UkraineAlert by Alexander J. Motyl
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has just replaced most of his cabinet, including his prime minister. His office will spin this as a sign of renewal. In fact, it’s an indication that Zelenskyy is already in serious trouble.
Less than one year ago, Zelenskyy was able to win the presidency because he was all things to all people. That quality helped him and his amorphous party, Servant of the People, triumph in last year’s presidential and parliamentary elections. However, it is no way to run a country that faces enormous economic and political challenges.
His inexperience as a policymaker — inexperience that Zelenskyy’s closest advisers also share — may finally be asserting itself and overshadowing the optimism that accompanied his 2019 election victories. Mistakes and missteps have become the norm. Confusion in the corridors of power abounds. Backstabbing and rumor-mongering — always signs of something amiss within a ruling elite — have increased. His administration seems confused about how to proceed with the sale of agricultural land, one of its most important declared reforms.
The absence of a defining strategy hinders all leaders, but the problem is especially acute in the case of Zelenskyy, as his and his party’s landslide victories have concentrated enormous power and responsibility in their untrained hands. Like it or not, Zelenskyy is now the linchpin of Ukraine’s political system. He runs the entire show. It’s as if he were the star of a reality TV series called Ukraine and has suddenly realized that, as its producer, director, and scriptwriter, he doesn’t know how to proceed.
Given this lack of policy-making expertise, the result has been seat-of-the-pants improvisation, half-baked ideas, and policies produced by an under-cooked political elite led by tech-savvy media people with minimal understanding of governance. As a result, a visibly frustrated Zelenskyy has taken to fuming and scolding in the manner of weak strongmen who know they bear full responsibility for goings-on they do not fully understand or control.
Not surprisingly, most of Ukraine’s intellectual elites have turned, or are turning, against Zelenskyy. Some of their criticism is excessive and unfair. Nevertheless, the bottom line, for Zelenskyy at least, is that this elite questions, if not, in fact, rejects, his legitimacy. Zelenskyy still remains popular with the public. But no democratically elected president can survive long as an effective leader if the intellectual elites regard him as a usurper or, worse still, a stooge of Putin or the Ukrainian oligarch, Igor Kolomoisky.
Zelenskyy’s current style of government is least suited to deal with the four challenges he needs to resolve as soon as possible.
First on the list, Zelenskyy has to deliver on all the populist promises he made to the electorate. In particular, this means ending the war with Russia, quashing corruption, and expanding the economy at a seven percent clip. A philosopher-king would be hard-pressed to meet these goals; a short-tempered tyro, whose popularity and legitimacy rest on public expectations of extremely rapid change, is sure to stumble. Over time, the temptation to pass the buck, blame parliament for his own missteps, and focus on enhancing his own authority may become irresistible.
Second, the politically inexperienced Zelenskyy has to transform his parliamentary deputies into an effective legislative branch without concentrating too much authority in his own hands. Many Ukrainians might be willing to overlook some dictatorial tendencies in exchange for reform, but the West and Ukraine’s intellectual class will not.
Third, the diplomatically inexperienced Zelenskyy has promised to reintegrate the occupied territories of eastern Ukraine, seemingly unaware of the fact that the Donbas has consistently opposed Ukraine’s move westwards ever since independence in 1991. Reintegrating this area into the Ukrainian body politic, especially with Russian agents and pro-Russian separatists still around, would be tantamount to political suicide for the Ukrainian state. If the occupied territories rejoin Ukraine as vassal statelets of Russia, they will stop all reform and destroy Zelenskyy’s presidency.
Fourth, despite impressive economic growth in 2019 and some good economic policies adopted by the former Minister of Finance Mylovanov, many economists point to the high likelihood that Ukraine will face worsening economic conditions in 2020. The country’s GDP is currently expected to grow by 3.5 percent, with the possibility that the coronavirus crisis may lower this growth rate as the global economy slows down. If serious land reform is not passed, Ukraine’s economy could slow even more.
All these challenges will require a coordinated, systemic response, something that Zelenskyy and his administration have thus far not produced. If Zelenskyy and his new cabinet do not retake the reform initiative immediately, political isolation and continued degradation will follow. Ukrainians will not tolerate a second-rate authoritarian who can’t deliver on any of his promises.
Under such a scenario, a third popular uprising along the same lines as the 2004 Orange Revolution or the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution becomes increasingly likely, unless a palace coup results in his removal from office. Needless to say, neither a popular insurrection nor a coup would enhance Ukraine’s stability and attractiveness to foreign investors. The Kremlin, however, would view either eventuality with glee.
What should Zelenskyy do? Above all, he must realize that, despite his fantastic electoral victories, he cannot govern alone. He needs the expertise, experience, and professionalism of the democratic opposition, both to develop sound policies and to protect himself from popular ire. Zelenskyy is not yet a banana republic dictator. It is not too late for him to pause and reach out to patriots for help in running a hugely complicated country.
Alexander J. Motyl is a professor of Political Science at Rutgers University-Newark.
(c) Atlantic Council
‘Third, the diplomatically inexperienced Zelenskyy has promised to reintegrate the occupied territories of eastern Ukraine, seemingly unaware of the fact that the Donbas has consistently opposed Ukraine’s move westwards ever since independence in 1991.’
Music to putler’s ears and not true. In December 1991, 83% of the Donbas electorate voted for independence, which is not far off the national average of 91%. The only area that voted significantly differently was Crimea, which had a 54% independence vote, which is why the putinazi scum have packed the place with Russian immigrants since the invasion and driven out the Tatars and Ukrainians in huge numbers. In other words, race replacement. As recently as the 1920’s, Crimea had a majority Tatar population. Stalin solved that problem with genocide and mass deportations. Shitweasel putler is a chip off the old block.
Other than the above, the article is fair comment.
It cannot be reiterated enough that all of Ukraine’s many problems are dwarfed by one thing: the need to remove all traces of putinazi occupation and putinazi influence from the country. Make a start by seizing the assets of putinazi oligarchs and putinazi parties and interring them until the war is over.
Until the nation is safe, there is only one wise option : a dictatorship ruled by Poro. Desperate diseases call for desperate remedies.
An appropriate term given that other evil virus that threatens the world.
I agree that he has exaggerated the pro-Russianness of the Donbas. But don’t forget that they have always chosen for the Party of Regions. I think it is a pro-Russian region to some extent. I do however, even though Putin would like it, mind it much, because I support the idea of letting the Donbas go. It is horrible, but if it could end the war, definitely worth it. In the meanwhile they can try to attract the upper class of Donbas, and then wait for the Donbas to collapse, like Eastern-Germany.
However, I am not sure if abandoning the Donbas will ultimately end the war. I think it could, because I think having the Donbas occupied, will make NATO and/or EU membership impossible. Also, I think Putin would like some sanctions relief (which I would consider betrayal, don’t get me wrong), and I think he will soon shift attention to another country he wants to bring under his control: Belarus.
You support the idea of letting the Donbas go? I assume you are Dutch Bert, the person who very occasionally makes sensible comments? This is not one of them.
You don’t give land to an invader, or legitimise invasion EVER. Sudetenland is the universal proof of that.
But then I recall that you are a lover of the corpulent putlerite shitbag Merkel, who also legitimised invasion. First by savages from primitive rape cultures, then by stating that ‘there is no military solution’ to putler’s occupation of Ukraine. Despite putler having just done exactly that.
I do not mean letting it go forever, and of course pressure should be put to get it back.
But I think Ukraine does not have hundreds of billions, maybe even trillions to repair the damage, while the economy is totally wrecked. The only way to prevent the region from starvation, is by subsidising it.
I think the most ideal situation would be a East- and West-Germany scenario. Russia is a house of cards that is going to collapse today or tomorrow. Ukraine should become a West-Germany that is prosperous and free. Once that will become clear among the population in Russia and the occupied territories, the skilled workforce will move to free Ukraine and the Russian regime will be under pressure and will become insecure.
Yes, I fully agree that is a terrible idea, as the local population will have to live on a terrorist regime, and these 14.000 Ukrainians died to restore the entire territory of Ukraine, not to have a piece of Russian cancer inserted into Ukraine.
But be fair, now we are heading nowhere. Young Ukrainians are dying almost every day, while the West is not helping. Ukraine does not have an army that can take on the Russians. And even if they would succeed, they cannot restore the damage for financial reasons.
My greatest fear is that Russia will control the Ukrainian government, which could happen if the Donbas is reintegrated as some kind of trojan horse, full of Vatniki’s and mobsters. Then there won’t be a free Ukraine at all.
You never surrender land to fascist occupiers under any circumstances whatsoever. As history proves. A lend lease solution might be viable:-
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/us-should-revive-lend-lease-to-contain-russia/
A very good article. Sadly the author ignores the fact that no political party is willing to abandon the occupied territories for the sake of a free Ukraine in Nato. And The US and Europe support this idiotic position. Ukraine is neither capable of retaking the occupied territories, nor is she financially and politically able to shoulder the burden they would become if returned. Instead of pushing the russian occupied crap away, Ukraine is holding on to it like a diver jumping into the sea while being tied to an anvil. Borders change sometimes, as seen in Yugoslavia. Putin is very happy to have a thorne deep in Ukraine’s body. Ukraine needs a revolution of thinking. Not being afraid of being called a traitor, russian asset, or worse. Otherwise the drama will last forever. Putin won’t back down, but if Ukraine gives up the occupied territories to break free, Putin will be like a bank robber who has to realize that the stolen money has zero value.
I agree. My comment would have been unnecessary if I read yours first.
Likewise. Ukraine’s situation is more like Korea, not like the Sudetenland. Therefore a split is not surrender, but saving democracy.
Only one problem with that solution. What happens after the split, that Putin decides he got away with it once, he’ll try his luck a second time, and take another chunk of Ukraine?
Putin is not really interested in the Crimea and Donbas. He is using them to blackmail Ukraine and force her back into Russia’s orbit. Concerning another piece, Ukraine’s army may not be able to reconquer, but is perfectly able to defend. More than ever before in history.
Ukraine has certainly upped their military game. However, the size of the military establishment is about the max they can support in peace time, although they could increase their reserve components quite a lot, and need to do so. The acquisition of modern weapons superior to what the Russians have is something can do with help from the west. The US is helping some in this regard.
At present, I doubt Russia could take Ukraine, even if they commit their entire peacetime Army. Putin would find his country bleeding heavily if he tried, and anywhere he manages to conquer, the bleeding would get heavier. Ukrainians have suffered enough under Russias thumb, and that want no more of it.
I think the West won’t help Ukraine in terms of military hardware. I think they are allocating almost nothing. The U.S. supplies some useful stuff, but most of it isn’t. Humvees are good against the Taliban, not against the Russian army. Also the drones the Americans supplied were not resistant against electronic warfare and were of no use. The army does not have permission to use the Javelins they have received.
Also, Ukraine has about 4-5 billion U.S. dollar to spend amid wartime. Most of it goes to salaries. There is about 500 million for new military hardware each year, for the army, navy and air force. Because of the low prices in Ukraine, this is a lot of money for Ukrainian standards, and you can buy a lot of military hardware with that, made in Ukraine. But in the West, 500 million is nothing, so they cannot afford any Western made arms. Buying Javelins is a waste, as you could maybe have a hundred Ukrainian anti-tank missiles for the price of one Javelin missile.
I think giving Ukraine weapons is only useful if you give them a few billion, but I think currently, they can better give money as the Ukrainian arms industry can offer a lot more bang for the buck than any U.S. company.