the right bank of the Kherson region, including the city of Kherson itself. This was the moment of maximum Russian weakness during the entire war, when strategic logic demanded that Ukraine exploit its success, deny the enemy the opportunity to stabilize the front, and force Moscow itself to start looking for a way out. Yet this was precisely when Washington began talking about negotiations. The Biden administration started pushing Kyiv toward dialogue, while General Milley, after the liberation of Kherson, publicly described the situation as a possible “window” for diplomacy. Russia received exactly what it needed most after a series of heavy defeats: time for mobilization, regrouping, and the construction of deeply echeloned defensive lines.

“Better give them time to regroup, build defenses, construct fortified lines, and dig themselves properly into the ground. It is not our land, after all. Then next year we will insist on a counteroffensive, for which, of course, we will not provide sufficient military assistance. And after it fails, we will say that Russia cannot be defeated and that there is no alternative to diplomacy — meaning concessions to the aggressor.” This, one can only conclude, was how Biden, Sullivan, Austin, and the other outstanding American strategists — the “friends of Ukraine” and “defenders of Western democracy” — reasoned. Their followers in the United States and Europe reason the same way today.

In each of these cases, the mistake has the same origin: an inability to place oneself within the opponent’s frame of reference. Western politicians constantly assume that the other side attaches the same meaning to words, actions, and diplomatic gestures that they themselves intend to convey. For Washington, the arrival of a high-ranking envoy demonstrates the seriousness of the issue; for Moscow, it demonstrates the envoy’s interest and weakness. For Washington, a warning about consequences constitutes a threat; for Moscow, it provides information about the price that will have to be paid. For the Americans, drawing a red line means imposing a prohibition; for the Kremlin, it simultaneously means permission to act freely right up to that line.

This is a fundamental error of diplomatic thinking. The meaning of a signal is determined not by the intention of the sender, but by the way it is interpreted by the recipient. 

This is why Western warnings so often prove toothless. They explain to the adversary in considerable detail what the West fears and what it wants to avoid at all cost. Burns showed how badly Washington wanted to avoid a major war. Austin showed how badly Washington wanted to avoid nuclear escalation. Now Ratcliffe, simply by traveling to Moscow, is showing that Washington once again wants something from Moscow — and therefore Moscow can once again set its own terms.

Effective diplomacy requires the opposite approach: forcing the opponent to do what you want rather than what suits them. If Moscow wants something from Washington, let Moscow ask for a meeting, send its own representative, and explain what it is prepared to give in return. When strategic pressure and initiative are instead replaced by toothless and feeble overtures proudly described as “diplomacy,” every such move makes its initiators weaker and merely convinces the adversary that its chosen course is the correct one.

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Boris Bondarev

Launched 2 years ago

Diplomacy and war: si vis pacem, para bellum

© 2026 Boris Bondarev

https://borisbondarev.substack.com/p/what-moscow-hears-when-washington?r=17e8q4&utm_medium=ios