
Nov. 29, 2025
Amid daily shelling, Ukraine’s defense industry has reached peak production – surpassing what the government can buy. Kyiv is now looking to export its surplus.

Nearly three weeks after President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that Ukraine would open its arms for export, officials say the policy is now shifting from declaration to implementation, with the first sales offices set to open in Berlin and Copenhagen.
The cautious step was discussed at an “on background” meeting with journalists last week – where information from the meeting could be shared without attribution – at the National Security and Defense Council, where Kyiv Post was present.
Senior Ukrainian officials and defense industry leaders shared details of the plan.
Here, Kyiv Post outlines some of the key ideas behind the upcoming expansion of Ukrainian weapons exports.
Why export now?
At first glance, it may seem contradictory for Ukraine to export arms while still relying heavily on foreign military aid, especially from Europe and the US.
Several categories of weapons remain in severe deficit – artillery shells, guidance systems, aviation missiles, spare aircraft parts, and aircraft themselves. These capabilities cannot currently be replaced domestically.
“Ukraine currently uses up to 25% of American shells,” military analyst Oleh Katkov explains. “This cannot be replaced if supplies stop, because Europe cannot cover the gap.”
However, drones are a different story. Ukraine can now manufacture enough drones – systems that define today’s battlefield – to meet frontline needs and export abroad.
The war has evolved into a conflict dominated by robotics, with the front line becoming a 10-15 km (6-9 mile) “kill zone” due to drone saturation.
“We already produce enough drones to export them,” one manufacturer said. “Volunteers from Latvia and Lithuania have even come for training.”
“Ukrainian industry produces, for example, enough [first-person view] FPV drones, and its capabilities indeed exceed the needs of the front. But with some specific types of drones, such as interceptor drones, we still have a production deficit,” said Hryhoriy Shverk, founder of drone-manufacturing company General Cherry.
Officials say Ukraine’s defense-industrial base now has an annual capacity of about $35 billion, though only about half of it is funded, leaving enormous unused potential.
“Long-range weapons alone may exceed $35 billion in value by 2026, with the entire sector reaching $60 billion,” Rustem Umerov, the Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, told Kyiv Post.

Ukrainian Defence Minister Rustem Umerov arrives at the Elysee Palace in Paris on March 26, 2025 ahead of France’s President and Ukraine’s President’s meeting to prepare for the summit with the ‘coalition of the willing’. The summit of the ?coalition of the willing? is held in Paris on March 27, 2025. (Photo by Ludovic MARIN / AFP)
Bloomberg estimates Ukraine can already build 4 million drones per year, enabling both domestic supply and export.
Ukraine is also rapidly reducing dependence on Chinese components, producing controllers, propellers, and other parts domestically.
Yet most drone producers, and not only they, still operate below capacity.

An instructor demonstrates during a training for civilians on assembling and repairing FPV drones in Lviv on October 18, 2025, amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine. (Photo by YURIY DYACHYSHYN / AFP)
“Only 14% of producers we surveyed expect full capacity utilization, another 21% expect their facilities to operate at more than half their workload. So, most respondents again forecast only partial loading of capacity. Whereas fulfilling orders under international contracts with open export and joint ventures would allow for full utilization,” says Kateryna Mykhalko, head of the association of dozens of drone producers, Technological Forces of Ukraine.

Export planning, officials argue, must begin now – not just to generate revenue but to share Ukrainian combat-tested expertise with European partners.
“In Europe and the US, local drone production is still very raw,” Shverk noted. “Ukrainian engineers refine systems based on real-time frontline feedback. We, for example, are constantly in contact with brigades that receive our products, we get feedback, constantly improve the product. Testing in a real full-scale war is what Ukrainian drones have.”
This is especially relevant for EU countries already facing the creeping threat of Russian hybrid aggression.
“It is important for export legislation to be compatible with European practices. Late last year, we conducted a survey showing that most NATO countries have already approached Ukrainian producers for partnerships or weapons procurement. The top five countries submitting requests to Ukrainian manufacturers include NATO members Lithuania, the US, the UK, the Czech Republic, and Latvia,” Mykhalko said.
How it will work – and potential pitfalls
Under the plan, Denmark and Germany – two of Ukraine’s most reliable military supporters – will host Ukrainian defense export platforms. These offices will showcase Ukrainian technologies, serve as negotiation hubs, and support cooperation with governments and private partners.
Each platform will include:
- An open zone for demonstrations
- A closed zone for military planners
- Office space for contract discussions
But the idea has generated concern among manufacturers.
Private producers prefer dealing directly with foreign buyers. Their main worry, Mykhalko says, is that the new offices could become a bureaucratic bottleneck or a de facto “special exporter” with undue influence, potentially creating corruption risks.
“It is important that the offices have no additional powers not foreseen in Ukrainian law, particularly regarding influence over which products are contracted. We want to warn against these platforms becoming special-exporter offices that create artificial barriers between business and the market and generate corruption risks. Producers do not need such an intermediary. Today, Ukrainian defense companies are already integrated into Western industrial and investment networks. They work directly with European and American partners,” Mykhalko notes.
Officials acknowledge this—but emphasize two key concerns.
- Control and Security
The state insists on oversight to prevent Russian entities from posing as foreign buyers. The NSDC will maintain a list of approved export destinations, with a focus on countries that have signed security agreements.
“How can we be sure of this if we do not control or at least monitor the sales process? No one says we should create a sieve, but we must at least understand who is working with whom – we must know this,” one official told Kyiv Post.

This handout photograph taken and released by the Ukrainian Presidential Press Service on Feb. 8, 2025, shows Ukrainian made long-range weapons at a defense industry enterprise, during the visit of the Ukrainian President and the Chair of the NATO Military Committee, in an undisclosed location in Ukraine. (Photo by Handout / UKRAINIAN PRESIDENTIAL PRESS SERVICE / AFP)
Still, Shverk believes direct contracts will eventually be allowed: “Platforms are good for now. Later, direct contracts will be possible.”
Officials expect the first export contracts no earlier than mid-2026.
- Frontline Priorities
Some fear exports could create shortages at the front. Officials say frontline needs will take absolute priority, and any export contract may be paused if required.
Producers argue exports won’t undermine domestic supply because export models differ from frontline ones, and export income will help companies scale production and buy components in bulk – something state contracts rarely enable.
Export approval will come through the State Service for Export Control and the Interagency Commission under the NSDC.
At the same time, officials note: private producers are not required to work through state special exporters; a producer may use a state special exporter, a private special exporter, or obtain its own export authority as a Defense City resident (in 7–12 days) or by a separate Cabinet decision for a specific producer (up to a year).
Defense City is a special regime for Ukraine’s defense industry. According to ex-minister of Strategic industries Oleksandr Kamyshin, all Defense City residents will receive simplified access to export procedures, international transfers, and joint production.
But without existing contracts, how these rules will work in practice remains to be seen.
Forms of cooperation and geography
For both Ukrainian producers and foreign partners, the key question is the format of cooperation.
Shverk says the focus shouldn’t be just drones, but on an entire ecosystem of products and services that are unique because they are battle-tested.
“A drone is not just a drone – not just a flying device. It is a set of solutions: pilot training, service, each drone has its own tactics of use, etc. Selling just the product means not revealing all its capabilities. You need to sell training, tactical development, and service,” Shverk argues.
Some firms fear their technologies may be copied in the West. The state is considering selective technology sharing and partial localization, but only for components that are not uniquely Ukrainian.
The initiative will operate under the “Build in Ukraine, Build with Ukraine” brand, starting with the “Danish model” that encourages investment in Ukrainian production or joint facilities abroad.
On export geography, opinions diverge. Officials prefer exporting only to reliable Western allies to prevent leakage to Russia.
Others argue Ukraine should enter Africa and Latin America to push Russia out of its traditional markets.
“We must sell to Africa and Latin America. We must push Russians out. I believe we can,” Shverk said.
https://www.kyivpost.com/post/65105

Selling certain types of arms makes perfect sense, even for Ukraine, when you can make a profit, and profits means more money to increase production, and to invest in other systems where money is scarce.