Syrskyi secures the breathing space Ukraine desperately needed

SHANKAR NARAYAN

NOV 10

The 25kms in Pokrovsk

Ukraine’s Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi announced yesterday that Ukrainian efforts to slow the Russian advance in the Pokrovsk direction are bearing fruit:

“But the intensity of the enemy’s attacks has indeed decreased. This does not mean that they want to take Pokrovsk any less. Right now, the Russians have gathered 50,000 troops there, but they know that since October they have lost a similar number—around 30,000 soldiers.”

The main Russian forward lines in the Pokrovsk sector are roughly ten to twelve kilometres from the town. The Russians are sending small, wave-like assault teams into Pokrovsk — the same “suicide squad” tactic they used in Bakhmut two years ago. 

These detachments may be cannon fodder, but Ukrainian defenders must destroy them, which exposes Ukrainian positions. Russia keeps accepting those losses to create chaos inside the city, to wring propaganda value from the fighting, and to open local gaps that let their frontline creep closer. Their aim is straightforward: encircle the town from three sides, then use heavy air strikes to reduce the pocket and seize the city.

Shaun Pinner, writing for CEPA, explains why Moscow prizes this little town: 

I don’t believe that if Pokrovsk were to fall (and Russian forces are inside the city), the war would suddenly flip in Russia’s favor overnight. This isn’t 1815, and there’s no single gate that decides the fate of nations in a day. But, short-term? Its loss would hit morale. It would give Russia a propaganda moment. It would let them parade ‘momentum’ even as Putin’s army continues to bleed itself white.

And that’s the point.

Pokrovsk represents a place where Russia feels it must win, and where the Ukrainian armed forces are making them pay dearly for trying.

My problem with a Ukrainian withdrawal from Pokrovsk is strategic, not sentimental: concede the town and Russia simply repeats the playbook at the next settlement. Putin’s logic in that scenario is brutally simple — order your generals to grind resources and manpower against a limited objective, burn through 50,000 men if needed, and produce a small territorial gain and a big political headline. If the Russians are allowed to take Pokrovsk as the result of a local tactical withdrawal, that approach becomes a template, not an anomaly.

That is only one part of the problem, there is another part, which is this: 

• Between November 5, 2025 and November 10, 2025, Russian personnel losses increased from 1,146,570 to 1,152,160.
• 5,590 personnel lost over that five-day period.

The Russians have been rationing their casualties within a narrow band of 800 to 1,200 troops per day — a pattern they’ve maintained since April. Unless that number spikes and the frontline near Pokrovsk begins to hold or shift in our favor, it’s difficult to call the situation an advantage for Ukraine.

For now, it remains a tense draw.

A withdrawal from Pokrovsk wouldn’t qualify as a tactical move unless it’s executed with the entire theater in mind. Ukraine’s weapons composition has also changed little in recent weeks. Kyiv has likely reinforced its air-defense grid using the first $2 billion tranche of U.S. arms delivered under the PURL scheme — a mechanism designed to channel European funds toward the rapid procurement of American weapons for Ukraine.

What matters now are the next two tranches. 

Once those clear, Ukraine should have enough offensive systems to support both its ground forces and the air force. Until then, Syrskyi faces the hard task of keeping Russian troops pinned down around Pokrovsk — denying them any sense of progress while avoiding unnecessary exposure of his own units. His best option is to keep pressure on Russian positions from multiple directions, forcing Moscow to spread its troops. 

For the moment, the situation in Pokrovsk looks better than it did a week ago. But this remains a week-to-week fight: momentum can swing either way with a single breakthrough or missed delivery. Ukraine has begun quietly redeploying units to the sector. It’s still a cat-and-mouse game — one that rewards endurance more than speed.

And endurance costs money. 

While Ukraine holds the line on the battlefield, Europe is still arguing over how to finance the next phase of the war. The EU’s proposal to borrow €140 billion against frozen Russian state assets still lacks the guarantees needed to reassure creditors. Belgium, which holds most of those assets through Euroclear, has blocked the move citing legal and financial backlash. 

Norway has emerged as a possible backstop — considering a €100 billion guarantee from its €1.7 trillion sovereign wealth fund to unlock the transfer. Four of Norway’s nine parliamentary parties support the plan, and negotiators are set to meet Friday to discuss it.

Link

I sincerely hope the European Union understands the game the Belgian government is playing. I have serious doubts that its reluctance stems only from a lack of EU guarantees. If that were truly the case, there would be no reason to keep delaying the delivery of F-16s to Ukraine. Belgium has been promising those jets for years. At this rate, Tesla will launch its robotaxis before Brussels delivers them.

Their national security with 47 jets is so dire that they cannot send 2 F-16s to Ukraine?

So, by all means, go secure the “ironclad” guarantees Belgium claims to need—but be ready, on the dot, when it invents the next excuse. This government will deserve trust only after it delivers the weapons it promised—or at the very least, starts to. There is simply no justification for refusing to send even two jets to Ukraine.

Until then, assume this: Belgium doesn’t want to disturb Moscow. It wants Russian money to remain parked in Euroclear—so it can keep collecting the tax revenue that flows from it.

Orbáns and Ficos don’t fall from the sky — we play a part in creating them. Time to bring this dance to an end.

© 2025 The Concis
548 Market Street PMB 72296, San Francisco, CA 94104