Vladimir Putin is often portrayed in Western media as a master strategist and shrewd tactician. Russia’s recent threats to invade Ukraine and disrupt post-Cold War European security have been received in a similar vein.

         

 “Checkmate,” a CNN opinion piece last month proclaimed. “Putin has the West cornered.” The Russian president appears to have seized the initiative, controlling the crisis narrative and forcing NATO leaders to play by his rules.

       

It’s true that there are few obvious positive outcomes for President Biden or U.S. allies in the current standoff. The crisis is partially a consequence of mishandling Putin’s conduct over the past eight years: He has been engaged in a political war against the West, seeking to damage the United States and its allies at every turn.

         

Western powers have failed to push back effectively, offering “resets” and accommodations in the hope that he would change. Instead, Putin has continued his worldwide assault on U.S. interests. He appears to believe that America is weak and inward-focused after decades of war, a recent defeat in Afghanistan and domestic political chaos.

        

But while it may look like Putin is in charge now, his actions threaten to imperil the very things he claims to care about. His belligerence and risk-taking could easily lead to exactly what Russia is trying to head off: an increased U.S. presence in Europe, a strengthened and re-energized NATO, and a forever Western-oriented Ukraine. An invasion might even jeopardize what matters most to Putin: political power and control at home.

       

Threatening to invade Ukraine will help Putin at home. Actually invading won’t.

       

Most experts agree that Putin’s primary goals are pushing the United States out of Europe, dismantling NATO and ensuring that countries on his periphery are Kremlin vassals. Upon taking office in 2009, NATO Secretary General Anders Rasmussen met Putin and stated that he was committed to increased cooperation with Russia.

      

Putin reportedly responded with a question: “Do you know my mission, Mr. Rasmussen? It is to make sure that your organization no longer exists.” More recently, he has opined that Ukraine should not exist as an independent country.

     

Above all, though, Putin’s overriding objective is political survival. Like any authoritarian, he fears that free and successful countries on his periphery may infect his own long-oppressed population with dreams of democracy and reform. Systems in Russia’s vicinity that follow the rule of law hinder the spread of the patronage networks Moscow relies on to protect the wealth of Kremlin cronies. Putin has witnessed political change in Ukraine and Belarus, as well as in allies such as Egypt and Libya, and he weathered street protests in Moscow in 2012. 

     

He has blamed the West and “terrorists” for the unrest. He also sent troops into Kazakhstan to help put down street protests in January.

     

Now his threat to invade Ukraine again is a tacit admission that his efforts to bring Kyiv to heel have failed. His bullying has pushed away those in Ukraine who might have been willing to work with Russia. Pro-Kremlin political parties won elections in Ukraine as early as a decade ago. But after Russia seized Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014 and launched relentless efforts to destabilize the government, more than two-thirds of Ukrainians in a recent poll described their neighbor as a hostile state — barely a decade after the country elected a pro-Russian government under Viktor Yanukovych. George Kennan once commented that “the jealous and intolerant eye of the Kremlin can distinguish, in the end, only vassals and enemies, and the neighbors of Russia, if they do not wish to be one, must reconcile themselves to being the other.” Putin’s attempt to make Ukraine a vassal has turned it into an enemy.

      

He’s done the same thing with NATO. As recently as a year ago, the organization’s future was in jeopardy. President Donald Trump threatened to pull U.S. troops out of Europe and belittled the alliance on a regular basis. His actions even forced a secret rear-guard action by members of his Cabinet and NATO officials to protect the institution. Some European leaders started musing about creating separate European security institutions outside of the trans-Atlantic alliance. But Putin’s saber-rattling over the past month has rejuvenated NATO and reminded its members why it exists. Even traditionally neutral states like Finland and Sweden are reconsidering their stance. In his New Year’s address to the nation, Finnish President Sauli Niinisto affirmed, “And let it be stated once again: Finland’s room to maneuver and freedom of choice also include the possibility of military alignment and of applying for NATO membership, should we ourselves so decide.”

        

Putin’s challenges at home appear equally daunting. Russia has faced the rampant spread of the coronavirus, a structural economic downturn, inflation, a reduction in household disposable income and a drop in real gross domestic product. Recent warmongering has hurt the country’s financial markets and led to a decline in the value of the ruble. Easy economic fixes are difficult because of endemic corruption and cronyism. As Timothy Frye pointed out in his recent book, “Weak Strongman,” institutionalized corruption inhibits growth and reform. Economic rewards go not to the best and brightest, but to the best connected. And as the New Yorker recently reported, the warming of Russia’s permafrost, which covers two-thirds of the country, is unleashing a slow-motion disaster, releasing greenhouse gases, stoking massive fires and destroying infrastructure — even causing anthrax outbreaks as ancient animal carcasses thaw. The landscape that saw so much human suffering in the vast human gulag of the past century is threatening more tragedy in the present, and fixes will cost billions.

      

It is hard to see Russia getting help from abroad. Moscow has no real allies aside from Belarus and Syria, and it has been in a state of covert war against the West for years. A bloody conflict in Europe risks turning Russia into even more of an international pariah, with renewed sanctions and scorn. Moscow seems eager to hype its relationship with China — but it is unlikely that China will tie itself to Russia’s fate. Russia is at best a baby brother in the present relationship. China looks to be a winner in the 21st century, and Russia appears to be a declining power.

      

Russian citizens often ignore politics because they know they cannot put political knowledge to good use. Putin has relied on that apathy to maintain control and steal the country’s riches for himself and his cronies. When necessary, he blames the West for economic setbacks or wields disinformation to keep citizens confused and misinformed. But there are recent indications that public support is waning, and dissatisfaction is starting to become more apparent. Over the past year, Putin has increased repression at home — trying to murder, then jailing, his main political opponent, and banning and arresting a wide variety of groups and individuals who don’t toe the Kremlin’s line. After decades of civil society being suppressed, it is difficult to measure public sentiment in Russia, and nobody — not even Putin — can know when emotions might reach a boiling point. Nonetheless, it is fair to assume that the death of Russian boys in an unpopular war would only add to Putin’s many challenges.

     

Regimes that rule by fear live in fear. Putin has made a conscious decision to confront the West and his neighbors in a never-ending battle. At home, he relies on repression, corruption and lies. While his juggling act has allowed him to remain in the seat of power for more than 20 years, a war in Europe may risk all his claimed objectives. He should remember that the delivery of body bags from Afghanistan was one of the final straws for the Soviet regime.

    

© 2022 Washington Post