05/10/2024 – Translated from Ukrainian via Google and OFP

Russia’s war against Ukraine has become the largest in Europe since World War II. In the third year since the start of the full-scale invasion, the Russian occupation forces have lost as much equipment in Ukraine as a number of EU countries – NATO members have never had and never will have, and in some categories its losses are greater than those of all European countries combined.

So what about Europe’s readiness for war with a country like Russia ? Let’s figure it out.

Losses of the occupiers

Before considering this issue in detail, it is worthwhile to first provide data on the losses of the Russian occupation forces according to two versions – the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and verified data. I note that the verified data differs from the real ones by 2-3 times, since they are based solely on the loss of enemy equipment confirmed in photos or videos.

According to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the Russian occupiers lost in Ukraine:

tanks – 7429;

AFV – 14,281;

cannon artillery – 12,340;

MLRS – 1058;

Air defense – 783;

aviation – 349;

helicopters – 325;

motor transport – 16,618;

special equipment – 2027.

According to verified data (photo and video evidence), the DOM was lost in Ukraine:

tanks – 3000;

BBM – 6279;

barrel artillery – 1209;

MLRS – 373;

Air defense – 455;

aviation – 109;

helicopters – 137;

motor transport – 3253;

special equipment – ​​500.

These indicators will make it possible to assess Europe’s capabilities to resist Russian occupation forces – if a full-scale invasion occurred in 2022 not in Ukraine, but in EU countries. And also, and this is a very important point, if the active phase of the war in Ukraine is frozen for a year, two or three, which will allow Russia to accumulate potential.

DOM potential in Ukraine

According to a rough estimate today (in the third year of a full-scale war), the potential of the Russian occupiers is:

tanks – up to 3500;

AFV – about 8600;

barrel artillery – more than 5300;

MLRS – 1300.

Due to the high intensity of hostilities, this number does not have a significant increase and the military-industrial complex of the Russian Federation works primarily on monthly compensation for losses, rather than on accumulation. The increase in the number of mechanized components, depending on the intensity of hostilities, can be up to 10% per month.

European military potential

In 2014, when the hybrid invasion of Ukraine by Russian troops began, an audit of the Bundeswehr was conducted in Germany due to the emergency situation – and the result horrified the average burghers. The German army turned out to be completely ineffective. Most of the equipment required repairs, and the training of military personnel left much to be desired.

The full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 forced almost all European countries to conduct a similar audit, and it only confirmed the fact that the EU armed forces were not ready for active combat operations. Of the hundreds of units of equipment of one class or another, only dozens were combat-ready, and the total amount of equipment, even for the largest and most combat-ready armies, regularly included in the TOP, would not even be enough to hold the ROV on its borders for not weeks, but several days.

An example is the German army, which was considered one of the most combat-ready armies in Europe:

tanks – a little more than 300;

Armored fighting vehicles – more than 2800 (wheeled and tracked chassis);

cannon artillery (self-propelled guns) – about 300;

MLRS – up to 50.

In general, the tank component in most Central and Western European countries is an extremely deficient branch of the military. In the UK this is 200 Challenger 2, in France – about the same number of Leclerc. The total tank potential of the three largest armies in Europe is less than a thousand, while in Ukraine alone the ROV lost about 7.5 thousand main battle tanks (MBT) and have 3,500 in service!

In turn, depending on the intensity of hostilities and losses of military personnel, the monthly increase in MBT among the Russians may correspond to the entire tank potential of France or Great Britain.

The situation with artillery is no better. The UK, for example, has just over 200 barrel artillery systems. Germany has about 300. France has a little over 100 artillery systems. This is nothing compared to the overall artillery potential of the ROV and the ability of the Russian military-industrial complex to restore hundreds of units of artillery systems every month.

In fact, the potential of the Russian military-industrial complex is to send 5-6 times more artillery units to the combat zone than are in service with France.

conclusions

In the third year of a full-scale war, European countries are not demonstrating a dramatic increase in the production of military equipment, which would correspond by at least a third to the potential for restoring the Soviet legacy of the Russian military-industrial complex. The leading armies of Europe have significantly less potential than Russia, and even the top armed forces alone would not have held out against the invasion of the ROV – without collective support.

In fact, the ratio of potential and the critical imbalance in the capabilities of NATO countries to accumulate resources demonstrate that with a targeted strike by the ROM on one of the EU countries, it will simply be impossible to maintain a deep breakthrough of the European coalition. And the fact that Russian troops in Ukraine have lost more than half of their potential is precisely what saves Europeans from an unenviable fate.

Nevertheless, the fact that the main combat potential of the ROV was eliminated in Ukraine does not mean that Russia has exhausted its ability to recover and continue hostilities. And not only against Ukraine.

The material was prepared as part of the joint project OBOZ.UA and the Information Resistance group.

https://war.obozrevatel.com/kovalenko-v-ukraine-likvidirovan-osnovnoj-boevoj-potentsial-rov-odnako-evropa-do-sih-por-ne-gotova-k-vojne-s-rossiej.htm