June 8, 2025


Somewhere along the front lines of Ukraine’s brutal war for survival, a soldier scribbles a number on a whiteboard: 3 BMPs, 11 infantry, 2 motorcycles. It’s not idle statistics or for morale. It’s the tally of kills to be submitted to Delta — the military’s situational awareness system. If the kills are properly verified by video, the unit gets ‘bonuses.’ Not medals or days off. Drones.
Welcome to the world of “є-бали” [ye-baly]— a Ukrainian play on words roughly translating to “e-points” but with a knowing wink at its vulgar slang twin. The official name is “Army of Drones: Bonus,” a government program launched by Ukraine’s Ministry of Digital Transformation. It transforms battlefield success into virtual tokens. Kill a Russian tank? 40 points. Eliminate a unit of infantry? 120 points. Destroy a multiple launch rocket system? Up to 50. Rack up enough, and you get rewarded: FPV drones, night vision units, multi-use bombers like the Vampire drone.
On the surface, it sounds like a gamified arms procurement system — and in part, it is. But deeper down, it’s a bold attempt to adapt state procurement to the brutal logic of an asymmetric war, where nimble drone teams make or break the line.
The system launched in August 2024 as a pilot, and by mid-2025, it already includes over 420 drone units across the Armed Forces, covering 90% of Ukraine’s UAV forces. Units upload video proof of confirmed kills to Delta, and at month’s end, their total score determines what drones they can select on the Brave1 marketplace — the defense-tech platform behind the program. The data is verified by teams from the Digital Ministry and the State Special Communications Service.
“Destroy targets, earn points, get drones,” is how Digital Transformation Minister Mykhailo Fedorov explained it at the Defence Tech Era conference.
It sounds simple. But war never is.
A math department for the front line
As it evolves, the program now features both general leaderboards and category-specific rankings: most tanks destroyed, most artillery neutralized, and so on. The Brave1 initiative has even established a modest “math department of war,” aggregating this data for analytical insights — not just for tracking success, but shaping procurement, battlefield strategy, and even drone design.
The logic is clear: send more equipment to the units that make best use of it. Units no longer wait for trickle-down deliveries — they compete for them. The government, in turn, gets a wealth of hard data to plan defense spending.
But data is only as good as its input. And that’s where friction starts.
Record it or it didn’t happen
Denys N., a drone pilot with Ukraine’s 152nd Separate Jaeger Brigade, explains the catch: no video, no points. His crew recently took out 11 enemy infantry, 7 motorcycles, and 3 vehicles. But to log these into the system, they needed:
- Footage from the FPV drone’s point-of-view approaching the target
- Simultaneous zoom footage from a Mavic or similar UAV verifying the destruction
Often, one of these is missing. Maybe the FPV’s camera feed dies just before impact. Maybe the recon drone was focused on adjusting artillery and missed the kill. Maybe the terrain made confirmation impossible.
In the chaos of combat, it’s common for several systems to engage a target — artillery, drones, mortars. And who gets the kill credit? Denys jokes: “You can’t kill the same Russian five times.”
The outcome is a tactical success that brings no logistical gain.
“We fly deep into enemy rear areas,” says Rostyslav from the 411th “Yastruby” UAV Regiment. “Ten, sometimes fifteen kilometers. But with no ability to confirm, those missions don’t count.”
It leads to a paradox: operators exert enormous effort not only to eliminate enemies, but also to prove they did.
Incentives that shape the battlefield
The point values themselves tell a story. Initially, a dead Russian infantryman was worth only 3 points. Tanks, armored vehicles, and MLRS systems naturally drew more attention: bigger bang, bigger rewards.
This led units to prioritize flashy hardware over soft targets. In some cases, drone teams chased BTRs while ignoring infantry pushing dangerously close.
Eventually, the General Staff stepped in. Monthly briefings with top drone commanders, led by Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi, sparked heated debates. One such session resulted in increasing the value of enemy infantry to 6 points in an effort to rebalance incentives toward what’s most dangerous in actual combat.
Still, some say the scale remains off. A recent change increased the value of an enemy infantryman even more — now up to 12 points — but as drone pilot and army officer Oleksandr Karpiuk (callsign “Serzh Marko”) notes, that still feels skewed when compared to the 3.2 points assigned to eliminating a skilled drone operator — a far greater threat to Ukrainian troops.
“We’re rewarding the elimination of cannon fodder, not the enemy’s most lethal capabilities,” he says.
He points to air defense systems like BUK, TOR, and S-300s — the systems that shoot down Ukraine’s most expensive and scarce assets.
“There’s no longer incentive to locate and destroy them. Instead, we reward the guy on crutches shifting between trenches.”
Bonus or burden?
Even when the kill is recorded and verified, delivery is not guaranteed. Units may wait weeks or months for their earned drones. Captain Oksana Rubanyak, commander of a UAV assault company, says her unit has waited since January for their rightful share of Mavics, Vampires, and Nemesises. Others echo the same: logistics lags undermine battlefield trust.
“The concept is excellent,” says Rubanyak. “But we need faster, smoother fulfillment. Six-month wait times demoralize troops.”
In many units, only 20% of drones come from the bonus program. Others rely on state deliveries and volunteer donations. Ironically, getting drones through the system requires already having drones to earn the points needed.
The Premier League problem
Denys likens it to football.
“The ye-baly system is the Premier League. If you don’t have the starting gear, you’ll never catch up. It’s not about talent or effort alone. It’s about resource access.”
Young, under-equipped units often lack the FPVs to make significant scores. The top spots go to the established elites — “Madyar’s Birds,” “Hartiia,” “Dovbush’s Hornets.” Worthy outfits, no doubt. But the gap widens.
This creates a feedback loop: well-resourced units earn more drones, which lets them stay dominant. Newcomers struggle to break in.
Collateral incentives
As with any competition, not all side effects are positive. Some units withhold intelligence rather than share it with neighboring detachments. Others shift drone resources from quieter zones to hot sectors, leaving positions vulnerable.
And yet, these aren’t flaws of the point system, argues Colonel Yuriy Fedorenko of the 429th “Achilles” UAV Regiment. They’re flaws of command.
“The problem isn’t with the ye-baly program. It’s with selfish commanders who prioritize clout over coordination. But they’re the minority. Most units choose common sense and cooperation.”
He cites recent collaboration with the National Guard’s “Bureviy” brigade. After taking out three vehicles together, one of them contested, both commanders insisted the other take the credit. Why? “You need the drones more than we do,” one told the other.
“That’s the kind of interaction that wins wars,” Fedorenko says.
Lessons beyond the drone war
Ukraine’s experiment in gamified logistics is being watched closely. Minister Fedorov hints at expanding the model to artillery. Units earning 152mm and 155mm shells based on effectiveness sounds, frankly, dystopian. But in a war where every shot counts and every drone is sacred, measurable incentives might make the difference.
Still, critics like developer Oleksiy T. warn of dangerous distortions. What about quiet sectors that may become flashpoints tomorrow? Do they lose out on supplies because they weren’t racking up kills last month?
“War logistics can’t be run like a casino,” he says. “Weapons must be allocated based on sound military planning, not leaderboards.”
The Drone Bonus Program: Between innovation and inequality
The Army of Drones: Bonus program is not a mere novelty. It is a product of wartime necessity, innovation, and desperation. It attempts to solve real problems: inefficient procurement, delayed resupply, lack of motivation.
It succeeds in parts. It injects purpose and competition into drone units. It creates a data stream to guide strategy. It empowers the most effective units. But it also creates new frictions, perverse incentives, and logistical bottlenecks.
Ultimately, the system reflects the war itself: scrappy, imperfect, evolving. It is a testament to how Ukraine is willing to rethink even the basics of military logistics to fight a technologically and numerically superior enemy.
Whether this system will become a global model or a hard-learned lesson depends on how it adapts next. But one thing is certain: in the skies over Donetsk and Zaporizhzhya, the battle for Ukraine’s survival is increasingly being fought not just with courage, but with spreadsheets.

“A recent change increased the value of an enemy infantryman even more — now up to 12 points — but as drone pilot and army officer Oleksandr Karpiuk (callsign “Serzh Marko”) notes, that still feels skewed when compared to the 3.2 points assigned to eliminating a skilled drone operator — a far greater threat to Ukrainian troops.”
I agree fully and so does Sergey Flash, an electronics engineer who operates a Telegram channel “About communication from Sergey Flash”. He focuses on electronic matters, like drones, electronic warfare, software, hardware, communications, radar, radio frequencies and so on. A roach drone operator is far more dangerous than a simple piece of meat with a rusty AK.
As with every novelty in life, this points system also had a rocky start, filled with flaws. The concept is sound enough, but more attention to details must be taken it make the system work much better.
I’m waiting for the video game, World of Drones….;)