America will not put boots on the ground, but may put jets in the air – what this promise is worth is still unclear

Telegraph View

19 August 2025

In tone, this meeting between Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelensky was a considerable improvement on February’s. In substantive content, a great deal remains unclear. The two fundamental questions of this conflict remain unresolved: where will the borders between Russia and Ukraine lie when Moscow’s terrible war of aggression ends, and how can Kyiv’s and Europe’s security be guaranteed in the future? Everything else is of secondary importance.

Russia continues to assert belligerent claims to territory including some still held by Ukraine, with Vladimir Putin insistent that the whole of Donetsk and Luhansk be ceded despite the failure of his forces to make progress. Mr Zelensky has correctly stated that the constitution of Ukraine forbids any such formal concessions of land without a referendum. Mr Trump has hinted that he may prefer to follow “the current line of contact”.

The tragic reality is that some territorial concessions on Kyiv’s part are now effectively deemed a given, including in Europe. The only question is how much, where, and the legal status of the lost land. There is a possible future in which a negotiated border becomes a diplomatic fact, but not one which is formally acknowledged.

No peace treaty has been signed between North and South Korea, with both Pyongyang and Seoul claiming the entirety of the Korean peninsula. As deeply unappealing as this parallel may be, it serves to illustrate that no final acknowledgement is necessary to demarcate a functional boundary. Whether this will satisfy Putin is another question.

A frozen conflict which asserts practical control over a region may not prove sufficient for a despot who has called the collapse of the Soviet Union “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe” of the last century, claiming that “tens of millions of our fellow citizens and countrymen found themselves beyond the fringes of Russian territory”, and who appears hell-bent on rebuilding his empire.

Russia’s historical and continuing aggression means that any acknowledgement that it has no claim to the rest of Ukraine cannot be taken in good faith. Memories of Russia’s pledge to “respect” the “territorial integrity” and “inviolability” of Ukraine’s borders in 1997 – and its previous commitments in Budapest – are still fresh in the mind. Trust, instead, lies in force of arms, and in security guarantees.

But here too much remains to be settled. The recent history of American foreign policy offers many examples of grand promises which the White House has failed to live up to. George Bush, in 2004, promised in writing to Israel that the United States would back Jerusalem’s disengagement from Gaza by leading efforts to “dismantle terrorist organisations” and “prevent the areas from which Israel has withdrawn from posing a threat that would have to be addressed by other means”. In Afghanistan, meanwhile, the American withdrawal after years of nation-building was a disaster for those who believed that America’s commitment was genuine and lasting.

In Ukraine, Mr Trump has pledged “very good protection, very good security”. The current understanding appears to be that America will not put boots on the ground, but may put jets in the air. What this promise would be worth is still unclear.

So, too, is the value of European nations assembling a reassurance force to be posted in Ukraine as an apparent tripwire – not meaningful enough to slow a Russian advance, large enough that its elimination would commit the continent to military response. This may not be particularly reassuring to those deployed, or indeed to Ukraine.

It is, however, about as much as Europe can offer. This point was underlined by the sight of the continent’s leaders gathering in Washington in an attempt to sway Mr Trump, waiting for the White House to determine which borders such a force might guard.

George Canning once claimed to have “called the New World into existence, to redress the balance of the Old”. With Europe woefully unable to provide for its own defence, spending on welfare rather than weapons, we find again that we must look for balance elsewhere.

It is a sobering illustration that Europe must regain the capacity to determine its own future. Until then, it must exert what influence it can to ensure that the uncertainties around Mr Trump’s deal are resolved in Ukraine’s favour.