Zelensky’s significant battlefield gains shows the value of boots on the ground alongside the destructive capability of drones.
Hamish de Bretton-Gordon
Hamish de Bretton-Gordon OBE was an army officer for 23 years, reaching the rank of colonel. In 1991, he saw active service in Iraq with the 14th/20th King’s Hussars as part of the First Gulf War, was commanding officer of the UK’s Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Regiment, and Nato’s Rapid Reaction CBRN Battalion.
Published 10 September 2026
The Ukrainian recapture of more than 200 square kilometres of its territory around the Donbas town of the Lyman could prove to be one of the most significant land operations of this war.
What makes it particularly remarkable is not simply the ground gained, but how it was gained. Over four months, the Ukrainians appear to have maintained an extraordinary level of operational security, concealing their intentions while preparing an armoured manoeuvre operation integrated with drones, electronic warfare and precision fires. That is precisely the sort of combined-arms warfare many commentators had prematurely declared dead.
Only last weekend, Vladimir Putin told the beleaguered US peace envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner that his price for a ceasefire remained the surrender of the whole of the Donbas. Only then, apparently, might Moscow consider stopping the missile attacks that continue to terrorise Ukrainian civilians.
Yet even as Putin was demanding that Ukraine surrender its territory, his own forces were being pushed back around Lyman and towards the very border from which they launched their invasion nearly five years ago. If that does not expose the disconnect between the Kremlin’s rhetoric and reality on the battlefield, I am not sure what will.
The obvious question is what Putin’s generals are actually telling him. Either they are concealing the truth, or the Russian president has become so invested in his own narrative that he simply is not listening. Neither possibility should give anyone in Moscow much comfort.
For Ukraine, however, this matters enormously. It potentially changes the strategic equation at the negotiating table. Volodymyr Zelensky is no longer being asked to negotiate from a position of inexorable Russian advance. He can point to the battlefield and say, quite reasonably: why should Ukraine surrender territory when Russia is struggling to hold it?
The Lyman operation also provides a rather useful corrective to the fashionable view that wars can now be fought principally by drones. Drones are magnificent. They have transformed reconnaissance, targeting, strike operations and battlefield awareness. They can destroy tanks, artillery and logistics at ranges that would have been unimaginable a decade ago.
But there remains one rather important technological deficiency: there is still no drone capable of occupying ground and holding it against a determined enemy. That still requires soldiers.
Over the past four months, Ukrainian forces have demonstrated that armour can survive and operate on what is undoubtedly the most drone-saturated battlefield in history. Tanks and other armoured vehicles have taken losses, but electronic warfare, jamming, concealment, deception and the use of supporting drones have allowed armoured formations to manoeuvre where many believed they could not.
The Ukrainians have also combined these manoeuvres with their own massed offensive and defensive drone operations and, increasingly, air power. The lesson is brutally simple: control of the air, whether achieved by aircraft, drones, electronic warfare or a combination of all three, remains fundamental to success on the ground.
The Ukrainians have essentially applied the doctrine of Britain’s greatest field commander, Bill Slim: hit the enemy hard, hit him fast, surprise him and hit him where it hurts.
They have found the weakness, massed sufficient combat power at the decisive point and exploited it before Russia could generate a meaningful reserve. That is not a victory for tanks over drones. It is a victory for combined arms. And this is where the implications stretch well beyond Ukraine.
Britain’s Strategic Defence Review and the Army’s emerging 20/40/40 concept, broadly 20 per cent traditional platforms such as armour and attack helicopters, 40 per cent expendable drones and 40 per cent durable autonomous systems across air, land and sea, look increasingly sensible in light of what we are seeing on this battlefield.
Ukraine is providing the operational laboratory. It is demonstrating that tomorrow’s army cannot be an armoured army of the Cold War, but neither can it be an army of drones. It must be both and, crucially, it must retain the manpower to seize and hold ground.
The Lyman operation may ultimately prove to be only one episode in this extraordinary war. But its reverberations should be felt in Washington, Moscow and London.
First, Russia is plainly not winning everywhere, perhaps only in Putin’s increasingly detached version of reality. Donald Trump needs to understand that before he makes concessions on Ukraine’s behalf simply to secure a political headline ahead of the US midterm elections. A bad peace imposed on Ukraine would not end this war; it would merely give Putin time to prepare for the next one.
Second, if Russia cannot generate enough combat power through its present system of recruitment, the Kremlin may ultimately have to contemplate another general mobilisation. That would be an extraordinary political gamble for Putin, potentially exposing just how unpopular and costly this war has become.
Third, Britain’s planned future military structure may indeed be broadly right. But a beautifully designed force on paper is worthless if politicians refuse to pay for it. If Britain genuinely believes the threat from Russia is existential to European security, then the Government must fund the forces it says it needs. Three per cent of GDP on defence by 2030 should be regarded as a starting point, not an impossible dream.
We may be approaching an endgame, politically as well as militarily. The next few months could prove decisive. Sadly, the West currently appears short of any Winston Churchill or Franklin D Roosevelt. In Moscow, however, there is no shortage of Stalinist ambition.
The question now is whether Trump and Andy Burnham rise to the challenge as strategic leaders, or become strategic losers. History is unlikely to give them a second chance.
Original article, with extra items, can be seen here :
Comment from :
John Greenwood
Excellent news now someone needs to tell Putin’s puppet Taco Trump what is really happening and that video may not be that safe in his boss’s safe. Now lets see what the trolls have got to say.
Glastonbury Tory
Putin has nearly reached his limit, the Kremlin house of cards could tumble down. China will be delighted and their recovery of outer Mongolia and eastern Siberia will be a wonderful legacy for the Chinese president Chi. Putin will be lucky to have dacha retirement like Nikita K.
Hairy Plotter
Reply to Glastonbury Tory – view message
Hear Hear, 🥂.
Further verification can be found in previous articles such as article posted on 18 Sept 24 in the Taipei Times, “Russia’s far east belongs to China.” Quoting President William Lai’s open challenge to The PRC.
Richard Naylor
Excellent article, a last an informed view of British Army strategy looking forward. Hamish may not appreciate Mr. Trump, but at least he has an army, navy and air force and is willing to use it. As Stalin once said of the Pope: “How many divisions has he?” That is the problem with Britain and EU these days – few divisions. The Belgian Army in 1940 had, I believe, 20 divisions, roughly one million men under arms (if I recall Mr. Churchill correctly). (Not that they did much good – the Belgian King surrendered, collapsing the left flank and creating Dunkirk). So, how many battle ready divisions have Britain, how many the rest of Europe? B…all. I doubt the combined force of all the major names combined would add up to the Belgian Army of 1940. It is time for a major popular objection.
John Georgeson
Some additional happy news:
FirePoint drones hit Urengoy, Russia’s “gas capital” in Northern Siberia in the Arctic zone, setting a record depth penetration of 3,300 km (2,050 miles).
Ukrainian drones struck 2 major gas condensate processing facilities; the Novy Urengoy and Purovsky plants in the Yamalo-Nenets region.
Novy Urengoy condensate processing plant is one of Russia’s largest gas condensate facilities, capable of handling up to 19.5 million tons of raw material annually.
Purovsky Gas Processing Plant processed 13.4 million tonnes of gas condensate in 2025.
The damages inside targeted facilities have been confirmed.
FP-1 drones were upgraded in 2026 to ensure they can fly up to 3,400km, now we know they actually can strike their targets at that distance. That’s an incredible achievement of both precision and depth.
John Bolwell
Putin’s regime is rapidly taking on the appearance of Hitler and the Nazis – where the truth was either hidden or rejected because his ego couldn’t stand it.
This dreadful war must be ended asap and it must be ended justly or another one will follow. We are way past the time when the West must step up and give Ukraine everything it needs to prevail.
Jon Carmi
The biggest threat facing NATO has always been the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact and now Russia. Ukraine is marginally reducing that threat every single day at enormous cost in lives and livelihoods and we should be immensely grateful. I believe that the computations about defence spending should combine donations to Ukraine with expenditure on domestic defence, because ultimately those funds achieve the same end, namely reducing Russia’s capacity to threaten Europe and to a lesser extent, North America. Spending 2% of GDP on the military and 2% on helping Ukraine is every bit as valuable and worthy as say, 3% on the military and 1% on Ukraine.
John Behardien
I think Ukraine should declare that each and every petrol station has now become a legitimate military target and may be struck at any time. Under no circumstances should the people of Russia use any of them at any time from this point on. Next week declare the same for railway stations and bus stations. It’s time to take the gloves off and let the ordinary Russian folk understand the cost of this “special” military operation as well of course as close down the whole country.
five dialogues
Peace is not down to Trump or even Vladimir Putin it will be down to the Ukrainian army when they decide to stop; through their courage and ingenuity, they have won a battle and land measuring over 200 sq k in a war where advances have en measured in meters. The only reason why they stopped there, was so they did not overrun their supply lines. This army could have marched on Moscow and taken every city along the way, as there is nothing standing in between them.
They have cleared the Black Sea of every Russian vessel and turned the sea into their lake, it is phenomenal what they have achieved from being announced as carron in 2022 with no chance of surviving the Russian onslaught, for more than a few days; they have contested and died in great numbers for every inch of their sovereign land; their heroics and tenacity will go down in the annals of military lore, never mind the technology and advances of strategy and tactics, the crucial and deciding factor, is and has always been in history a people who fight for freedom, demand justice and through their effort proclaim an eternal truth.
To match these peoples courage with an empressed army of drugged up slaves, driven like cattle into a slaughter, under a barrage of lies, reaffirm why all free people know where and why they stand with Ukraine.
When faced with seemingly insurmountable odds a free people have nothing to fear but fear itself. Tyrants do not get to dictate terms to free people.
Wonderful analysis. Provides a great overview o& what is possible with Ukrainian brains at the helm. Bravo Bravo
The Colonelis correct. Air supremacy or at least parity has always been necessary for large scale maneuver warfare since WWII. That has not changed.
Drones are just a new component of the equation. Air defence now needs to be developed down to the lowest level of even vehicles and small units.
All that is needed for a return to maneuver warfare is to develop the current Active Protective Systems to cover a full 180 degrees so that high angle of attacks such a drones and Javelins can be countered.