12/22/2023 – Translated from Ukrainian via Google and OFP

According to the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces , Russian occupation forces have already lost more than 8,100 pieces of artillery in Ukraine. And according to a number of estimates, in the combat zone in Ukraine, the ROV has at least 4.5 thousand artillery systems. At first glance, Russia’s artillery potential is inexhaustible and is constantly being restored. But this is only at first glance.

Read more about this in the material of the joint project OBOZ.UA and the Information Resistance group.

Record months

During 2023, several records were set for the destruction of Russian artillery. First it was June, when the Ukrainian Defense Forces eliminated 688 artillery systems, in August – 691 artillery systems, and in September an absolute record was set in the modern history of wars and conflicts – 947 units! Never before in the last 30 years of modern history have so many artillery systems been destroyed within a month in one war/conflict!

https://videopress.com/v/FpcDtU7f?resizeToParent=true&cover=true&preloadContent=metadata&useAverageColor=true

Nevertheless, the Russians continue to saturate the combat zone (CA) with artillery, compensating for losses and even seemingly increasing their potential.

Before delving deeper into the essence of the issue, I note that the Russian military-industrial complex has the ability to send an average of 350 units of towed cannon artillery to the DB zone per month, +/- 10-20%, which depends on the degree of maintainability of the systems coming for restoration.

This is an important point in understanding what the Russians mostly have to fight with now and what prospects they have for maintaining such a level of saturation of the combat zone with artillery systems.

I would also like to draw your attention to the fact that from March 2022 to April 2023, an average of 200 artillery systems of the Russian occupation forces were destroyed every month. That is, for 14 months in a row, the Russian military-industrial complex had the opportunity to send up to 150 artillery systems to the database zone, not just as compensation for zero, but to accumulate it as a plus. In total this is up to 2,100 trunks.

In turn, records for the destruction of Russian artillery began to be set in May, in increments to the statistical average:

– May +350

-– June +488 (-150)

– July +477 (-150)

– August +491 (-150)

– September +747 (-150)

– October +573 (-150)

– November +481 (-150)

Thus, over the past six months, 3,607 units of artillery systems were destroyed. Taking into account the growth 14 months before the peak values ​​of annihilation, 1,507 remains in the minus. But with a full growth cycle for six months, this is 900 and the remainder of the minus is 600.

But an important point in all these calculations is the initial indicator of the artillery systems with which the Russian occupiers entered a full-scale war against Ukraine.

As of February 23, 2022, that is, on the eve of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the ROV included about 110 separate divisions, 17 regiments, and 15 brigades. If we take into account artillery systems from 100 mm, then there are at least 3,100 barrels.

The basis was the units of the Western Military District (WMD), the predominant part of which were the most modern self-propelled guns “Msta-S” in the Russian army more than thirty years ago. The Southern Military District (SMD) at that time represented what the entire Russian artillery component was turning into – towed howitzers.

And now the most interesting thing: what do ROVs have today?

Potential

Russian troops inherited from the USSR a wide range of artillery systems, the number of which amounts to tens of thousands of units, and it seems at first glance that this supply is simply inexhaustible. But in reality, this is not entirely true.

Firstly, today in Russia there is no full-fledged serial production of artillery barrels, and what exists does not allow the mass and serial production of artillery systems on a scale one-tenth comparable to the scale of Soviet production.

Currently, the prevailing part of Russian artillery in the combat zone is artillery removed from storage, restored and sent to war. Moreover, more and more of them are towed howitzers, since they are much easier, faster and more can be restored. In turn, the share of self-propelled guns is becoming smaller, which affects the quality of fire, mobility, and counter-battery warfare.

But still, what is the approximate potential of Russia today in terms of artillery?

D-20 (152 mm) – about 100 (about 1 thousand in storage)

D-30 (122 mm) – about 450 (about 4 thousand in storage)

Msta-B (152 mm) – about 450 (about 550 in storage)

Giatsint-B (152 mm) – about 100 (about 1 thousand in storage)

Self-propelled gun Gvozdika 2S1 (122 mm) – about 400 (about 1.2 thousand in storage)

Self-propelled gun Akatsiya 2S3 (152 mm) – about 700 (about 800 in storage)

Self-propelled gun Giatsint 2S5 (152 mm) – about 150 (about 500 in storage)

Self-propelled gun Msta-S 2S19 (152 mm) – about 400 (about 150 in storage)

Self-propelled gun Pion 2S7 (203 mm) – about 100 (about 100 in storage)

SAMU Nona-S 2S9 (120 mm) – about 300 (about 500 in storage)

SAMU Nona-SVK 2S23 (120 mm) – about 30 (0 in storage)

SAMU Tulip 2S4 (240 mm) – about 30 (150 in storage)

This list does not include 120 mm 2B11 type mortars, 82 mm BM-37, 100 mm MT-12 Rapier anti-tank gun, 85 mm D-44 divisional gun and others. The category in storage indicated the quantity that is approximately suitable for restoration and can be brought to a combat-ready state.

That is, approximately the same number of barrels remains at the disposal of the ROM as have been destroyed since 2022. But there is a nuance: there is quantity, but there is no quality.

As I noted above, the share of towed artillery in the Russian troops is growing, as it is the easiest to restore and quickly compensate for losses. But at the same time, it is faster and destroyed, since it has a disadvantage in mobility, firing range and accuracy, which negatively affects the counter-battery performance.

The lack of standardized 152 mm ammunition is also becoming a problem. Few people know, but the 152-mm towed howitzer 2A36 “Gyacinth-B” uses a specific separate-case-loading shot, which differs from the 152-mm shots for “Msta-S”, D-20, etc. That is, the restoration of ROV artillery depends on the availability of one or another type of ammunition with which it can be proportionally provided.

Conclusion

All of the above factors indicate that Russia, at least by 2024, will still have the opportunity to systematically compensate for losses in artillery using Soviet reserves, but even they are not endless. In addition, not all stocks are subject to restoration, and can also be provided with ammunition.

Russian artillery potential is now on the verge of resource depletion. If the monthly rate of destruction of Russian cannon artillery remains more than 350 units, the Ukrainian army will be able to create an irreversible critical shortage of ROV artillery systems by the end of 2024.

But to create such conditions, tools are needed, the receipt of which directly depends on stable supplies of everything necessary by international partners.

https://war.obozrevatel.com/ni-odin-ne-ostanetsya-beznakazannyim-zelenskij-predupredil-rossijskih-voennyih-letchikov-video.htm