Alina Pereverzieva

🇺🇦 Azure Data Engineer // Power BI

Matrix42

Kyiv, Kyiv City, Ukraine

🇬🇪 On August 8, 2008, Russian regular forces crossed into Georgia through the Roki Tunnel with tanks, artillery and thousands of troops. By August 11, they had pushed far beyond South Ossetia toward Gori, Senaki and Poti, while Russian aircraft struck targets across Georgia.

A ceasefire came on August 12.

On August 26, Moscow recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia as “independent” and later built permanent military bases there.

But this was YEARS in the making.

Russian involvement was already visible during the South Ossetia war in 1992. In June, Russian military helicopters intervened against Georgian armor; on June 24, Russia and Georgia signed the Sochi agreement, creating a Russian-commanded peacekeeping force.

During the 1992–93 Abkhazia war, Russian military elements aided Abkhaz separatists.

On July 1, 2002, Russia’s new citizenship law took effect and mass “passportization” expanded in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

By 2008, most residents held Russian passports — later used by Moscow to justify “protecting Russian citizens.”

Then the pace accelerated: on March 6, 2008, Russia dropped CIS sanctions on Abkhazia. On April 16, Putin ordered Russian state agencies to establish official ties with both separatist administrations. In July, Russia held the Kavkaz-2008 military exercise near Georgia.

So August 2008 was not some spontaneous rescue mission. Russia had spent years building military, political and legal leverage inside Georgia.

The INVASION was the culmination of that policy, not its beginning.

Comment from :

Vladyslav Sushko

Principal Economist at Bank for International Settlements – BIS

I remember how Russian columns were headed towards Tbilisi, but a tiny Georgian army held them back long enough for Bush Jr to exercise a real deterrent: double the US air squadron in Romania, move a carrier strike group in into the Black Sea, and land US military cargo planes in Tbilisi airport. These measure worked, Moscow backed down.

However, subsequently came the “Obama reset”, the EU Council published what is known as the Tagliavini Report (2009), kind of blaming both sides but essentially blaming Georgia for the war, and so instead of sanctions the aggressor was rewarded with Nordstream 1 and the Winter Olympics.

This illustrates the complicity in tearing up the 1975 OSCE Helsinki Final Act, which was an important backbone of European security

William R. Becker

I asked my Congressman about this why no investigation. More than once finally acknowledged that I was the only one in his district asking. Considering the positioning of Russian forces something went horribly wrong to successfully bait Putin.

Massimiliano “Max” F. 🤝

Mil. Air Ops. and C2 SME | Snr. Off. (Res.) | International OPS Veteran

We recognize that pattern and won’t appease anymore!

David Lawton

Thank you Alina, puts things in perspective…

……………..………….

In 2012, under the Georgian law of that time, Mikhail Saakashvili was required to step down after two terms as president.

He was replaced by a defacto dictatorship, which has become increasingly putlerist over the long years.

Current PM Irakli Kobakhidze leaves little doubt as to where they are headed :

Kobakhidze Accuses “Deep State” of Fueling Russophobia and Seeking Conflict with Russia

14 AUG 2026 | NEWS, POLITICS, GEORGIA

https://caucasuswatch.de/en/news/kobakhidze-accuses-deep-state-of-fueling-russophobia-and-seeking-conflict-with-russia.html

On August 12, Irakli Kobakhidze, the Georgian Prime Minister, stated at a briefing held at the government administration that, according to what he described as a new plan of the “deep state,” its local agents were allegedly seeking to prevent Russian tourists from visiting Georgia. He argued that such a development could eventually prompt the Russian government to suspend economic relations with Georgia, citing alleged Russophobic sentiments in the country as a justification.

Kobakhidze said the alleged objective was similar to what he described as previous efforts to push Georgia into opening a second front against Russia or joining sanctions imposed on Moscow. According to him, these actions were intended to weaken the Georgian economy, create hostility between Georgians and Russians, and ultimately provoke a military confrontation. He recalled that in 2022, following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, radical forces inside Georgia had called on the government to open a second front and send volunteers to Ukraine, while foreign actors had allegedly encouraged Georgia to consider military action in Sokhumi and Tskhinvali. “The goal of all this, like the opening of a second front and joining the sanctions imposed on Russia, is to collapse the Georgian economy, incite hostility between nations, and lead the processes to a military conflict,” Kobakhidze emphasized.

The prime minister urged Georgian society to avoid allowing political disagreements or what he called the plans of the “global war party” to damage relations between the Georgian and Russian peoples. He stressed that maintaining communication between the two societies and ensuring peaceful coexistence should take precedence over political considerations or the interests of informal oligarchic forces. Kobakhidze particularly highlighted the existence of mixed families in Georgia and Russia, the sizeable Georgian diaspora in Russia, and the presence of many people of Russian origin in Georgia. He therefore called for caution so that political disputes would not turn into hostility between the two populations.

Kobakhidze further argued that the current rise in what he characterized as Russophobic sentiments in Georgia was artificially generated. He claimed that, following Russia’s occupation of Georgian territories in 2008 and its recognition of Abkhazia and the so-called South Ossetia as independent states, the same actors had previously supported welcoming Russian tourists, Russian involvement in strategic sectors of the Georgian economy, and the unilateral lifting of visa requirements for Russian citizens. According to him, the subsequent promotion of anti-Russian sentiment was therefore inconsistent with their earlier positions.

“Despite the incorrect policy of the National Movement regime and the Russian government, which is a political issue and politicians and state institutions will take care of this, both Georgian and Russian societies should be especially careful not to act in favor of the interests of the global war party,” Kobakhidze stated. He maintained that any deliberate or unintentional escalation between the two societies could serve the interests of forces seeking confrontation.

Addressing the events of June 19–20, 2019, Kobakhidze claimed that the unrest and subsequent anti-Russian reactions had also been preceded by coordination involving what he called the “deep state.” He told journalists that foreign agents had been present both in the parliamentary majority and in the government until 2021, alleging that around 15 such figures had been in parliament and that foreign agents had also occupied senior government positions. According to him, the government team was eventually “completely freed” of such figures after 2021.

Kobakhidze contrasted the 2019 events with the 2016 session of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly held in Georgia, when six Russian parliamentarians visited the country. He noted that one of them had previously headed the FSB and alleged that two or three members of the delegation had violated Georgia’s Law on Occupation. Nevertheless, he argued, the visit did not generate comparable public reactions because, in his assessment, the “deep state” had no interest at the time in provoking Georgian society over the issue. He also recalled that the guest list had been agreed upon by Davit Usupashvili and the National Movement.

The prime minister similarly referred to a 2020 pre-election event organized by the National Movement, during which “Tbiliso” was performed partly in Russian. Kobakhidze argued that the incident did not provoke significant criticism and used it to support his claim that current expressions of Russophobia were politically motivated. “Because Russophobia is fake even among you, it is fake even in foreign agents, let alone the Georgian society,” he said.

Kobakhidze also addressed the issue of fuel supplies to the occupied territories of Georgia, rejecting claims that the government itself had supplied fuel there. He explained that the deliveries had been carried out by private businesses and stressed that any future measures aimed at improving conditions for people living in Abkhazia would be undertaken within the framework of Georgia’s Law on Occupation. “If we have the opportunity in the future to alleviate the situation of the population living there, Georgians or Abkhazians, we will do it in the future as well,” Kobakhidze stated.

Turning to the August 12, 2012 agreement, Kobakhidze described the document as an “act of capitulation” for Georgia. He argued that, before August 8, Georgian forces had controlled 125 villages, while the subsequent agreement effectively formalized the loss of control over those settlements. According to him, the circumstances under which the agreement was signed made it particularly unfavorable to Georgia because Russian forces were advancing while the Georgian side was on the defensive.

Kobakhidze stated that the six-point ceasefire agreement effectively relinquished the control Georgia had exercised over territories before August 8. He noted that Georgia had previously controlled around two-thirds of the inhabited territory of the Tskhinvali region, including more than 100 villages, as well as Upper Abkhazia. “What we controlled before August 8, we gave up with this agreement,” he said, adding that the agreement ultimately strengthened the legal position of the de-facto forces exercising control over those territories.

At the same time, Kobakhidze argued that Russia had failed to fulfill its own obligations under the agreement. He said that Georgia had implemented the commitments assigned to it, while Russian occupation forces remained stationed in Tskhinvali and Abkhazia, which he described as a violation of international law. According to the prime minister, the agreement contains obligations for both sides and should not be viewed solely from the perspective of Russian interests. He emphasized that Georgia’s responsibility was to continue working toward the implementation of the agreement’s provisions.

Kobakhidze also criticized the agreement’s enforcement mechanisms, arguing that they had proven insufficient. He noted that the European Union had acted as a guarantor and maintained that when an agreement between two parties is not implemented, questions inevitably arise regarding both the document itself and the effectiveness of its guarantor. “An agreement is signed so that the parties and guarantors take measures to implement it,” Kobakhidze stated.

Video here with Eng translation:

https://www.instagram.com/reel/Db_GeOnE9Bu/?igsh=MWh6Nm5wNXFpZmIyYw==