18.02.2025 

During his speech at the Munich Security Conference, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said that Russia could soon accumulate a contingent of up to 150,000 troops on the territory of Belarus and pose a threat to neighboring countries. Is this realistic and what is Russia’s current potential for creating such a strike group? Let’s find out.

Cold shower

The words of the President of Ukraine shocked many in Europe because from a high rostrum, a completely realistic scenario of a threat was voiced, which many in the West try not to think about (despite three years of bloodshed in Ukraine).

It is noteworthy that literally on the eve of Volodymyr Zelensky’s speech in Munich, the Danish Foreign and Military Intelligence Service published the report “Forecast 2024” , which voiced the threat of Russia’s invasion of Europe within the next 5 years. And maybe even earlier?

Be that as it may, it is difficult to imagine the formation of such a strike group on the territory of Belarus… Or is it?

The bitter experience of Ukraine

Europe should remember the past, namely 2022, when, under the cover of the “Allied Determination-2022” exercises, Russia transferred a forty-thousand-strong group to Belarus, which invaded Ukraine on February 24.

At that time, this was the largest concentration of Russian troops ever deployed on the territory of the Republic of Belarus. Moreover, almost all of these troops had a full complement of equipment and short-term reserves.

In other words, Russia has experience in deploying a large contingent on the territory of Belarus. And the Russian occupation troops will be able to do this in a similar way – under the cover of the “West-2025” exercises.

Current composition of DOM in Belarus

As of now, there are slightly more than two thousand Russian military personnel on the territory of the Republic of Belarus. In particular, they are stationed at the following facilities:

– radio engineering center “Baranovichi” and the 43rd communications center “Vileika” – about 1,450 personnel;

– Baranovichi, Zyabrivka and Mozyr airfields – about 530 people;

– 313th Military Prosecutor’s Office of the Garrison and 484th Military Investigation Department – ​​about 20 people;

– 1405th artillery ammunition base (military unit 42707, Velyka Horozha settlement, Osypovytskyi district) – about 20 people;

– PMC “Wagner” – about 100 bodies.

These are mainly crews of air defense systems, electronic warfare and electronic warfare systems, service personnel, etc. That is, not a combat group of ground forces, which may be capable of performing tasks within the framework of combined-arms offensive operations.

But can this group increase to the number announced by Volodymyr Zelensky, how much time will it take and under what conditions?

Creation of a ROV strike group in the Republic of Belarus

I would like to note right away that, given the current intensity of hostilities in Ukraine and the losses of the Russian Armed Forces, Russia does not have the ability to quickly increase the number of strike forces in Belarus to 150,000. On the other hand, under what conditions will it be able to do so? The conditions are extremely simple: cessation of hostilities or reduction of their intensity in Ukraine.

Let’s imagine a situation in which hostilities stop completely for some reason. Russian troops, which lose 45-48 thousand people killed and wounded every month, will reduce these losses to zero or a minimum. At the same time, Russia’s monthly mobilization rate will remain within 30-40 thousand people.

Thus, by the end of May alone, Russia will have an additional 90-120 thousand people, and by the end of August – 180-240 thousand. Taking into account the basic preparatory period of the mobilized, the first batch of 90-120 thousand occupiers will be in combat readiness as early as June.

Even if a ceasefire does not occur and we simply observe a decrease in the intensity of fighting and, as a result, losses to the level of 10-15 and even 20 thousand people per month, Russia, with its current mobilization rate, will still have the opportunity to accumulate human resources and form new units. In particular, for deployment near Belarus.

Moreover, construction work is already being recorded today to expand a number of military facilities with the direct participation of the Russian military. For example, on the territory of the 1405th artillery ammunition base, military unit 42707 in the village of Velyka Horozha, Osypovichi district of the Republic of Belarus. New facilities are being built there to accommodate personnel and equipment.

Therefore, in terms of forming a group to strike at Europe, all Russia needs is a suspension of active hostilities in Ukraine. However, this does not solve the issue of equipping the units with equipment.

If Russia can meet the needs of a new strike group with people, then in terms of equipment – no. Even taking into account the termination of the DB in Ukraine, the military-industrial complex of the Russian Federation is unable to fully staff a 150,000-strong group. Yes, it will be mainly a mass of people in the form of infantry formations at the level of marching battalions in something similar to infantry corps. Some kind of rifle divisions.

However, given how the Russian command manages its troops, I do not think that this will be a serious operational-tactical problem for them, let alone a moral-ethical problem. But for countries like Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, this could become a serious threat that they will not be able to fully confront (taking into account the slowness, archaicness, and bureaucratization of NATO).

In addition, the replenishment of Russian units on the territory of Belarus at the expense of equipment that is in service and in storage in the Belarusian army is absolutely not ruled out. A similar scheme worked in 2022 both during the fighting in northern Ukraine and after the withdrawal of the Russian contingent.

Currently, logistics between Russia and Belarus work quite well, and in 2024 alone, 216 wagons with military cargo were sent from the Russian Federation to the Republic of Belarus. They included air defense systems, ammunition, and armored vehicles for the ground forces.

Conclusion

Today, Russia is suffering such serious losses in Ukraine that it cannot threaten European countries. But as soon as the level of losses begins to decrease (or is reduced to zero), this threat will begin to increase sharply.

In January, in an article on OBOZ.UA “After a year of “silence of the guns”, the Kremlin may resort to the old scenario: how real is the invasion of Europe?”, I outlined in detail the possible course of events and described what potential Russia could gain during the accumulation of forces in the absence of losses.

But taking into account all scenarios, one should also consider much shorter terms for the formation of possible strike groups that could expand the battlefield to Europe. And in general, provided there is a ceasefire or minimal losses, Russia may well form the “shock fist” that the President of Ukraine spoke about at the Munich Security Conference, and will pose a real threat not only to our country, but also to the EU.

https://war.obozrevatel.com/ukr/zagroza-z-bilorusi-naskilki-shvidko-vorog-mozhe-sformuvati-udarne-ugrupovannya-ta-skilki-zaraz-rosijskih-vijskovih-u-rb.htm