US complicit in a criminal plan

JONATHAN FINK

NOV 20

Date episode published: 20-Nov-25

The 28 points: what they demand, and why they’re rotten

We don’t have the full text of the 28-point plan yet, as it’s not been fully shared, and even the Ukrainian side claim they only know the points from verbal communication and have not seen the draft proposal. What we do have is a mosaic of leaks from Axios, Reuters, the FT, The Guardian, The Times, The Moscow Times, Kyiv Post and others. (Axios) Bear in mind also, that if the leaks were facilitated or encouraged by Moscow, then the version of the plan that we do know about, is likely the version that Moscow wants us to know about. 

Based on that reporting – and on earlier Trump-era trial balloons – we can reconstruct the main pillars. Think of these 28 points less as exact legal clauses, and more as a catalogue of what Moscow wants Washington to sell to Kyiv. A Christmas shopping list of capitulation. 

I’m going to walk through 28 likely elements and give you the cynical response to each.

See the full video episode: 

Territory & sovereignty

1. Lease or “rental fee” for Donbas

Ukraine supposedly keeps legal title to Donetsk and Luhansk but leases them to Russia in exchange for a “rental fee” or “land tax” on the mineral-rich region. (Kyiv Post)

This is Trumpian real-estate cosplay: treating a genocidal occupation as a mall lease. You don’t “rent out” cities where people have been deported, executed and tortured.

2. Formal recognition of Russia’s control over all occupied Donbas

Kyiv would accept that Russia permanently administers the areas it already holds, plus additional territory in eastern Donbas it does not control today. (The Guardian)

Rewarding land-grabs is how you get more land-grabs. Ask Georgia. Ask Moldova. Ask every neighbour whose border Russia has ever “revised.” As many commentators point out, rewarding aggression and illegality, only begets and incites more of the same. 

3. Demilitarised buffer zone in the rest of Donbas

Ukrainian forces would withdraw from remaining front-line areas, turning them into a demilitarised zone patrolled by some sort of international mission. (Kyiv Post)

Demilitarised zones sound fine until the side that keeps violating ceasefires – Russia – turns them into staging grounds for the next attack. And this deal implies that Ukraine would give up heavily fortified areas, giving Russia a clear shot at more territory and the city of Dnipro and potentially other areas. 

4. Freeze or de facto recognition of Russia’s control of Crimea

While not always spelled out, multiple commentaries suggest the plan would leave Crimea under Russia, with Kyiv pledging not to contest it militarily. (Medium)

That’s the 2014 aggression simply written into stone. It screams to every nuclear-armed bully: seize a neighbour’s territory, hold it long enough, then Washington will call it “reality.” Finder keeps… might makes right… the law of the jungle – whatever label you want. 

5. Front line becomes new line of control

The existing front line, adjusted for new Russian gains in places like Pokrovsk, becomes the permanent line of control, with Ukrainian attempts to change it banned. (The Times)

This is not “ending the war”; it is legalising the result of Russia’s current offensive and inviting another one when the balance shifts, and when they feel emboldened to attack.

6. Constitutional “neutrality” for Ukraine

Ukraine would be pressed to adopt renewed “neutrality,” closing off NATO membership in law. (Reuters)

We tried Ukrainian neutrality. Russia invaded anyway. The message here is: you don’t get to choose your alliances, Moscow does. Ukraine would cease to be a sovereign entity in fact and may find itself more isolated the next time Moscow chooses to invade. 

7. Special status for occupied areas

Occupied regions gain “special status” with their own local rules, vetoes and security arrangements – a long-time Kremlin demand. (Reuters)

That’s a Trojan horse: embed Russian influence inside Ukraine’s legal system, then use it to paralyse Kyiv forever. Again, this was tried before under the Yanukovich regime, and proved to be nearly fatal for Ukraine’s independence, statehood and security. 

8. Constraints on Kyiv’s domestic “de-Russification” laws

Kyiv would be asked to roll back language, education or church reforms deemed “discriminatory” by Moscow. (The Guardian)

This isn’t about minority rights. It’s about giving the aggressor a veto over how Ukrainians talk about their own past, and which version of history gets told. The one that supports truth and independence, or the imperial version that stifles sovereignty and agency.

Military & weapons

9. Halve the Ukrainian army

The plan reportedly calls for cutting Ukraine’s armed forces roughly in half – to around 400,000 troops. (The Moscow Times)

Yet Russia keeps mobilising; Ukraine demobilises. That’s not balance, that’s pre-loading the next invasion, and tying Ukraine’s hands behind its back. Note, there is no clause in here that demands limits on the size of Russia’s army, or how many troops it can station on occupied territory or on Ukraine’s borders. This is a ludicrous and one-sided demand. 

10. Force structure caps

Limits on heavy brigades, artillery, armour and air defence units, justified as “confidence-building.” (Reuters)

It’s strange how all the “confidence-building” runs one way – and what does the victim need to convince the aggressor of anyway? That it’s weakened enough to submit to subsequent rounds of aggression. And only one side keeps dropping cruise missiles on civil power plants and apartment blocks. Is it the serial killer that needs protection from their victims, or the other way around? Witkoff does not seem able to tell the victim and perpetrator apart. 

11. Eliminate long-range missiles

Ukraine would have to give up long-range strike systems – the very weapons that finally made Russian logistics and oil depots vulnerable. (The Guardian)

Take away the tools that stopped Russia hitting with impunity, the only thing that represent a real deterrent option to Russian aggression, then call that “stability.” It’s stability for the attacker, not the defender.

12. Ban long-range drones hitting Russia

Similar restrictions on Ukrainian long-range drones striking airfields, oil terminals and command posts inside Russia. (Kyiv Independent)

Russia still gets to bomb Ternopil’s apartment blocks; Ukraine loses the means to hit back at the launch pads. This is one of the most absurd clauses in the proposed plan. 

13. Cap or mothball Ukraine’s air force

No Western jets flying combat missions from Ukrainian airfields; perhaps caps on sortie numbers and weapons loads. (New York Post)

If you wanted to formalise Russian air superiority over occupied Ukrainian territory, this is how you’d do it. Against this is a laundry list of Russian demands. 

14. No Western missile defence infrastructure

Restrictions on things like permanently based Patriot or Aegis-style systems that could intercept Russian missiles. (The Guardian)

“Security guarantees” without the hardware to intercept missiles is another form of capitulation. 

15. Limits on mobilisation

Caps on Ukrainian conscription or reserve forces, framed as a humanitarian measure.

The country fighting for its survival is told it’s not allowed to mobilise too much – but the aggressor faces no equivalent constraint. Again, this is the emasculation of Ukraine’s defence. 

Foreign presence & alliances

16. Ban foreign volunteers and “International Legion” units

No foreign brigades, no volunteers, no foreign-trained special units in Ukraine’s order of battle. (New York Post)

Russia gets to keep Wagner, its Syrian volunteers, recruits from the Global South, North Korean shells and bodies; Ukraine is supposed to reject the people who turned up to help, some of whom are now Ukrainian citizens. Russia would like to extend this to all NGOs and external governmental support as well. It’s imposition of a new form of Soviet isolation. 

17. No foreign troops or permanent bases in Ukraine

Even if Ukraine ever joins NATO or the EU’s defence structures, no permanent foreign forces on its soil. (The Guardian)

It’s like inviting someone into NATO and then telling them, “By the way, you don’t get the deterrence part.” It’s a membership without benefits and perks. 

18. No NATO aircraft operating from Ukrainian airspace

Ban on allied aircraft flying combat missions or patrols from Ukrainian bases. (New York Post)

Again: everything designed to make Ukraine dependent on promises instead of hard power.

19. Vague U.S.-European “security guarantees”

In exchange for all these concessions, the plan reportedly offers some form of U.S. guarantees to Ukraine and Europe against future Russian aggression – details unspecified. (The Guardian)

Ukraine has already tried “assurances.” It was called the Budapest Memorandum. Russia tore it up. The West shrugged and reneged on any of the implied promises and commitments.

20. Russian promises to respect the new status quo

Moscow would sign up to some language about respecting borders – again. (Reuters)

Russia has violated every agreement it ever signed with Ukraine. A new signature on a new piece of paper doesn’t magically change that – and it’s dangerously delusional to believe so.

Sanctions & economic terms

21. Phased sanctions relief for Russia

Once Ukraine implements the concessions, some Western sanctions begin to lift – especially on energy and finance. (Reuters)

Russia invades, kills tens of thousands, and the prize for holding stolen land is – your economy gets to breathe again, and Putin gets to replenish his war chest and war machine. 

22. Restrictions on Ukraine’s defence industry

Limits on what kind of weapons Ukraine can domestically produce, especially long-range missiles and drones. (The Guardian)

The country that built its own long-range strike capability under fire is told to disarm itself – while the aggressor carries on churning out cruise missiles.

23. Black Sea and trade provisions

Some arrangement for grain exports, shipping and maybe transit through Russian-controlled ports. (Reuters)

We’ve seen how this unfolds before: Moscow signs up to grain deals, then weaponizes food the moment it wants leverage. The humiliation of seeing grain stolen from occupied territories and shipped through Ukrainian ports is also part of the humiliation. 

24. Investment sweeteners for reconstruction

Talk of Western business opportunities in rebuilding Ukraine – once it accepts the map written in Moscow. (Kyiv Post)

There are several things wrong here – Moscow will try to angle investments towards the territories it has stolen and devastated. Those places will then be stuffed with ethnic Russian colonists shipped out from Russia, with the intention of supplanting and disenfranchising the local population. Any country that signs on to this will be complicit in the process of ethnic cleansing and genocide. 

Internal politics, justice & memory

25. Russian language as an official language

Ukraine would have to grant Russian official-language status nationwide or in certain regions. (The Guardian)

The issue is not whether people speak Russian – millions do. It’s that Moscow wants a permanent lever inside Ukraine’s constitution, and a wedge within its education system.

26. Status for the Russian Orthodox Church

Special protections, maybe legal status, for the Moscow-linked church structures in Ukraine. (The Guardian)

The church was used as a vector for occupation and propaganda, and in some instances has been accused of complicity with the occupying forces to identify Ukrainians resistant to the Russian presence. This is essentially a demand to reinstall a Russian influence network within the Ukrainian state, embedded within communities, and in the worst-case scenario, allow Russia to build its intelligence, penetration and corruption networks via the church. 

27. Amnesties and no war-crimes trials

Earlier Trump-era proposals floated the idea that Russian officials wouldn’t face war-crimes prosecutions and Russia wouldn’t pay reparations. Those ideas seem to be back. (Kyiv Post)

Peace with justice is no peace at all. Without Russia admission of responsibility for and complicity in crimes, there will be no repentance. The phrase ‘we can repeat’ is the lesson that Russia will take from this. No justice, no deterrence. If the consequence of invading your neighbour is amnesty and frozen front lines, every dictator will be taking notes.

28. Silence on kidnapped children, filtration camps and reparations

The leaks say nothing about the return of deported Ukrainian children, accountability for torture and filtration, or serious reparations. That silence is the point. (Kyiv Post)

A plan that doesn’t put stolen children at the centre, or mention mass graves and destroyed cities is not a peace plan. It’s a face-saving exit ramp for the aggressor and his American enablers.

Notice what’s missing: there’s no serious enforcement mechanism on Russia; no automatic snap-back sanctions; no NATO accession; no guaranteed air-defence umbrella; no explicit commitment to war-crimes tribunals or reconstruction under Ukrainian control.

As historian Timothy Snyder writes in a recent essay on how to negotiate with Russia, any serious approach must “account for history, law, and above all, Ukraine.” This plan, by contrast, appears designed to account above all for Trump’s need for a photo-op and the unlocking of lucrative business deals, and Putin’s need to lock in his gains. (Kyiv Post)

Why “land for cash” and vague guarantees are a dead end

The idea at the heart of this – land for cash, land for “rental fees,” land for vague U.S. security promises – is not new. It’s Munich with 21st century spreadsheets. The consolidation of criminality, the validation of war crimes. It assumes three things:

1. That Russia will respect a new status quo it got by force.

2. That Ukrainians will quietly accept losing huge chunks of their country in exchange for vague and unsubstantiated promises.

3. That Europe is happy to live next to a radicalised, militarised, undefeated Russia sitting on more Ukrainian territory.

All three assumptions are wrong.

First: Russia. Even now, as the plan is being leaked, Putin’s spokesman is insisting that any peace must address the “root causes” – meaning NATO enlargement, Ukraine’s western turn be reversed, its government purged, and Russia’s imperial grievances met. (Reuters)

In other words: even if Ukraine signs away Donbas and demilitarises, Moscow will still say the “root causes” haven’t been solved until Ukraine is neutralised, disarmed and effectively in Russia’s sphere of control. Only the full loss of sovereignty will satisfy Putin, that much is clear. 

Second: Ukraine. This is not a war being sustained by one man’s ego in Kyiv. It’s being fought by a population that has seen Bucha, Mariupol, Izium, Ternopil’s apartment blocks. Snyder warns that Americans who think this is a real-estate dispute between two leaders are missing the point: Ukrainians are fighting “for their lives and for a sense of what a decent life means.” (Kyiv Post)

You cannot sell them a deal that says: your dead remain unavenged, your deported children remain in Russia, your torturers walk free – but congratulations, you get a smaller army and some “security guarantees” that will likely never be acted upon in any case. 

Third: Europe. Kaja Kallas makes the basic point: this war has one aggressor and one victim. Any settlement that rewards aggression weakens the entire international order and incentivises copycats – not just in Moscow, but in Beijing and elsewhere. (Kyiv Post)

If Ukraine is forced into a bad peace, the lesson for every frontline state from Tallinn to Taipei is simple: either get your own nukes, or hope your neighbours are kind. Let’s talk about those “security guarantees.”

The Economist notes – in a paywalled piece whose summary is circulating – that the 28-point framework is “aimed largely at curbing Ukraine’s military power once the shooting stops.” The guarantees on offer look flimsier than the ones Ukraine got in 1994 when it gave up its nuclear arsenal. (Facebook)

Rubio, trying to clean up the messaging, posted that ending the war will require “an extensive exchange of serious and realistic ideas.” (Reuters) His post was vague to the point of being meaningless. What do you mean Marco? Are you willing to stand up for any values at all? 

But what Ukrainians and many in Congress see right now is something very different: a not-serious, not-realistic list of unilateral Ukrainian concessions cooked up by Witkoff and Dmitriev in Miami, leaked through Axios, and wrapped in the language of “difficult but necessary compromises” by officials who know nothing but their own self-interests, but who should know better. (The Times)

In the U.S. Congress, reactions already show a split. Some Trump-allied figures warn that any deal that “looks like surrender” is politically toxic; others seem content to let Ukraine twist in the wind if it helps Trump claim a “deal” in the media or the awards circuit. (Kyiv Post)

Meanwhile, Ukraine is under the heaviest missile and drone barrages in months. On the night these leaks appeared, Russia fired dozens of missiles and hundreds of drones across the country; one strike on Ternopil killed at least twenty-plus civilians including children. (Kyiv Post) That’s the context in which this “peace plan” lands: as Russian bombs hit apartment blocks, Trump’s envoys float ideas about leasing out occupied territory and cutting Ukraine’s air defences. It’s beyond gross – it’s criminal negligence and complicity with war crimes. 

Where this leaves the “rules-based order”

If this 28-point plan – or anything like it – becomes the template for ending the war, the message to the world is brutal but clear:

* Nuclear-armed states can invade neighbours and, after a few years, negotiate a discounted price on the land they stole.

* Security guarantees and international law are soft concepts that melt under pressure from a determined autocrat and a transactional White House.

* Democracies don’t stand together; they bargain away each other’s territory when the costs bite.

That’s why Ukrainians are furious. That’s why Baltic and Polish officials are alarmed. That’s why Kallas says Europe will not accept a plan that sidelines Kyiv and Brussels. (Kyiv Post)

It’s why voices like Snyder insist that any real negotiation must start from a different place:

* No concessions in advance on behalf of other countries.

* Victims of aggression – not just aggressors – at the table.

* Enforcement mechanisms that bite when Russia cheats and lies and breaks treaties and law.

* Justice and reconstruction as central pillars, not afterthoughts. (Kyiv Post)

The leaked Trump plan fails every one of those tests.