May 26, 2025

Spokesperson for the Ukrainian Navy, Captain 3rd Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk, in an interview with Radio NV, discusses the situation in the Black and Azov Seas and the near-total absence of the Russian fleet.

— Can you tell us what the current situation is in the Black Sea? How often do Russian ships go out, and how active are they there?

— You could say they’re not active at all—they haven’t gone out in several days. Even submarines are absent. The reasons may vary, but the fact is, we’re not observing any presence. That’s in the Black Sea.

The Azov-Black Sea region is usually viewed together. In the Azov Sea, we haven’t seen them for quite some time—months, in fact. I think soon we’ll be able to celebrate, so to speak, the anniversary of Russia’s absence from the Azov Sea.

— We used to hear a lot about the movement of Russian ships, then about their destruction, and how they’re trying to hide them. What’s the situation now? Are they always hiding in bays? Have they been moved to Novorossiysk, or somewhere near Ossetia or Abkhazia? Where are they now?

— All valuable assets have been relocated to their base in Novorossiysk. It’s overcrowded, since the base wasn’t designed to host the entire combat-ready Black Sea Fleet—even in its reduced form.

It’s relatively safer there in the military harbor, at least from drones, but they’re forced to leave the harbor when there’s a threat of missile strikes.

So they’re in a strange situation: it’s dangerous to stay in harbor, and it’s dangerous to go to sea. That’s the main dynamic now.

As for Sevastopol in Crimea, auxiliary vessels remain there—support ships that are unarmed but still part of the fleet. There are many of them, but they’re not of much interest to us; they’re not worth wasting expensive munitions or planning complex operations around.

The rest of the combat ships there include large landing ships or vessels that have lost combat readiness—either damaged before arriving for repairs or while already at the base. They pose no current threat and hold no strategic interest for us.

They’re now guarding their bases with very small units—various Mangust and Raptor-class boats. These are standard small patrol boats, used mainly for anti-sabotage duties.

That about sums up the current state of their naval bases.

There were attempts to enter the Temryuk Bay in the Azov Sea. But they’ve since cleared the Azov Sea after suffering strikes on the eastern coastline—finally realizing that Admiral Oleksiy Neizhpapa’s warnings about fire control in the area were not just words.

As for Abkhazia—they’ve been building a base there for some time. But it’s not meant for these types of vessels. It’s more of a coastal facility for Russia’s border guard—not a combat fleet. They can dock there for a time, fly their flag, make a show of it, but it’s not a base for regular deployment.

— Between 2022 and 2024, we saw many strikes on Russian ships. That intensity seems to have dropped. Why is that?

— Because they no longer go out to sea. Obviously, to hit a target, you need to see it. It’s like that saying: you can’t sell something useless unless someone buys it. Same logic applies. To hit a vessel at sea, it needs to actually be at sea.

When they do go out, it’s mostly submarines. And you can’t really hit a submarine with a naval drone. That’s the method they’ve chosen for patrolling.

But you have to understand—these vessels are complex machines. They require maintenance. It’s not endless. If a submarine is basically acting like a surface ship, constantly on patrol, it’s going to need repairs eventually.

Maybe that’s the reason for the current pause. By the way, they have four submarines in the region, three of which are equipped with Kalibr cruise missiles.

— Have you suggested to drone developers that they start working on ways to hit submarines? After all, they’re already downing planes, helicopters, and launching UAVs.

— You know, those types of weapons systems usually get discussed after they’ve been used. When the Russians start posting their sad videos, when it’s already online—then we can talk about new systems. So for now, I can’t confirm anything.

— Recently we’ve heard little about missile launches or other weapons fired from the sea. Am I right in thinking Russia is barely launching anything from the Black Sea these days—most of it is coming from the air?

— Ballistic strikes are coming from Crimea. The Iskander-M operational-tactical missile system is stationed there, and they use occupied Crimea to launch ballistic missiles. In fact, there were launches just today.

As for our naval area—ports. This spring, we’ve seen two ballistic missile strikes on port infrastructure. On March 11, four foreign civilian sailors were killed. And just last week, they launched another strike. No one was killed this time, thankfully. It’s just luck, really—because the ports are active, people are working. Previous strikes have caused casualties.

I’ve been to every one of those impact sites. Usually, there are a few fatalities—always port workers. Sometimes it’s stevedoring company staff or others, but they’re always personnel.

Regarding launches from sea platforms—this year we’re seeing roughly one instance per month. The number of missiles varies—sometimes it’s four, sometimes 10. It depends on which launch platforms are at sea and how they’re used.

There are many reasons for this. One major factor is their separation from Sevastopol. It took them half a year to bring in a crane to Novorossiysk—this “superpower”—just to load the missiles.

But overall, there are other issues tied to missile system maintenance. Their detachment from their main base does matter. The logistics and infrastructure were built over years, and reconfiguring them is no small task. Still, we assume all launch platforms are armed—more than 50 in total.

— Just to compare, how many launches were there per month in 2022–2023?

— Much more frequent. They used this weapon type a lot more when they were based in Crimea. The missiles are produced in sufficient quantities to supply the Black Sea Fleet, especially considering the current pause. Back then, yes, they used them more than once a month. I can’t even recall exact numbers—it was all part of combined attacks.

They still use airspace to launch attacks from aircraft—at tactical or operational-tactical levels. But now, their main strike platform is ground-based systems—ballistics.

Earlier, we would more often see systems like the Val or Bastion. These are anti-ship missile systems, which they repurposed to strike ground targets. I won’t call them “targets,” because what they’re hitting can’t be considered military objectives. There’s been a lull in that, too. This year, they used it only once—a P-800 Oniks launched from Crimea.

So, yes, we can say the use of naval platforms has now been reduced to a minimum.

https://english.nv.ua/russian-war/russian-navy-all-but-gone-from-black-and-azov-seas-ukrainian-navy-spokesman-says-50516960.html