Fight for Russia? We’ll Stay at Home, Thanks

Vladimir Putin may declare another round of mobilization, but young men have heard the news from the front and don’t want to go.

April 3, 2024

If Russia’s plan to decapitate the Ukrainian state had worked, the casualty-lite operation would probably have enshrined Putin in Russian history. Instead, it is bleeding the country of its most precious resource; its young people.

During the ultimately successful February assault on Avdiivka, Russia pressed forward in the style of the 1941-45 Great Patriotic War. Soldiers were scythed down by Ukrainian defenders in extraordinary numbers — British military intelligence estimated that throughout the month, losses in dead and wounded were running close to 1,000 a day.

This is not the Great Patriotic War and Russians do not see it as a conflict that their national survival depends on. Public opinion surveys by the Institute for Conflict Studies and Analysis of Russia (IKAR), which I head, offer a stark illustration of the deterioration in fighting sentiment among ordinary Russians. To be clear, this is not to say that outright revolt is brewing or that people want an end to the Kremlin’s war of aggression at any price. But it does show that while Russians are happy enough for others to fight, they are profoundly unwilling to go themselves.

Early last year, about 60% rejected a second wave of mass mobilization. That number had risen to 74% by the second anniversary of the invasion. At the same time, the number of supporters of the new wave of mobilization slumped — from 24% at the beginning of last year to 14% at the beginning of 2024. Those attitudes are even stronger among the young.

At a time when many in the West are focused on blockages to new aid for Ukraine (especially opposition from right-wingers in the US House of Representatives), our findings show there are also powerful countervailing forces that make the war’s prolongation harder for Russia.

The Kremlin’s argument that Russia is engaged in a Great Patriotic War 2.0 has failed, our results show. The population just does not accept it. Instead, they believe the war is extremely dangerous for participants and they are right — British intelligence also noted that the official number of disabled Russian males aged 31-59 increased by a record 507,000 in 2023, a leap of 30%, mostly due to the war.

These damaged men are a huge drain on the resources of the country’s health care and rehabilitation systems. But they are more than that. They are also witnesses and illustrations of what happens on the real front line, not the propaganda-heavy depictions fostered by the Kremlin and its mouthpieces.

It is perhaps unsurprising that the word is out and the response so stark. Young people aged 18-30 years are outright opposed to any suggestion they be sent to Ukraine. Even at the beginning of 2023, this age group clearly rejected opposition to the second wave of mass mobilization, with 74% against another round of mobilization (the first was in the fall of 2022.) A year later, the figure has reached 84%.

The reasons for the clear negative attitude towards a second wave of mobilization are obvious: young people are the first to be sent to the war and they, more often than other age groups, receive real information about what awaits them. After all, they have friends who have already been mobilized. On average, young people are twice as likely as their older fellow citizens to say that they have one or more friends among drafted Russians.

The second reason is closely related to the first: the rate of those who have had several friends killed in the war is almost double among young people as among all generations. Therefore, young people, more often than other age groups, not only receive information about the real course of events at the front from direct participants, but also more often than others have war dead among their inner circle. This is enough to make ardent would-be warriors more hesitant.

It should be emphasized that the rejection of mobilization and personal participation in the war is not driven by pacifist or other moral beliefs among the young. It is pragmatic — they don’t want to die or be maimed.

Such near-universal attitudes are a great danger for the Kremlin.

3 comments

  1. “It should be emphasized that the rejection of mobilization and personal participation in the war is not driven by pacifist or other moral beliefs among the young. It is pragmatic — they don’t want to die or be maimed.”

    The average ruskie is a warmonger or and has no morals. Most of the world’s population is aware of this by now.

  2. “We’ll Stay at Home, Thanks”
    Except they won’t, when the mobilization orders arrive, the overwhelming majority of them will grudgingly but passively line up at army training centers, experience shows. So, don’t put much hope on those losers revolting, it most probably won’t happen. These aren’t guys who will fight for their right to party, not even for survival. 🙄

    • I never make empty hopes about ruskies standing up like men, Mr. Gray. I always see them as fluffy meat puppets.

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