July 8, 2026
Valerii Zaluzhnyi, Ukraine’s ambassador to the UK, says: ‘This is no longer a war of swift manoeuvres. It is a war of attrition’ Credit: Oleg Palchyk/via Getty Images
Modern warfare no longer rewards tactical victories in the way it once did
By Valerii Zaluzhnyi
Published 08 July 2026
A growing number of Western analysts now argue that Russia has effectively lost the war.
They point to Ukraine’s successful strikes on logistics, attacks on critical infrastructure and the steady erosion of Russia’s military position as evidence that the conflict is approaching its end.
That is a dangerous misreading of the war.
It reflects a tendency to interpret events through the lens of individual battlefield successes rather than the wider strategic picture.
Modern warfare no longer rewards tactical victories in the way it once did. Advances in drone technology, precision strike capabilities and surveillance have transformed the battlefield, making decisive breakthroughs extraordinarily difficult for either side.
This is no longer a war of swift manoeuvres. It is a war of attrition.
Every tactical gain now comes at an extraordinary cost. Positions can be taken, but holding them, reinforcing them and evacuating the wounded has become increasingly difficult under constant drone surveillance. Success on the battlefield is measured in metres rather than miles, and often at a price that bears little relation to its strategic value.
The same is true beyond the front line. Ukraine’s increasingly effective strikes against Russian logistics and critical infrastructure have imposed real costs on Moscow. But these attacks are expensive, technologically demanding and ultimately reciprocal. Russia retains the ability to strike back with equal or greater force. Neither side can rely on this form of warfare to produce a decisive strategic outcome.
Rescuers at the site of a Russian missile and drone strike, during which a residential building in Kyiv was heavily damaged Credit: Alina Smutko/Reuters
The battlefield has therefore reached something close to equilibrium.
Russia lacks the military capacity to conquer Ukraine outright. Equally, Ukraine does not currently possess the means to liberate all occupied territory by force alone. The military balance has become one of mutual denial rather than decisive victory.
Has Russia therefore lost?
If the measure is whether the Kremlin achieved its original political objectives, then clearly it has not. But defeat requires more than failure to achieve initial ambitions. Russia continues to fight, occupies substantial Ukrainian territory and has shown no intention of ending the war on terms that would amount to an admission of defeat.
Nor can Ukraine yet claim outright victory.
Kyiv has prevented Russia from achieving its principal aims and has inflicted severe damage on the Russian economy and military. Yet it remains heavily dependent on Western financial assistance, military equipment and technological support while facing mounting domestic pressures of its own.
Moscow understands this. Its strategy increasingly rests not on rapid advances but on exhausting Ukraine economically, militarily and psychologically. Russia still possesses deeper reserves of manpower and industrial capacity in several critical sectors, including ballistic missile production. Air defence alone cannot fully offset that advantage.
‘Russia continues to fight and has shown no intention of ending the war on terms that would amount to an admission of defeat’ Credit: Valentyn Ogirenko/Reuters
The other decisive variable is international support.
Ukraine’s ability to sustain the war depends heavily upon continued backing from its allies. Here, there are worrying signs of strain. Political changes in Washington and persistent divisions within Europe raise legitimate questions about whether today’s level of support can be maintained indefinitely.
Diplomatic summits and carefully choreographed demonstrations of solidarity have symbolic value. They do not necessarily translate into the sustained political unity required for a prolonged confrontation with Russia.
This is why the war can no longer be judged primarily by movements along the front.
The line of contact remains militarily important, particularly in any future territorial settlement, but it is no longer the sole determinant of strategic success. The conflict has expanded into a contest over logistics, industrial capacity, critical infrastructure, air defence and, ultimately, societal resilience.
Even territory itself has become a more complicated concept than it was in the early stages of the invasion.
The land corridor linking Russia to Crimea once appeared to be one of Moscow’s most significant strategic gains. Yet the development of long-range strike capabilities and drone warfare has steadily undermined its value. Persistent attacks on supply routes along the Sea of Azov have increased logistical pressure on Crimea and raised serious questions about the long-term sustainability of Russian control. Fuel shortages and disruptions to civilian supplies illustrate that physical occupation no longer guarantees strategic security.
These pressures strengthen Ukraine’s position in any future negotiations. But they do not eliminate the risks facing Ukraine itself. Russian strikes against Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure will continue, making investment in air defence and civilian resilience as important as success at the front.
Wars of attrition do not produce clear winners in the conventional sense. They are decided by endurance.
The decisive question is not who captures the next village or destroys the next ammunition depot. It is which society can continue to bear the economic, military and psychological burden of a prolonged conflict, while maintaining the international support necessary to sustain it.
That, rather than any individual tactical success, will determine how and when this war ends. Too many analysts remain focused on the daily movement of the front line. They risk missing the larger strategic reality.
In looking for an end to the war, the conversation returns to Nato.
Ukraine has every reason to appreciate the support Nato members have provided, and continues to provide. But respect for the alliance should not prevent an honest assessment of its shortcomings.
The war in Ukraine has exposed uncomfortable questions about whether Nato is equipped for the conflicts of the 21st century.
The central problem is not simply military capability. It is strategic culture.
Nato was created at the height of the Cold War, when its overriding purpose was to deter the Soviet Union while preventing direct confrontation between nuclear powers. Avoiding escalation became the organising principle of the alliance.
That mindset remains deeply embedded today.
The alliance remains indispensable. But institutions designed for one era cannot assume they are automatically fit for another.
The nature of warfare has changed dramatically. Drone technology, precision strikes, cyber warfare and the rapid pace of technological innovation demand a different approach to deterrence and collective defence. A security architecture built primarily around managing crises rather than shaping outcomes risks falling behind the realities of modern conflict.
Europe’s future security will ultimately depend not only on those prepared to defend themselves, but also on those willing to lead a new strategic vision for the continent.
Ukraine has demonstrated that it is prepared to do the former. The unanswered question is who is prepared to do the latter.
Valerii Zaluzhnyi is Ukraine’s ambassador to the United Kingdom and former commander-in-chief of the armed forces of Ukraine
Original article, with videos, diagrams and more pics, can be seen here :
Those photos do not fail to shock, even though we have seen thousands of them throughout these past 12 years of genocidal war.
They stand as a silent testament to the pathetic response of Ukraine’s European allies and the sheer evil of the Krasnov regime, which has allowed thousands of needless murders and now says it might allow Ukraine to produce Patriot interceptors, on the absurd grounds that “I prefer defensive weapons to offensive weapons.”
Well, whoopie do. Even if it goes ahead, its gonna take a long time (years?) before Ukraine is tooled up and ready to produce them, as the geriatric putlerite well knows.
The General has chosen a good outlet for his OpEd. The DT is strongly supportive of Ukraine.
Because of that unfortunately, shitloads of bogus accounts have been opened by the kremkrappers to post “comments” under bogus English-sounding names. Understandable, but also unacceptable is the volume of turds posting who come from Reform (farage) or magaputler shitheads.
I suggested on a Hamish de Breton-Gordon article that all pro-putler comments should be deleted on the grounds that an ancient and reputable conservative paper like the DT should not provide a platform for the apologists of a nazi child-murderer.
The mods zapped it
Thanks a lot cuntz.
I agree that announcing a defeat for the mafia state is too early. Ukraine must continue striking at the enemy’s oil infrastructure, arms industry, and supply lines, while remaining static on the battlefield. Let the roaches attack and get slaughtered while their country gradually sinks deeper into the morass of defeat.