Military expert, reserve colonel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Sergei Grabsky in an interview with UNIAN spoke about a potential offensive from Belarus, the peculiarities of Iranian kamikaze drones, why Israel needs to stop its “ostrich policy” and take the side of Ukraine, and why Russia needs a war.

Sergei Maratovich, let’s start with Belarus. Just the other day, a statement was published by the Chief of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine , Alexei Gromov , that troops and aviation were being accumulated, and a probable offensive was being prepared. But they changed direction – to the west of Ukraine, in order to interrupt the logistics and supply of weapons. How likely is this offensive and how will it happen?

For us, this is not news at all. We have observed these movements, which were directly related to the build-up of strike capabilities from the northern side, for quite a long time. A series of exercises conducted by the Belarusian armed forces, constant updating of the lists of mobilized and stocks of equipment, checking the readiness of equipment up to testing armored personnel carriers to see if they can swim across rivers, and so on. Building up the control system, preparing military airfields, logistics and transport communications. All this was already obvious and it was just necessary to understand: what, when and how they were going to do.

It was also absolutely obvious that an attempt to attack Kyiv was fraught with very negative consequences. And therefore, to consider today the question that someone from the north would risk attacking Kyiv would probably be wrong. Nobody dismisses this idea in general, but it would be wrong to expect it in the short term.

As for the western direction, definitely certain measures to prepare our defense lines began to be carried out immediately after the start of military aggression, the active phase of the war. Therefore, we are not seeing anything new here, this is a logical continuation of those processes that have already taken place and were absolutely obvious.

If / when there is an offensive from Belarus, do you think our military will be able to destroy ammunition depots, for example, and military bases on the territory of Belarus?

First, offensive is a very relative concept. Of course, we always consider the most extensive option, when columns of troops will go, who will try to move towards Kovel, Sarn, Korosten and further to Kyiv, to this northern corridor. There will not necessarily be such a large-scale offensive, because it is connected, among other things, with certain nuances, namely, territorial features and the like.

If something like this happens, then any country has an absolutely legitimate right to protection. And a military target, wherever it is located, which threatens the life and health of civilians and the combat capability of the army, is an absolutely legal target and there are no obstacles to destroy this target. Therefore, yes, of course, in the event of the start of aggression, such targets on the territory of Belarus will be absolutely legitimate targets for the Ukrainian Defense Forces.

Iranian kamikaze drones: how they differ from others

About drones. Ukroboronprom partially presented a new Ukrainian drone, it has even been nicknamed the “flying hymars” . If we compare them with the Shahed-136, which Russia purchased from Iran, are at least some approximate characteristics known?

You know not. We saw only some incomprehensible construction. What is it, what stage is it in…

We had a drone, “The Turtle Dove “, which was developed in 2016, but due to objective and subjective reasons, the development of this drone stopped in 2019. And now I can’t even imagine at what stage this development is. One thing I can say is that the period of research and development work often takes from 5 to 7 years. Therefore, this break that we allowed is what we are now paying for.

Therefore, it would be simply wrong to compare them with “Shahed”, because they have a different principle of operation. The “gorlitsa” is not a “kamikaze”, it is a drone that could deliver a certain amount of ammunition over a long distance, such an improved “brother” of the “Bayraktar”, with a longer range. How much ammunition it can carry is little known, since the work was not completed.

Is everything so hopeless? Not at all. There is a prospect of rapid development and creation of production by Baykar. But not “Bayraktarov” – today these drones are outdated. If back in February-March we heard how they were used against stationary columns of troops, then for the last 2-3 months I have not even heard about what kind of strikes and how effectively they deliver.

But this does not mean that everything has stopped and everything is so bad. The Turks have already announced the creation of two fundamentally new types of UAVs – Akıncı and Kizilelma. And these drones are already a new word. Why do we need to reinvent the wheel when we can be more actively involved in the creation and production of these particular drones. This will already be a breakthrough and Ukraine will take a serious position in the UAV production market .

“Shaheds” are a completely different type of weapon. This is a weapon of terror that can be made in artisanal conditions. When my colleagues and I sorted out what it consists of, there was at first a state of shock: “And this is what they want to scare us with?”. And then we understand – yes.

A weapon of terror is not something produced in stationary conditions by high-tech processes, but something that is available for manufacturing in artisanal conditions. “Shahed” is a reflection of this “handicraft”, but at the same time it has a very high terrorist threat.

Therefore, it is unacceptable to compare them even with our potential Gorlice, and even more so with Akıncı, Kizilelma or Bayraktar TB2.

But “Shaheds” remain a serious threat to the civilian population, since the range of their flight and the specifics of delivering ammunition to the target are quite difficult for our air defense systems. Air defense fights against the goals for which it was created, but not against the new ones, which are these kamikaze drones. We must look with a greater perspective. If we can’t guarantee to physically destroy each of these drones, then why don’t we consider destroying, for example, the places where they are produced, stored and the places they are launched from. And for this we will need a new generation of drones.

The position of Israel in the war of the Russian Federation against Ukraine

Israel had already launched strikes in Iran when it learned that it supplied the Russian Federation with these drones. What other measures can Israel take? Moreover, some negotiations were held with him, but he still maintains the position “No, we will not give weapons to Ukraine.” After all, there is a threat that Iran will supply ballistic missiles.

Israel can take one measure that will work for them and for us. They must realize that in the end we are at war with a common enemy. And they must stop their “ostrich policy” – not to transfer weapons to Ukraine. Because they have to decide which side they are on.

These are the passages that we are worried that Israeli weapons will fall into the hands of the Iranians … Let them look at the Americans, at the British, at the entire civilized world, which supplies us with quite serious types of weapons in a full range and no one is afraid that these weapons will fall into the hands of the opposite side. And believe me, it would be very interesting for Russia to get the same HIMARS, Pantsir howitzers and other types of weapons.

Therefore, this Israeli policy is absolutely untenable. And all they can do is coordinate our efforts with them on joint, fairly active actions, each on his own sector of the front. Israel must understand that if Ukraine falls, it will not have to live, no one will save it, it will cease to exist.

Air defense efficiency of Ukraine

Regarding the effectiveness of our air defense. Alesey Gromov said that the effectiveness of our air defense is 64%. What, in your opinion, has increased its effectiveness?

First of all, we need to understand what numbers we started with. An air defense system is considered effective enough if it has an efficiency percentage of 25-30%.

What we have achieved through a whole range of measures is simply a phenomenal result. Of course, this is a physical build-up of air defense systems. In addition, the physical capabilities of destroying targets have expanded. That is, we have a larger range of weapons. We are building up the system of electronic warfare, especially for the destruction of unmanned objects. Here we are moving on to the next phase, when our air defense system will be even more powerful due to physical, intellectual buildup, receiving intelligence information that helps us immediately respond to missile launches or aircraft takeoffs.

This complex, together with the system for ensuring operation and maintenance, allows us to say that the Ukrainian air defense system has significantly increased its effectiveness. At least three times what I said.

Well, as far as I understand, it will continue to increase?

Yes, definitely. You need to understand that the world is faced with something new. The world has not been preparing for any war at all for the past 30 years, and for the first time it has faced such a complex problem of using both manned and unmanned aerial vehicles in a military conflict. Never before in the history of human civilization has there been such an episode when, for more than half a year, a country would be flattened by cruise missiles of such power. Of course, one can recall the carpet bombings of World War II, but this is a slightly different situation and a different philosophy of war. But no one saw such a blow.

Therefore, it is now in the interests of the entire civilized community to create such an integrated system that could withstand existing and potential threats.

Here we are talking about the threats of using Iranian-made ballistic missiles as well. Any Russian missile is essentially a deep modernization of Soviet missile systems. And the air defense systems that were created in the West are able to deal with these missiles.

Iranian missiles are something similar, but a little different. And against them, such powerful air defense systems were not specially created, capable of completely covering the whole country. We are facing such a challenge for the first time when a new type of weapon begins to influence the development of systems to counter these weapons. This issue can certainly be resolved, since the economic potential of the Western countries and those who help us is many times higher than Iran and Russia combined.

Yes, we can resist it, yes, it will take time, yes, there will be losses, but we don’t have much choice. And again, the sooner Israel realizes this, the fewer victims we will suffer, the fewer victims there will be in Israel, and this nightmare will soon end.

How should Israel act now?

Today, Israel must clearly define who it is with, who it is against; and join the full-scale process of ensuring our now collective security.

It must be understood that, having honed its skills in Ukraine, the political regime of Iran will begin to massively use missiles against Israel. And believe me, after the Ukrainian experience, it will be very difficult for Israel to resist massive attacks, especially knowing that Hezbollah alone has thousands of missiles at its disposal. If they decide to massively launch it, and after the hypothetical defeat of Ukraine they get a second wind, I will not bet even a shekel on the existence of Israel.

Does Israel, and the world in general, have air defense systems that can shoot down ground-to-ground ballistic missiles with a range of 300-700 kilometers?

Certainly there is. But you voiced the figure of 64%, I named the figure of 25%. And this figure shows that out of 10 missiles, six can be shot down, even seven. But three missiles will fly. Again, returning to Israel, if in the conditions of Ukraine three missiles that fall at a great distance, in principle, cannot give any serious effect, then in the case of Israel it will be a disaster. And if we are talking not about 10 missiles, but about 100, and this is already 30 missiles that have flown? Even the well-known “Iron Dome” does not guarantee the repulsion of all air attacks for which it is designed, that is, single-flying unguided missiles. And such weapons as ballistic missiles, which have a range of action from 300 to 2000 kilometers, not a single air defense system in the world is capable of repelling a massive attack.

And how long should such a massive attack with ballistic missiles be prepared, as, for example, was on October 10?

From two weeks to a month. Under the conditions, I emphasize, of Russia. Because here you still need to understand the factor of distance and transportation. These missiles had to be taken from warehouses, certain measures had to be taken to check their ability to fly in principle. Because even after checking, there is a certain percentage of missiles that do not reach the target. And as my colleagues say, lately missile launches from the direction of Crimea have been carried out over the Black Sea, because a certain percentage of these missiles simply fall into the water after leaving the rails.

That is, this is a long-term process if we are talking about Russian missiles. Or rather, not even Russian, but Soviet ones, which have been in storage for 50 years. Therefore, depending on a number of factors – storage conditions, range, transportation, readiness of carriers, and so on, the preparation period can take from two weeks to a month.

And in the case of Iranian ballistic missiles?

Here the question is different. Optionally, the Iranians will supply finished objects. They can supply the components of this object. And Russia has enough power to create a warhead for this missile, that is, to use its own explosives. And here the problem is where the enterprises for assembling these missiles will be located, how these elements will be transported and whether they will be transported at all. Because the specificity of these Iranian missiles lies in their sufficient simplicity, and Russia’s technological potential is sufficient to produce these missiles locally. In fact, Iran can say with “honest eyes” that “we did not transfer any missiles”, but they transferred technologies.

And even the information that the Iranians are now teaching the Russians in Crimea how to operate the Shaheds, then who will forbid the Iranians to be present at the launches of these missiles, and, so to speak, to test them in a real conflict.

Therefore, this is not only a Ukrainian problem, it is becoming a global one.

Sanctions against Iran adopted by the European Union, will they help somehow?

Any sanction that is applied has a delayed effect. That is, if the sanction is applied today, then the effect of this sanction will begin to work in a year or two. The Iranians, due to the fact that they have been under sanctions since 1979, they have gained some immunity to them.

Sanctions only for Iran will have minimal effect, and not today and not tomorrow. Consolidated sanctions of the entire world community against the aggressors could have an effect.

The simplest example is the sale of hydrocarbons. Russia continues to receive income from their sale, which allows it to calmly conduct hostilities. And until the world refuses to supply the aggressor with money, the war will continue.

And it is not yet known what we may face in this war. I’m not talking about high-tech weapons like lasers. But even ordinary iron is enough to turn life on the planet into a nightmare.

And what should be the actions of Western partners, the same Israel, in order to somehow minimize the consequences of cooperation between Iran and Russia?

Three directions:

• Political. That is, the political blockade of existing regimes, based on the awareness of their danger to world civilization.
• Economic. The introduction of severe sanctions that will limit any trade with these countries.
• Military. It must be understood that without the destruction of the enemy’s military potential, this issue will not be resolved in the near future.

Therefore, when we talk about delivering these strikes, political, economic and military, they must be consolidated. After all, as we have already said, European sanctions in isolation from other players have a very limited effect.

The situation on the fronts: Lugansk and Kharkov

Let’s move on to our fronts. Now a lot of attention is riveted to the south of Ukraine, to Kherson, but let’s first talk about the Luhansk direction, Svatovo, Kremennaya, how are things going there?

The enemy, realizing the exceptional importance of this line, which I would extend from Svatovo north to Troitsky, is feverishly trying to create any fortifications on it and carry out any actions that could slow down or stop the advance of the Ukrainian troops. And the desperate counterattacks of the Russians near Kremennaya really slow down our progress.

Our troops must regroup and strike, fragmenting the enemy defenses. How successful it will be… Well, the time factor works both against us and against the Russians. In the short term, when the Russian occupation troops do not yet have enough resources to hold back our offensive, we have every opportunity to break through, bypassing Svatovo and displacing the enemy, and create the prospect of advancing to Starobelsk.

And how it will work out – we’ll see. It is impossible to consider the dynamics of this front without understanding that Russia is hanging over us and that a flank attack could be delivered at any moment.

Therefore, the situation is quite complicated there, but Ukraine has certain prospects for success.

In the Kharkiv direction, by the way, NSDC Secretary Oleksiy Danilov said that there could be another offensive, and three lines of defense had already been built there. That is, the line of defense continues to line up, and is another offensive possible from there?

Yes, you definitely need to understand this. Everyone understands the exceptional importance of Kharkov, which is why the enemy simply irons this city, creating a “death zone” in this direction. And this is a big problem, the enemy will continue to act in the same manner. Therefore, we are not talking about lines of defense, but about fortified points.

Understanding who we are dealing with, we follow the so-called principles of mobile defense. That is, defense against an enemy that surpasses you at times – in number and quantity of weapons and military equipment. I always repeat the phrase, it is not mine, but I really like it: “Russia is not as strong as it seems; but not as weak as we would like it to be.” You need to understand this. It has serious potential, even if it is not of the highest quality, not of the 21st century, but this potential is there.

Partial mobilization added this potential?

Objectively yes. One can “snort” a lot and often about the fact that the quality of this mobilized resource is insufficient, but here it is not about quality, but about quantity. There are just a lot of them. It’s one thing to fight against 10 enemies, and another thing when there are 100 of them. And for each of these enemies there must be some kind of means of destruction.

Well, perhaps we have a different tactic, which would take into account the number of the enemy?

That is why we are talking about tactics of mobile defense. One that has proven itself excellently, and we see the enemy’s unsuccessful attempts to break through.

But their attempts at indentation have had some success. The enemy is pressed in on the Bakhmut, Maryinsky, Avdeevsky directions, simply creating in front of him the so-called “lunar landscape”, on which it is physically impossible to defend. Everything that is there is simply demolished, there are some fragments of some buildings, a huge number of craters and funnels. To make it clear, in Popasnaya or Novotoshkovsky, the highest height of the remaining remains of the walls is twenty meters; behind them it is impossible to hide and conduct defensive battles. There’s nowhere to hide. Scorched earth.

Is there any analogue in the history of waging a war the way Russia is waging it now?

No. Russia has always waged such wars since the 16th century. In their theory of warfare, nothing has changed – to destroy everything around, and everything.

Including your own manpower, that is, a soldier?

And they never spared their soldiers. Russia is a typical colonial empire, where there are two metropolises, Moscow and St. Petersburg, and everything else is colonies. The metropolises have never cared how these colonies live as long as they provide some kind of resources – human, material, financial. They don’t care what happens there.

Why is Russia at war?

The question that every Ukrainian asks himself is: what do they need from Ukraine? From a military point of view, or some other. This war is what?

In order to produce nothing, at the behest of a pike, to become the owner of some material resources, and using, defiling these resources, move on in search of the next resources.

So they’re just parasites, right?

Yes. And you know, when they ask me what Russia is, I say: look at Vasnetsov’s painting “Three Heroes”, what do you see there. And it explains everything. In this picture, we see three fattened rednecks hung with weapons, who look in different directions, as if to grab something. And the main question is what is behind them. And there – a huge nothing, behind them is a desert. And these goons are well-fed – this is the essence of all Muscovy – wherever they can grab something.

Russia today is a country that cannot make a ballpoint pen in a closed cycle. They import nails. But ambition overrides all of that. And these ambitions are heard, in the brain and in the hearts of the vast majority of the inhabitants of this territory.

Therefore, if you ask them the question “why?”, the answer will be: “why do you live better than we do, why do you need this?”. That’s the whole answer, everything is at the level of very primitive reflexes.

The situation in the Kherson direction

Let’s move on to Kherson. It is no longer a secret that Gauleiters, collaborators are being evacuated, and they are also offering to evacuate ordinary citizens to the left bank. And plus the so-called “martial law” announced by Putin. What is happening in Kherson, are they preparing for something?

According to my information, Ukraine has concentrated enough resources, and it is obvious that it will try to liberate this territory. Therefore, realizing the critical limitations of evacuation opportunities later, the Russians are trying to act in their usual manner: they rob everything that can be robbed, they take out everything that can be taken out.

And you hooked on a very interesting topic – the evacuation of the population. This is also a robbery of potential. And do you know why? Because I specifically looked through, studying collaborator resources, it was said there that the Russian government is ready to provide housing on the territory of the Russian Federation. And this is the robbery of Ukraine, because people who fall for this offer will no longer be able to return home. They will be driven there, as we say, where “Makar did not feed the calves”, in order to replenish the resource of depressed regions. No one will offer them an apartment in Moscow or St. Petersburg, by no means.

This is total robbery. Systematic, phenomenal, polished robbery of anything and everything. Everything that can be stolen, everything that can be stolen, including human potential.

They understand that if the Ukrainian army pushes a little harder in the short term, they will not be able to oppose anything. And the only thing they can do is try to save manpower.

Another important aspect is why they organize this evacuation. From a military point of view, they already know perfectly well how we will act. If they begin to evacuate local residents, and between cars or buses with people they will put trucks with the military or move columns on foot, we will not shoot at them.

That is, this is another war crime – the use of civilians as human shields. There is not a single war crime that Russian troops have not committed on the territory of Ukraine.

During the “evacuation” of the population, roughly speaking, each Russian soldier can hide behind at least two other civilians, and we will not shoot at them. That’s the problem. Therefore, they do not act chaotically, they act absolutely consciously, they act clearly, cynically, criminally.

How will they act when our troops approach Kherson and begin to de-occupy it?

I think that there will already be a purge system in place.

The Russian army is good when it relies on a clearly vertical command and control system. If you read our reports, we specifically indicate on a separate line how many command posts we destroyed. That is, when the army breaks into fragments, it will cease to be stable. The Russians do not know how to fight in isolation. The level of commanders, the level of independence in decision-making there is zero. The same applies to junior officers, whose losses are serious enough not to overlap.

Therefore, to say that “we will fight for every house there,” as they did in the case of Severodonetsk or Lisichansk, this will not happen, they will simply give up or flee. Those who do not run away, of course, individual resistance can be like rats driven into a corner.

Therefore, the recommendation for the civilians of Kherson is not to become a human shield and find a shelter where you can somehow protect yourself from bullets. There will still be victims. But counting on some kind of organized resistance is not.

Quiet in the Zaporozhye direction, but the other day something was also evacuated from Energodar, it is clear that it was loot, but some military trucks there also drove out and took something out. This may also be the beginning of a flight, or did they settle down in Energodar at the Zaporizhzhya NPP and will not leave until the last moment, blackmailing our military with a nuclear power plant, which, of course, cannot be shot at?

You know, it depends on the situation that will develop exactly on the right bank – Kherson, Berislav, Novaya Kakhovka. These are the keys to all subsequent actions. With access to the steeper right bank of the Dnieper, we get the opportunity to keep fairly large areas under fire control, including exits from the Crimea, which will significantly weaken the enemy’s ability to hold positions in that direction and, together with frontal pressure, there is a prospect that we can break through. Because if you keep under control the supply lines coming out of the Crimea, the grouping of Russian troops in the left-bank Kherson region and the part of the Zaporozhye region coastal to the Dnieper will become practically defenseless. That is, it will be possible to destroy it and destroy it methodically, without fear of any counterattacks there.

Therefore, they are taking certain measures in order to at least take out part of the loot with the prospect that active hostilities can unfold like this. Even the transfer of a certain contingent of troops there will be limited due to the fact that there is such a thing as a “delivery shoulder”. That is, if we drive troops far enough into the field, and the “delivery shoulder” does not correspond to the capabilities, these troops simply will not physically be able to hold this territory, that is, they will be forced to retreat. And this will be a very serious strategic blow to the Russian military machine.

Winter, what surprises can it prepare for the occupiers and difficulties for the Ukrainian army?

You know, I have said many times that every season of the year has its difficulties and its prospects. That is, what are the prospects for the occupiers? Their forward lines, their fortified points become visible to our reconnaissance assets, and we can choose our targets. Their technique becomes vulnerable, because with the lack of greenery, there will simply be nowhere to hide it.

On the other hand, you need to understand that with the freezing of the soil, the actions of armored and mechanized units can be more intense.

On the third hand, burrowing into such soil, that is, creating a sane line of defense, is also quite difficult.

There are many factors, therefore, I try to avoid this topic, because, well, winter, we had Debaltseve, we had, in the end, our February-March, it was also winter, so what? Nothing. Each time of the year has its own characteristics of warfare. And to say that there someone will run more slowly from a projectile flying at him is not, it will not.

Sergei Maratovich, intelligence chief Kirill Budanov, in one of his interviews, said that Kherson could be de-occupied before the New Year, but Crimea is even closer to summer, the end of spring, summer somewhere. Can you agree with this?

No I can not. Well, firstly, I do not have the amount of information that will allow me to say with confidence that these time parameters can be met.

Secondly, you need to understand that there are three components of war: money, money and again money. Russia has this money, Russia has enough resources to conduct military operations. I am not yet taking into account the internal political situation, the difficulties of the economic situation, because this is a more distant prospect. They have a certain cushion, such a “fat”, which allows them to fight. Public opinion in Russia is clearly set on the continuation of the war today.

Therefore, understanding the pace of building up our efforts, including the supply of weapons and military equipment, I have serious doubts that we will be able to secure such a preponderance in forces and means that will allow us to operate unhindered in any direction and carry out these tasks.

Offensive is another philosophy of war. These are very serious expenses, not comparable with defensive actions. This is a different level of troop training, a different level of interaction and support for these troops. So I just imagine this scope of tasks and have doubts about what we will complete.

Again, there are factors that we are discussing with you today, but we do not take them into account. What will happen if Iran really starts supplying ballistic missiles en masse? Should this factor be taken into account? Yes, definitely. Will this lead to increased losses and destruction of Ukraine’s potential? Yes, definitely. Will it slow down the advance? Yes, definitely.

Let’s at the very end about international history. British Defense Secretary Ben Wallace and his recent emergency trip to the US on Ukraine issues. What can she talk about?

Well, you know, this is a very difficult question. I don’t know what the allies can agree on, but I think that we are talking about some tactical details, that is, agreeing on the volumes and range of assistance that is being transferred to Ukraine.

Perhaps we can talk about the distribution of responsibility for the training of Ukrainian military contingents. If Britain has taken over, for example, the training of our mechanized units, the Americans can probably take over the training of our technical specialists.

You need to understand that the time is not far off when we will be forced to switch to Western standards of weapons and military equipment. But any standard does not make sense if you do not have a prepared system for ensuring the operation of these standards. Perhaps we are talking about the training of some military specialties, for example, the same HIMARS operators, pilots, tankers, and so on. That is, there can be a lot of questions. I don’t want to create any conspiracy theories about this. Understanding that we will not be left without help is obvious to me.

Sergey Maratovich, I am not a journalist now, I want to ask you as a mother, as an ordinary Ukrainian citizen who is currently in Kyiv. How much longer do you think?

For a long time. You see, there is such a thing as the nation’s pain threshold. Well let’s do it. Even if we assume that we destroyed 65 thousand of the enemy and the ratio was 1:6.5, then it was 10 thousand of our guys who lost.

The mental factor, the ideological factor and the setting of the Russian population, the specifics of the geography and economic geography of the regions, they can score a million. Their resources, you know, ours say 25-27 million, it’s not true. 10% of the population is always taken into account. That is, 14 million, of which 10% is 1.4 million. They have now scored only 200 thousand. They can round up a bunch of people under arms. Yes, this pile will be unusual.

We take a conditional man from some conditional Altai Territory, who is unemployed, the only source of income is a grandmother who receives a pension. There is no work, and then such luck falls on him – money, and you can even rob. Because they are firmly convinced that they will live. Even his wife, that he will go somewhere and die… He will die anyway, he can die under the fence, but the family will not get anything. Or he will die and the family will receive money, and five million rubles is a normal salary, plus benefits for children, plus benefits for everything. In their nightmare life, this is a huge plus. So they will go and they will kill.

But will we still win?

And we have already won. We won. He lost the war on March 2. But, as I said, Hitler lost World War II on September 1, 1941. But there were still 4 years of terrible battles and millions of victims. But they have already lost. They don’t stand a chance.

Alexander Topchiy, Tala Kalatay

(C)UNIAN 2022