07/22/2025
Against the backdrop of increasingly massive drone attacks by the aggressor country Russia on Ukraine, it seems that their production in the Russian Federation is also growing exponentially. But this is far from the case. The Russian Federation is able to produce no more than 180 drones per day, including strike “Shaheds” and decoy drones. Large-scale attacks on Ukraine involving hundreds of drones are just the result of accumulation. Both these attacks and the stories of Kremlin propagandists that Moscow can produce 2 thousand drones per day are actually IPSO and are aimed at undermining morale and breaking Ukrainians.
The US and Germany have agreed to transfer five Patriot air defense systems to Ukraine , but using expensive missiles against cheap drones is economically inexpedient. It is necessary to strengthen Ukrainian air defense with cheaper mobile short- and medium-range systems, as well as anti-aircraft drones.
This opinion was expressed by military expert Vladislav Seleznyov in an exclusive interview with OBOZ.UA.
– The first question concerns the huge number of drones that the enemy is launching over Ukraine. On the one hand, Russian propagandists talk about billions of drones that they are supposedly capable of producing. On the other hand, we see a real picture in which the number of drones during the recent attacks has really increased significantly. Do you think that this is still mostly about the hybrid, psychological component of the war? Is it possible that such large-scale attacks are a kind of time-limited action aimed at breaking the spirit of Ukrainians, and that in reality today the aggressor does not have the ability to attack Ukraine with such a huge number of drones in the long term?
– The Chinese strategist Sun Tzu said: if you are weak, show that you are strong, if you are strong, show that you are weak. This is a classic, proven by centuries of wars in the history of mankind. In principle, what the Russians are doing now is the information component of the Russian Federation’s hybrid aggression against Ukraine, which it began in 2014. Of course, the Russian Federation is not capable of attacking with drones in the amount of 400 or more units every day, because it is not capable of producing such a number of drones.
The maximum, the limit of the Russians’ industrial capabilities as of today at all sites, is 150, 170, possibly 180 drones per day. And we are talking here not only about kamikaze drones of the “Shahed-131”, “Shahed-136” type, but also about decoy drones “Parody”, “Gerber” and other modifications. That is, in fact, the ceiling of Russian capabilities is clearly not 400 per day.
Where, then, do these 400 drones that sometimes fly over our heads come from? This is a process of accumulation.
For example, last night (the night of July 20-21. – Ed.) the Russians brought in only 42 drones , launching them from two sites. That is, in dry residue they have at least 130 of these drones left in stock. Within a few days they will again accumulate drones, and when they reach an acceptable number, they will again use massive missile-drone attacks.
Therefore, it is obvious that the enemy, acting in waves, attacking our borders and positions not only on the front line, but also deep in the rear, is certainly trying to break our will to resist, to demonstrate not only to Ukraine, but to the whole world, that we have enough resources to create serious problems for the functioning of Ukraine as a state with relatively inexpensive forces and means. And in this process, they are consistent.
But, in principle, we have to assess this situation also from the point of view of the counteraction of the Ukrainian Defense Forces, and here we have some problems in terms of the effective use of kamikaze drones. I know that this issue is not yet closed for us in relation to Odessa and in general to the south of our country. Moreover, the problem is not so much in the technical support of these processes, but in the adoption of certain organizational, command, leadership decisions by military officials on the ground.
I know that this issue is currently being actively discussed, in particular on the platforms of the Office of the President. I hope that a completely rational and adequate solution to the situation, so that this system can work, will be adopted soon, because there are specialists, there are technological solutions, there is equipment.
After all, it is not difficult to analyze, using, in particular, monitoring data, that, in principle, the Russians are trying to use the same channels through which they send kamikaze drones deep into our country. The use of several combat crews, equipped with a sufficient number of anti-aircraft drones, will be able to change the course of the Russians’ actions in terms of reducing the effectiveness of attacks, in particular large-scale drone attacks.
– Germany and the United States have agreed to transfer five Patriot systems to Ukraine. On the one hand, we see massive drone attacks, which put a huge strain on our air defense. On the other hand, Ukraine will receive five Patriot systems. Do you think that our air defense system will become more resilient thanks to these Patriots, or are additional special measures to counter drones still needed?
– In December 2023, the then Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Zaluzhny, said that there is no Wunderwaffe, that is, a weapon of victory, only a complex combination and use of different types of weapons, equipment, ammunition for this weapon, technologies. The use of technologies, weapons and equipment will allow us to gain an advantage on the battlefield and, accordingly, have an advantage in war in general.
Patriot is certainly a good story, but it is not a panacea. It is also critical for us to have a sufficient number of medium- and short-range air defense systems, in particular to effectively counter swarm attacks by Russian drones. It is obvious that it is not very rational from an economic point of view to destroy a drone worth $200,000 with a Patriot missile that costs $1.5 million. Therefore, it is clear that we need other systems and means of destruction, not only anti-aircraft strike drones, but also medium- and short-range air defense systems.
Of course, we must understand that it is unlikely that the Russian Federation will abandon the option of carrying out massive missile and drone attacks. Moreover, the active use of drones by the enemy to a certain extent makes these attacks cheaper, because missiles are, in principle, expensive. A drone costs $200,000, and a Kinzhal-type missile, which the Russians have been using extremely rarely lately, costs $10 million. The figures are incomparable. Therefore, the enemy will certainly move towards the area of maximum reduction in the cost of missile and drone attacks.
And we need to find the strength and means to counter these cheap drones, which the enemy is increasingly using, with minimal effort and resources.
By the way, in terms of numbers. The other day I saw a statement by German General Christian Freuding that, supposedly, in the near future Russia will use up to 2,000 drones per day during massive attacks. But this is only possible if these drones are accumulated for two or more weeks. The Russian Federation is not able to implement this option in such volumes every day, or even much smaller ones.
– This is, of course, very good news. Another good news is that in the Sumy region, over the past two weeks, Ukrainian troops have regained control of three settlements: Andriyivka, Kindrativka, and Oleksiyivka. As far as I understand, these successes of our Defense Forces are partly due to the fact that the Kursk special operation was carried out. How do you view the prospects of this operation? Is it necessary to curtail it?
– I think that some preventive activity of the Ukrainian Defense Forces continues to take place. Why? Because the best defense is an attack. And of course, the actions of the Ukrainian army in the Kursk region were exclusively preventive in nature, because in May 2024, Putin announced the creation of the so-called buffer zone in the territory of Ukraine. We are talking about the regions that border Russia. These are Kharkiv, Sumy, Chernihiv regions. In order to most effectively counteract such intentions of the enemy, the Kursk offensive operation was carried out. Therefore, our task has not gone anywhere.
Currently, fighting is ongoing in the Kursk region. The final figure I heard from Commander-in-Chief Syrsky is that the Armed Forces of Ukraine control 90 square kilometers. There was also information that we hold several bridgeheads in the Belgorod region.
I just saw a report that the deputy governor of the Bryansk region was detained on charges of embezzling federal resources during the construction of engineering fortifications in the Bryansk region. It is quite likely that Russia is now conducting some kind of audit and sees that money was simply embezzled not only in the Kursk and Belgorod regions, but also, as we see, in the Bryansk region. Why am I saying this? It is quite likely that the Ukrainian Defense Forces are currently conducting certain measures, search and raid operations, in particular in the Bryansk region. But the fact that there are constant clashes and DRGs operating in the border area – both the enemy and ours – is obvious.
Certain measures aimed at preventing the concentration of enemy forces and assets are also constantly being carried out. Therefore, I would not talk about the curtailment of the Kursk operation and the actions of the Ukrainian army on the territory of the Russian border.
I will say more, the same transport collapses that have recently been occurring more and more frequently in the territory of the Russian Federation – both the blocking of air transport and the slowing down of the movement of military echelons in various Russian regions located near the border with Ukraine – are the result of the activities of the Ukrainian Defense Forces aimed at maximally complicating Russian logistics. After all, logistics is a resource, and a resource is a determining factor on the battlefield.
“That is, in fact, the ceiling of Russian capabilities is clearly not 400 per day.”
That’s good news, if true. However, I still wish that UKraine were given the tools to demolish those factories … and the ones making missiles, aircraft, ammunition, and the oil depots and refineries … and the kremlin.