FOR OUR FREEDOM AND YOURS – One Ukrainian Voice

Ukrainian, shaped by two revolutions and aware that freedom is never guaranteed. Writing about global politics, geopolitics, history, and economic trends, guided by a commitment to facts, freedom, and a deeper understanding of the world.

By Svitlana 🇺🇦

 · Launched 2 years ago

FOR OUR FREEDOM AND YOURS – One Ukrainian Voice

Ukrainian, shaped by two revolutions and aware that freedom is never guaranteed. Writing about global politics, geopolitics, history, and economic trends, guided by a commitment to facts, freedom, and a deeper understanding of the world.

By Svitlana 🇺🇦

 · Launched 2 years ago

How a decades-old ambition to control Europe’s security continues to challenge the sovereignty of nations today.

SVITLANA 🇺🇦

OCT 25, 2026

From a private conversation in Istanbul in 1999 to Russia’s demands on NATO in 2021, the documentary record reveals a persistent ambition to limit the freedom of other nations. Today, the question of sovereignty extends beyond Russia — and reaches the heart of the Western alliance.

Based on an analysis by Ukrainian journalist Vitaly Portnikov, with historical claims checked against declassified records and contemporary reporting.

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“Just give Europe to Russia”

These words were not spoken by Vladimir Putin. They were spoken by Boris Yeltsin, Russia’s first president, during a private meeting with US President Bill Clinton in Istanbul on November 19, 1999.

The meeting took place on the sidelines of the OSCE summit. It was the last time the two presidents met while Yeltsin was still in office.

According to the declassified memorandum of their conversation, Yeltsin argued that the United States should leave European security to Russia.

“You can take all the other states and provide security to them. I will take Europe and provide them security,” Yeltsin told Clinton. He then made his demand explicit: “Just give Europe to Russia.”

The record is preserved in the archives of the William J. Clinton Presidential Library and was published by the National Security Archive at George Washington University.

Primary source: National Security Archive — Memorandum of Conversation: Meeting with Russian President Yeltsin, Istanbul, November 19, 1999

Yeltsin’s argument was revealing. He was not simply asking for greater Russian influence within European institutions. He was proposing a division of responsibility in which Moscow would assume a privileged role over an entire continent, while Washington would concentrate on other parts of the world.

Clinton did not accept this division. He responded with irony and challenged the premise that the United States should withdraw from European affairs.

The exchange exposed a fundamental disagreement between the two presidents: whether European security should be organized through cooperation among sovereign states or through an informal arrangement between great powers.

That disagreement would become even more consequential in the years that followed.

1997: Yeltsin wanted a veto over Ukraine’s future

The Istanbul conversation was not an isolated episode.

Two years earlier, on March 21, 1997, Clinton and Yeltsin had met in Helsinki to discuss NATO enlargement, European security, and the future of relations between Russia and the West.

During their private conversation, Yeltsin demanded assurances that NATO would not expand to include former Soviet republics.

He was particularly concerned about Ukraine.

Yeltsin proposed a secret understanding that would not appear in any official statement. As the memorandum records, he suggested a “gentlemen’s agreement” that no former Soviet republics would join NATO.

He explained that admitting Ukraine to the Alliance would complicate Russia’s relations with Kyiv.

Clinton refused.

He argued that a secret agreement of this kind would send a damaging message to Europe: that Russia still considered the former Soviet republics part of an empire, even if its reach no longer extended as far west as it once had.

Clinton also warned that such a deal would alarm the Baltic states and other countries seeking to protect their independence.

His objection went beyond the practical consequences for NATO. It concerned the principle underlying Yeltsin’s proposal: Russia could express its concerns about NATO enlargement, but it could not be granted the right to determine the foreign policy of independent states.

Yeltsin pressed for a personal assurance, even suggesting that Clinton make a commitment privately, without their closest advisers present. Clinton refused to promise that NATO would exclude particular countries.

The American president made clear that he could not grant Moscow a veto over NATO membership.

Primary source: National Security Archive — Memorandum of Conversation, Clinton–Yeltsin Summit, Helsinki, March 21, 1997

The significance of this exchange is difficult to overstate.

The dispute over Ukraine’s right to choose its own security arrangements did not begin with Putin’s presidency. It was already present in the highest-level discussions between Moscow and Washington during the 1990s.

Yeltsin’s Russia was different from Putin’s Russia in many important respects. Yet the documents show that the desire to restrict the strategic choices of former Soviet republics was already part of the Russian leadership’s thinking.

Clinton’s response: Cooperation without an imperial veto

Clinton did not pursue a policy of confrontation with Russia. On the contrary, his administration sought to develop a cooperative relationship with Moscow after the Cold War.

The two governments negotiated arms-control arrangements, discussed European security, and worked together on international issues. Clinton supported the creation of a NATO–Russia framework intended to improve communication and cooperation.

But cooperation did not mean accepting Russia’s claim to special authority over its neighbors.

In 1997, Clinton and Yeltsin signed a joint statement reaffirming their shared goal of building a stable, secure, integrated, and undivided democratic Europe.

The public statement stood in contrast to the private proposal Yeltsin had made: a Europe in which Russia would have a privileged position and former Soviet republics would face restrictions on their future alliances.

Primary source: The White House — Joint US–Russian Statement on European Security, March 21, 1997

In 1999, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic joined NATO.

Their accession demonstrated that the United States and its allies would not accept a blanket Russian veto over the security choices of Central European countries.

This does not mean that Clinton’s policy was free of contradictions, nor that Washington consistently understood the fears and ambitions shaping Russian politics. The relationship remained complicated, and the consequences of NATO enlargement continue to be debated by historians and policymakers.

But on one essential question, Clinton maintained a clear position: cooperation with Russia could not require the United States to surrender the independent choices of other nations.

Istanbul, 1999: Yeltsin names his successor

The Istanbul memorandum also contains another revealing exchange.

As the conversation drew to a close, Clinton asked Yeltsin who would win the coming Russian presidential election.

Yeltsin answered confidently that Vladimir Putin would be his successor. He described Putin as a democrat who understood the West, praised his toughness, and promised to do everything possible to help him win.

Yeltsin even described Putin as having an “internal ramrod” — a phrase that conveyed his belief in the younger man’s strength and determination.

Putin had become prime minister only a few months earlier and was still relatively unknown to much of the international public. Within weeks of the Istanbul meeting, Yeltsin resigned, on December 31, 1999, making Putin acting president.

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