July 22, 2026

President Volodymyr Zelensky announced the dismissal of Oleksandr Syrsky from the post of Commander-in-Chief. What will we remember about Commander-in-Chief Syrsky during his 2.5 years in office and what could have actually caused his dismissal, in the material of Espresso

“The fact is that Oleksandr Syrskyi ensured Ukraine’s results in the defense of Kyiv, in the Kharkiv Offensive Operation, and in the Kursk Operation. I am grateful to Oleksandr Syrskyi and each of our soldiers for Ukraine’s strong front-line positions. We all have one desire – victory over the enemy and the achievement of such conditions at the front and in pressure on Russia that would allow us to force Russia to peace,” President Volodymyr Zelenskyi wrote in an official address, presenting the main personnel changes in the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Oleksandr Syrsky is one of the most controversial figures in the Ukrainian military leadership. Even among the military, he is evaluated ambiguously: some consider him one of the most talented Ukrainian commanders, who is not afraid to be on the front lines. Others consider him an overly tough general who demands that the tasks be completed at any cost, sparing no one. It was he who was destined to lead the Armed Forces of Ukraine after the public favorite Valeriy Zaluzhny and to leave against the backdrop of the scandal with the dismissal of Defense Minister Fedorov, who also rapidly gained popularity. But is his resignation really the result of a worldview conflict with the Ministry of Defense? Read more in the material.

Fedorov VS Syrsky: War of the Worlds

The main reason for the resignation of Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, whose popularity was growing, is said to be a conflict with Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrsky. According to media reports, at a meeting of the Servant of the People faction, President Volodymyr Zelensky said that he could no longer put up with the constant conflict between Fedorov and Syrsky.

“They live in two different worlds. Misha wants to digitize everything, build a system around technology. The military just wants to be heard. They ask to purchase one type of weapon, but he refuses and finances other areas. They simply stopped hearing each other,”  one of the deputies recounted the president’s words.  

After his dismissal, Mykhailo Fedorov assured during a briefing  that he did not set any conditions: he or Syrsky, but confirmed that there was a conflict with the General Staff. According to Fedorov, when the president decided not to replace Syrsky, he agreed and tried to establish cooperation. But, according to Fedorov, the initiatives of the Ministry of Digital Affairs/Ministry of Defense were systematically blocked.

“Syrsky is not ready to talk openly about problems in person. He is ready to weave intrigues, to think that someone ordered some kind of campaign in the media, and not the problem in the actions that are taking place. In fact, he gave an ultimatum and instead of thinking about how to asymmetrically defeat Russia – which is the task of the commander-in-chief – he thought about how to split the country in which we are, and this is a big problem,” said Fedorov.  

At the same time, he recognized Syrsky’s merits in 2022 – the Kyiv, Kharkiv and Kherson operations. At the same time, he emphasized that the war has changed dramatically since then, and the management system has not kept up with these changes. Fedorov said that in half a year of work at the Ministry of Defense, it was not possible to create centers of competence or change the organizational structure, since the General Staff allegedly refused to sign the relevant documents due to formal reasons such as an unsuccessful name. He also gave an example when a simple decision on the basic provision of drones to brigades was agreed upon for four months due to bureaucratic confrontation.

Fedorov described the practice of isolating and “toxicating” successful and effective commanders, instead of encouraging them, by not giving them assignments and burdening them with bureaucratic burdens. He also spoke about the problem of uneven distribution of resources between corps (from 5 to 12-13 brigades), constant rotation of brigade commanders, the gap between brigades and corps, and the “manual” distribution of supplies based on loyalty rather than effectiveness. He called all of this the systemic consequences of the lack of clear responsibility in the command vertical.

Interestingly, Oleksandr Syrsky himself stated that he was unaware of the conflict with the Minister of Defense.

“It was a surprise for me to learn that the minister and I had a conflict. I perceived our relationship as a working one: with complex issues, with different positions. This is how it should be between two institutions during a major war,” he wrote in a column for “Military”, in the introduction to which he noted that he is not building an image and has no political ambitions, but instead is engaged in war 24/7. 

A soldier who does not discuss orders from his superiors

Syrsky gave his vision of the situation and reminded that the Ministry of Defense is responsible for providing troops, procurement, policy development, and civilian control over the Armed Forces of Ukraine. However, war strategy, planning operations, and the situation on the front are the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief.  

“When I am accused of “lack of strategy,” I will remind you of a simple thing: the war strategy is not a public document or a post on social networks. It is reported to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and its result is visible at the front, where a million-strong army has been holding back a superior enemy for the fourth year. Whoever demands that the Supreme Commander-in-Chief “present the strategy” publicly demands that it be presented to the enemy,” Syrsky said.

In response to the accusation of “manual control”, he noted that he has served in the army for over 40 years. Therefore, he does not issue ultimatums to his commander and does not command the troops via messengers.

“A million-strong army is not managed on WhatsApp. It is managed through headquarters, orders, and the responsibility of commanders on the ground,” he said.

In an interview with Ukrinform in 2024, Oleksandr Syrsky also stated the clear execution of orders without discussions about their appropriateness.

“The military has one duty – we do not discuss orders, we carry them out. So if the President of the country, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, had reasons for such a replacement, especially during the active phase of the war, it means that these reasons are weighty.”, –  Syrsky answered the question of what Zaluzhny’s resignation is connected with.

After Zaluzhny, there was almost no chance of public love.

There are rumors that in 2021, President Zelensky offered the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces to Oleksandr Syrsky, who was the commander of the Ground Forces at the time, but he refused. So Valery Zaluzhny was appointed Commander-in-Chief. And it is his merit that the Russian Federation was unable to take Kyiv in three days. The  New Yorker magazine  claimed that Zaluzhny hid military preparations even from Volodymyr Zelensky and Kyiv’s American partners. Valery Zaluzhny was quite public, for a commander-in-chief, willingly communicated with Western media and allowed himself to disagree with the president. At the same time, as his popularity grew, so did the conflict with Volodymyr Zelensky. The decree on his resignation on February 8, 2024, was perceived by many Ukrainians almost as a betrayal. Against this background, anyone who was not appointed Commander-in-Chief instead of Zaluzhny would have received a portion of popular dislike right from the start. Oleksandr Syrsky, who has a reputation as a tough leader and, after Bakhmut, nicknames like “the butcher” and “general 200,” had no chance of becoming the same favorite of the public. After all, he didn’t even try.

Oleksandr Syrskyi, photo: General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine

Unlike Valeriy Zaluzhny, who was often associated with the maneuver operations of 2022 (the defense of Kyiv, the Kharkiv counteroffensive, the liberation of Kherson), Oleksandr Syrskyi led the Armed Forces of Ukraine at a different stage of the war. The announced large-scale counteroffensive of 2023 did not achieve strategic goals, and the military began to talk about a lack of personnel, ammunition, and delays in international aid.

 So Syrsky had to adapt the Ukrainian Armed Forces to a war of attrition in conditions of acute shortage of people. Jack Watlig, a senior researcher at the Royal United Services Institute in London, believes that Syrsky’s decisions were fully consistent with the real state of affairs in the army. 

On February 17, 2024, the new commander-in-chief, Oleksandr Syrsky, issued an order to withdraw troops from Avdiivka. This was his first decision in office. At that time, the city was effectively under operational encirclement and there was a threat of a repeat of the catastrophic situation, as in Debaltseve. But starting his work in office with a decision to retreat also added negativity to his image, although ISW analysts considered this decision justified and even belated.

“Every commander has his own cemetery”  

At the beginning of the full-scale invasion, Oleksandr Syrsky, as the commander of the Ground Forces, led and participated in the planning of most ground operations. Of course, under the command of Commander-in-Chief Zaluzhny. Some believe that the defense of the Kyiv region is the merit of Syrsky. Then, on his orders, two rings of defense of the capital were created, bridges in the Kyiv region were destroyed to prevent the advance of Russian troops. In particular, the dam on the Irpin River was partially blown up, which made it possible to flood enemy positions and prevent the approach to the city.

For the defense of Kyiv and the liberation of northern Ukraine, Syrskyi received the Order of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, 2nd degree, and later the title of Hero of Ukraine.

Oleksandr Syrsky was also one of the commanders of the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ counteroffensive in the Kharkiv region in 2022. Many military analysts consider this operation to be the most successful Ukrainian offensive operation of the entire war. Then the Ukrainian troops liberated Balaklia, Kupyansk, and Izyum, and the Russian army was forced to retreat, abandoning its equipment. 

From the fall of 2022 to the spring of 2023, Oleksandr Syrsky led the defense of Soledar and Bakhmut, but the Armed Forces of Ukraine failed to hold these cities. On May 20, 2023, the Russian army reported the capture of Bakhmut. However, Syrsky is most criticized not for the fact that these territories were lost, but because he had to retreat earlier to save the lives of the soldiers. It was after this that rumors began to appear about him as a “general of 200” who does not spare people. They say that he insisted on holding the city for too long. The units were exhausted, and the human losses were huge. 

Oleksandr Syrsky, photo: GeneralStaff.ua

The battle for Bakhmut is called one of the bloodiest in Europe since World War II. At the same time, supporters of Syrsky believe that the defense of Bakhmut tied down the forces of the Wagner PMC, Russia lost tens of thousands of soldiers, and Ukraine gained some time to prepare reserves. They say that if Ukrainian troops had withdrawn from Bakhmut too quickly, it would have led to the loss of much larger territories than Bakhmut and Soledar.

“Even in purely military terms, Ukraine’s decision to hold its ground in Bakhmut makes logical sense. If its troops had retreated, Russian forces would likely have followed them, taking the fighting even deeper into Ukrainian territory, into terrain that is no easier to defend. An arc of small and medium-sized Ukrainian cities with populations of 50,000 to 150,000 lies just 20 miles to the west. Ukraine’s retreat from Bakhmut would not have brought significant respite or strategic advantage,”  The Washington Post wrote in 2023 in the article “Bakhmut ‘Massacre’—A Lesson for the West.” 

The liberation of Bakhmut was a matter of honor for Syrsky. And this is what is considered one of the reasons for the failure of the 2023 counteroffensive. Zaluzhny proposed to concentrate the main Western reserves and heavy equipment in one place in the south in order to cut off the Russian land corridor to Crimea. However, President Zelensky then supported Syrsky’s proposal to throw part of the forces to liberate Bakhmut and move further to Luhansk region, so the initial plan agreed by NATO was changed. So the forces were divided equally between General Tarnavsky, who led the offensive in the Melitopol direction, and Syrsky in Bakhmut. As a result, neither Melitopol nor Bakhmut could be liberated.

However, despite different visions in planning operations, it did not come to an open conflict between Zaluzhny and Syrsky.

“Once I asked Zaluzhny what he thought about Syrsky. It was around the beginning of 2024, we were sitting in the office and discussing potential war scenarios. At that time, information was already actively spreading that Syrsky would become the next General Commander. Zaluzhny answered as briefly as possible, literally in one word: Professional,”  recalls Maria Berlinska, the head of the Victory Drones project. 

According to her, there is much to criticize Syrsky for, but some of the accusations are absurd.

“For the sake of justice, it is important to understand that every high-level commander has his own cemetery. Every one. There is no war without losses, just like there are no mistakes. My comrades – platoon, company, combat, brigade commanders – each have their own list in their heads of those who might not have died. Every time they scroll through how they could have done more wisely, how to calculate in order to avoid these terrible conversations with mothers and wives. It is not customary to talk about this. But believe me, those who have a conscience suffer until the end of their lives, even if they are not actually guilty,” writes Berlinska. 

The Kursk operation is the first attempt to transfer the war to enemy territory.

One of the attempts to change the course of events in the war was the Kursk operation. On the morning of August 6, 2024, the Armed Forces of Ukraine crossed the Russian-Ukrainian border near the city of Sudzha and began advancing deep into Russian territory. This was the first Ukrainian combined-arms operation on the border territory of Russia since the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. At the same time, discussions about whether this operation was justified and what goals the General Staff under the command of Syrsky set for itself are still ongoing. In particular, whether the reserves that were needed in the Donbas were used for the operation. And whether the effect corresponded to the resources spent. 

Kursk became the actual only large-scale operation of Alexander Syrsky as commander-in-chief. 

In 2025–2026, ISW repeatedly noted that the Ukrainian command used the Kursk salient to deter Russian forces, but this did not bring a decisive turning point.  

From Syrsky’s assault regiments to the “Rock” scandal  

Oleksandr Syrsky was born in Russia. His father was a career military man, and in the 1970s he was transferred to Ukraine, so Oleksandr Syrsky finished school in Kharkiv. But then he went to study in Moscow. He graduated from the Moscow Higher Combined Arms School, from a platoon commander in the Soviet Army to the commander of the 72nd Mechanized Brigade. 

Although he is often criticized for his Soviet-style leadership, he was responsible for introducing NATO standards to the Armed Forces of Ukraine. In 2006, after graduating from the National Defense Academy of Ukraine, he headed the operations planning board of the Joint Operational Command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (JOC), which was created in 2005 to bring the Ukrainian army closer to NATO standards. After the JOC was disbanded under Yanukovych, Syrsky became first deputy head of the International Cooperation Department at the General Staff. 

Oleksandr Syrskyi, photo: General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine

However, the creation of personal assault regiments, which are directly subordinate to Commander-in-Chief Syrsky, is considered a completely Soviet practice.

“I think he came up with this idea after the Kursk operation, because before it was carried out, he gathered all the paratroopers and, as far as I know, said: “You are with me or not.” Some brigade leaders opposed it, after which they were removed. The story here is to create units that will unquestioningly carry out absolutely all the tasks that will be assigned to them. I don’t know what to call it – nepotism, corruption, working for their own bonuses. By closing some direction, making a media splash: we were advancing somewhere, retaking some village, it is created that the Commander-in-Chief is doing something. And the fact that the enemy will retake this village in two or three days, and storming it, we could lose up to 600-1,000 people, no one considers,”  said  Bohdan Krotevych, former chief of staff of the 12th special forces brigade of the Azov National Guard, in an interview with Censor.net. 

According to him, against the backdrop of huge losses in these assault units, they are actively replenished with new recruits, while other commanders receive many times fewer new people.

“Assault regiments are a fairly convenient reserve that can be thrown into any battle. Syrsky provides them with everything: “Bradley”, “Leopard”, “Stryker” – they really have everything! They lose them in assaults and calmly get new ones, and also lose people, thousands a month! His part of the agreement is to provide support, theirs is to do everything he says. And how – he shouldn’t worry. For me, this is a regular organized crime system,” says Krotevych.

On June 23, Babel  published an investigation into the situation in the 425th Assault Regiment “Skelya”, also known as the “Syrsky Regiment”, in which witnesses spoke of torture and murder. In just six months, there were 26 deaths in the training centers of “Skelya” – most of the deceased men had not been in the regiment for even a month.

The General Staff did not react to the scandal for several days. Then, in an interview with “TSN”, Syrsky said that the investigation into “Skel” was conducted back in the winter. Several criminal cases were opened against this regiment, which are currently being worked on.

“This is a shameful story in the sense that it exists in the Armed Forces of a country at war, where a serviceman should not die in the rear, but should prepare to defend his state,” said Syrsky.

Already in early July, a new scandal erupted. It became known that at the end of June, soldiers of the 55th separate mechanized brigade kidnapped two Moseychuk brothers from the village of Kalynivka in the Kyiv region. According to media reports, the reason was that the friend of the commander of the 155th separate mechanized brigade, Stanislav Luchanov, complained to her husband about the noise from motorcycles at night. On July 9, the bodies of the brothers were found in the Poltava region with numerous gunshot wounds. By the way, Luchanov came to the 155th brigade from the position of chief of staff of the 425th separate assault regiment “Skelya”. 

The General Staff  stated that it would fully cooperate with law enforcement agencies at all stages of the investigation and provide them with the necessary assistance within the competence of the military administration. However, it was the investigation into the tolerance of cruelty in the “Syrsky regiment” and immediately after it – the shocking murder of civilians by the military due to a domestic conflict that could have become the last straw, why Commander-in-Chief Syrsky could no longer be left in office. 

Oleksandr Syrsky’s activities as Commander-in-Chief will be evaluated by future generations and historians. During his 2.5 years of leadership, the war moved from a phase of rapid Russian advance in the Donetsk region to a change of trends in our favor and the opening of a window of opportunity, which will be implemented by the next head of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.  

https://espreso.tv/viyna-z-rosiyeyu-chim-vidznachivsya-golovkom-sirskiy