3 February 2026
The irrational faith of Russians in the well-being of the Russian economy, which arose in the wave of patriotic fervor at the beginning of the war, has sharply declined.
The index of public expectations regarding the country’s development prospects for the coming year fell to 107 points in January 2026—the lowest since the end of 2022, according to a monthly survey by the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.
The index’s 10-point monthly decline was the worst since the shock of the mobilization of the fall of 2022. At the same time, the index of expectations regarding the country’s prospects for the next five years and the index of expectations regarding personal financial situation fell to a three-year low, standing at 109 points and 104 points, respectively.
Russians’ expectations for the “level of production” in the economy (125 points) and “standard of living” (81 points) fell even lower, to their lowest since March and November 2022, respectively.
Soon after the invasion of Ukraine, consumer sentiment soared to levels never seen in the Central Bank’s statistics history. However, chronic tax hikes, inflation, and the lack of a promised victory undermined economic optimism.
According to the Central Bank, 28% of Russians complain of a worsening financial situation, and 53% of them report a “very strong” rise in prices. They are primarily concerned about rising prices for meat and poultry (48%), fish and seafood (38%), fruits and vegetables (35%), and rising utility bills (36%).
Since last year, consumer behavior has changed: people have begun saving on groceries and forgoing variety in favor of simpler, cheaper options, notes Leonid Ardalionov, Director of Analytics at NTech. As a result, for the first time in a long time, food sales have begun to decline in units, kilograms, and liters. Moscow, a showcase of consumer abundance, has been hit by a wave of bar and restaurant closures unseen since COVID-19. Meanwhile, regions of Siberia, including Khakassia, Transbaikal, Novosibirsk Oblast, and Kuzbass, seem to have returned to the 1990s with mass wage arrears for public sector workers.
Russians’ expectations for their material well-being are deteriorating, according to Levada Center experts. Their survey found that 42% believe an economic crisis is possible in the coming year—10 percentage points higher than the 2024 estimate.
Similar events occurred after the annexation of Crimea, says political scientist Abbas Gallyamov: in 2014, amid a wave of euphoria, some in focus groups actually spoke of a willingness to tighten their belts; in 2015, “passionate patriots” became rare, and by 2016, they disappeared entirely.
Although pro-Kremlin sociologists claim that people are ready to further “tighten their belts,” the reality is that Russians are fed up with the war: they’ve become disillusioned with their army and security services, and their dream isn’t victory, but a government that will boost the economy, curb inflation, and build schools and hospitals instead of shutting down the internet, Gallyamov continues: “Russians signed up for a quick victory, not an endless, nightmarish disgrace.”
“Russians signed up for a quick victory, not an endless, nightmarish disgrace.”
The good part is that the nightmare for mafia land won’t end even after the war ends. From the West, business is dead. From the east, the chinks are encroaching on Siberia and every facet of the mafia economy. And its military reputation is destroyed forever.