Acting On Bad Intel, ‘Rigid’ Russian Forces Keep Attacking Along The Same Roads In Kursk—And Rolling Into The Same Ukrainian Kill Zones

‘Every day they attack,’ one Ukrainian drone operator reported.

Nov 13, 2024

A missile strike on a Russian vehicle in Kursk.
47th Mechanized Brigade capture

A week into their counteroffensive aimed at eliminating Ukraine’s 250-square-mile salient in western Russia’s Kursk Oblast, Russian forces have suffered staggering casualties—and have very little to show for it so far.

They’ve retaken the village of Pogrebki, on the northern edge of the salient. But that’s little consolation to the hundreds of Russians who have died in failed assaults elsewhere along the salient’s northern and western sides.

The Russians’ problem is twofold. First, there are only so many roads into the salient from the north and west—and the Russians keep attacking along them, day after day despite previous defeats. Second, it’s not clear Russian commanders are giving their troops accurate intelligence on the disposition of Ukrainian forces in the salient.

All that is to say, the Russian attacks are both predictable—and blind. It’s a recipe for massive losses. Kreigsforscher, a Ukrainian drone operator supporting the defense of Kursk, has tallied 88 destroyed Russian vehicles on three main roads threading through and around the settlement of Zelenyi Shylakh, in the no-man’s-land on the salient’s northwestern flank.

Eleven of those vehicles—divided between the 51st Airborne Regiment, 83rd Air Assault Brigade and 155th Naval Infantry Brigade—were knocked out on Wednesday. Without a doubt, more are coming. “Every day they attack with [armored fighting vehicles],” Kriegsforscher reported. “Mostly four to six per attack.”

The Ukrainian 17th Heavy Mechanized Brigade, 41st and 47th Mechanized Brigades and 95th Air Assault Brigade, among other units, have met the Russians with mines, artillery, missiles, drones and tanks. The fighting on Saturday was so close and chaotic that a pair of Ukrainian tanks rolled right past a clutch of four Russian vehicles without the tank crews even noticing.

The tankers finally spotted the Russian vehicles as they disgorged 15 paratroopers. That’s when the tanks opened fire, destroying one of the vehicles.

It’s possible the Russian crews were acting on bad intelligence. Consider the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade’s attack around Pogrebki on Nov. 7. Graphic drone footage depicted several of the brigade’s BTR-82 vehicles getting blown up at short range by dug-in Ukrainian troops.

“What you see in the footage is the result of yet another lie from the local command to the general staff,” Russian blogger Romanov explained. Marine commanders assured their superiors that Rusisan forces were fully in control of the road through Pogrebki. “Logically, after receiving this information, the general staff issued an order to storm the settlement,” Romanov wrote.

But the Russians weren’t in control of the road. There were still Ukrainian mines on the ground—and no one in the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade bothered to clear them before the BTRs barreled in, according to Romanov.

The problem is systemic in this brigade, if not in adjacent units. “In general, deliberate disinformation [to] the general staff by the command of the 810th Brigade has become a routine practice,” Romanov warned.

Feeding bad information up their chain of command and then relaying bad orders back down, Russian commanders in Kursk are setting their troops up for bloody tactical failures. That doesn’t mean the Russians will lose in Kursk. It does mean they’ll probably suffer catastrophic casualties, regardless of the ultimate outcome of the battle.

Sheer numbers are the Russians’ main advantage. There are an estimated 50,000 Russian and allied troops in the area—and only 20,000 or 30,000 Ukrainian troops. The Kremlin will probably need those extra people. It has made the elimination of the Kursk salient a top priority, and is clearly willing to expend thousands of lives in the process.

The clock is ticking. Anticipating that the administration of U.S. President-elect Donald Trump will cut Ukraine off from vital U.S. aid, potentially compelling the Ukrainians to acquiesce to an armistice that freezes the front line in place, the Russians are trying to advance as far as possible as fast as possible before Trump’s January inauguration. “This locks them into an unnecessarily rigid political position,” wrote Emil Kastehelmi, an analyst with the Black Bird Group.

The Ukrainians in Kursk know the Russians are coming. And they know how, where and usually when the Russians are coming. All the Ukrainians have to do is lay their mines, dial in their artillery, launch their drones, position their missile launchers … and wait for the inevitable attacks.

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Sources:

1. Kriegsforscher

2. Moklasen

3. Romanov

4. Emil Kastehelmi

David Axe

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/11/13/acting-on-bad-intel-rigid-russian-forces-keep-attacking-along-the-same-roads-in-kursk-and-rolling-into-the-same-ukrainian-kill-zones

3 comments

  1. Non-existent competencies in their leadership, terrible tactics, lies, deceits, total disregard to human life, and desperation make for very high cockroach casualties, but is very good for the AFU.

  2. “Sheer numbers are the Russians’ main advantage. There are an estimated 50,000 Russian and allied troops in the area—and only 20,000 or 30,000 Ukrainian troops.”

    If Ukraine have 20-30,000 in Kursk, then 50,000 orcs is nowhere near enough, and with the snow now falling in the area, mafia land have no other option than to use roads.

    • Indeed. And, it was smart of the Ukrainian staff to keep the salient small. It’s easier to defend, and it’s still mafia territory, even if it’s only one square km.

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