Take down Russia’s energy infrastructure, culminating with Yamal Cross 

JONATHAN FINK

NOV 9

Date episode published: 09-Nov-25

Despite the profusion of stories we’ve covered, the battle for Pokrovsk, energy sanctions, and so on, the most important strategic angle on the war this winter is the attritional energy war. And it’s unlike the Western attitude to the war throughout all these four years – to cede the escalation dominance to Russia, always pulling punches, in support for Ukraine, and never allowing its ally to land a decisive blow on Russia. Now Ukraine is taking off the gloves, because below the nuclear threshold, there is nothing holding back Russia’s viciousness and violence.

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Ukraine is seeking to inflict greater costs on Russia in the energy war, than it can impose upon Ukraine. This ‘escalation’ is the only way to make it clear to Putin he cannot win and is the only way to inflict economic and social costs that start to make Putin’s brittle regime appear vulnerable to its internal audience. Nothing else will get through to Putin. Nothing at all. 

See the full video episode:

Ukraine’s “doomsday lever”? Hitting the Yamal network – myth vs. math

There is an inescapable logic to the course of this existential escalation for Ukraine’s existence. It starts with testing the theory of imposing blackouts and heating denial to smaller, non-strategic Russian towns. Belgorod, Vladimir, Voronezh. And this is happening now. The next stage is to test supporting infrastructure around Moscow – electricity substations, energy supply routes for fuel, gas and oil products. This is happening. Beyond that, are substantial and extended blackouts in smaller towns, then Moscow and St. Petersburg. But that’s not the final arrow in Ukraine’s quiver. It has a doomsday option – hitting Yamal Cross. If none of the other escalatory steps lead to an unconditional ceasefire, then I suggest it’s a near certainly that we’ll reach the doomsday stage for Moscow by end of this winter. 

There’s been chatter about a Ukrainian “doomsday” option to strike Russia’s Yamal gas pipeline hub, but it has not received as much attention as it perhaps deserves. Sometimes called the “Yamal Cross”, and it incorporates several gas lines including the Yamal-Europe natural gas pipeline, which is a 4,107-kilometre-long (2,552 mi) pipeline connecting Russian natural gas fields in the Yamal Peninsula and Western Siberia with Poland and Germany, through Belarus. The Poland portion ceased operating in 2022.

In Gazprom’s development project nomenclature, the pipeline consists of four sections, Bovanenkovo-Ukhta (1,200 km or 750 mi), Ukhta-Torzhok (970 km or 600 mi), the western section from Torzhok also confusingly named Yamal-Europe (1,660 km or 1,030 mi), and the partly parallel SRTO-Torzhok branch section (2,200 km or 1,400 mi).

Europe hasn’t relied on the Yamal-Europe route since 2022 and all Russian gas transit via Ukraine ended on Jan. 1, 2025, when Kyiv let the five-year transit deal expire. Moscow has floated restarting transit in “peace” proposals, but Kyiv shut the spigot, and alternative routes are limited (TurkStream is near capacity; Yamal-Europe remains politically blocked).

For a shorter-term hit, and more impact on battlefield logistics, Ukraine needs to hit the fuel the war machine burns – diesel and jet – rather than the gas Moscow barely sells westward anymore. However, some analysts have claimed there is still extraordinary power in striking this fuel nexus within Russia’s gas transit system at the Yamal Cross. 

It’s “Enough to collapse Russia’s economy,” says military expert Oleh Zhdanov, in relation to why Ukraine needs Tomahawk missiles, and why they are unlikely to be supplied. He claims that a strike on the “Yamal Cross” could alter the war’s trajectory. Tomahawk missiles, which the US is being asked to supply to Ukraine, could ‘collapse’ Russia’s economy. A hit on the ‘Yamal Cross’ – a nexus in northern Russia where 17 high-pressure gas pipelines converge – would suffice. This view was expressed to TSN.ua by Zhdanov.

It’s for this reason the analyst doubts the US will hand over Tomahawks. In his view, it’s more in the character of a ‘political bargaining chip’ by Trump. A way to exert pressure on the Kremlin to align with the outcomes he wants to achieve, rather than because of any way they can assist Ukraine to push back Russian aggression, or to achieve a victory of any sort. 

“But on the flip side, if we hypothetically assume they did provide them, I’d say even 20-50 missiles – that figure floats in open sources – 20 could snuff out the ‘Yamal Cross’ in one go. And that would cripple Russia’s entire energy sector,” Oleh Zhdanov states.

‘Yamal Cross’ may not be operational in its entirely but still represents the strategic core of Russia’s gas network. Zhdanov’s contention that a coordinated strike on this node could collapse Russia’s energy economy, is the exact reason, he states, why the US will never greenlight these missiles for Ukraine:

“Because that is the main task, I said this at the very start of the war. The first to guard against the collapse of the Russian Federation will be the United States. Everyone fears this collapse.”

The Yamal-Europe pipeline was highly strategically important as a major conduit for Russian natural gas supplies to Western Europe, but it is currently idle due to the geopolitical fallout from the war in Ukraine. The pipeline, with an annual capacity of 33 billion cubic meters (bcm), was one of the primary land-based routes for transporting natural gas from Russia’s Yamal Peninsula to Poland and Germany, contributing significantly to Europe’s energy security. The construction of the Yamal-Europe pipeline, along with Nord Stream 1, provided Russia with alternative routes to supply gas to Western Europe, bypassing Ukraine and increasing its leverage in transit negotiations.

The pipeline fostered significant economic ties and interdependence between Russia and European nations, with long-term contracts forming the basis of a major energy relationship for decades. Russia chose instead to use energy as a weapon, and then to invade Ukraine. 

The pipeline has been idle since 2022 after a payment dispute led to Russia halting deliveries to Poland, and subsequent sanctions and countersanctions on the Polish section’s owner. The Polish section of the pipeline is now primarily used for reverse flow, transporting gas from Germany to Poland, supported by other diversification efforts like the Baltic Pipe linking Poland to Norway. The war in Ukraine has fundamentally altered the European energy landscape. The EU is actively working to end its reliance on Russian fossil fuels by 2027 through diversification of supplies (e.g., LNG from the US and Qatar) and a transition to renewables, diminishing long-term strategic importance of traditional Russian pipeline routes. Hitting Yama Cross would reinforce the policy and close of future renewal of that supply.

While the physical infrastructure remains, the political and commercial viability of the Yamal-Europe pipeline as a major east-to-west supply route for Russian gas to Europe is currently non-existent, with the remaining operational pipeline being TurkStream. In essence, while the infrastructure was built for major strategic importance, political developments have largely neutralized that role in the current European energy strategy.

Russia’s domestic gas production is not solely dependent on the Yamal pipeline system, but the Yamal fields are a strategically important and growing source of gas for domestic consumption. The majority of Russia’s domestic gas comes from a vast, integrated network of fields and pipelines across the country, but Yamal Cross is that highest density node of supply in the system. Taking it down could trigger a cascade effect through the system. 

The Yamal Peninsula itself is a key strategic area for new development, with huge reserves. As of 2020, the Yamal gas fields produced over 20% of Russia’s natural gas, a share that was projected to increase. The gas from the Yamal fields is fed into Russia’s Unified Gas Supply System (UGSS), a massive network of pipelines spanning over 158,000 km, which serves the entire country. Gas from various fields is commingled and distributed through this system.

While the Yamal-Europe pipeline was a major export route to Europe (now largely halted due to sanctions and political disputes), the production fields in the Yamal region also supply the domestic market via the internal network. Russia has also diversified its infrastructure by building pipelines to China (Power of Siberia) and developing Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) projects, such as the Yamal LNG terminal, which primarily serves export markets but further reduces reliance on any single pipeline for overall production/revenue. 

So, there is another angle here – future trade with Europe is threatened by a strike, but it would also emphasise to China the instability of such a potential supply partner, for as long as the war persists, and Russian aggression against Ukraine. 

But a spectacular attack on Yamal pipelines inside Russia would bring diplomatic blowback and environmental risk, for marginal short-term impact on the Putin war machine, when compared with Ukraine’s ongoing, strike campaign against oil refineries, depots, and logistics – the part of Russia’s energy complex that fuels tanks, jets, and budget cashflow. But it remains a potent threat to Russia, its prestige, and long-term viability of its energy economy. Perhaps a strike on Yamal is more potent kept as a threat, than to be followed through with. 

Ukraine’s energy-attrition strategy is biting

Ukraine’s long-range drone/missile campaign keeps degrading Russian refineries and petrochemicals deep in the rear. It’s not just headlines – throughput and exports are wobbling, and Z-Patriots, as well as regime analysts have started to notice:

Reuters (Sept 1): “Recent Ukrainian drone attacks shut down facilities accounting for at least 17% of Russia’s oil processing capacity.” (Reuters)

Independent and market analyses since August track sustained outages and throughput cuts at Volgograd, Ryazan, Novokuibyshevsk and more, pushing periodic fuel shortfalls and price spikes inside Russia while forcing costly workarounds. (Reuters)

This is turning into a successful campaign with the option to scale the pressuring strategy: cut refined-fuel output, stress military logistics, and strain Russia’s budget and war machine.

Blackouts in Russia’s borderlands after Ukrainian strikes

Belgorod & Kursk: Local Russian officials say Ukrainian attacks knocked out power to tens of thousands. Belgorod governor Vyacheslav Gladkov wrote that “more than 20,000 residents are without electricity” in the regional capital; a fire at a power plant in Kursk compounded outages. (Nov. 9, The Moscow Times)

This mirrors Kyiv’s shift toward deep interdiction – aiming at Russia’s war-supporting power nodes and grinding down air-defence coverage by forcing it to protect a vast territory.

“A powerful secondary detonation”: Donetsk Shahed hub hit

Ukraine says it struck a Shahed storage/assembly/launch base at occupied Donetsk airport with drones and missiles. The General Staff reported “a powerful secondary detonation”-suggesting substantial stocks of munitions were ‘cooked off’. (Nov. 6, The Kyiv Independent)

“a base of storage, assembly and launch of Shahed-type UAVs” and “a powerful secondary detonation.” – Kyiv Independent, Nov. 6, 2025

That’s months of Ukrainian ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) work paying off – neutralizing a hub that feeds Russia’s long-range loitering-munitions campaign.

Volgograd: refinery halted after strike

Lukoil’s Volgograd refinery halted operations following a Ukrainian drone strike, with damage to the CDU-5 primary unit and a hydrocracker, according to multiple industry sources. (Nov. 6, Reuters)

“The plant has been stopped. CDU-5 was on fire…” – Reuters, Nov. 6, 2025

Taking a big conversion unit offline hits diesel/jet yields – exactly the fuels Russia needs for war logistics. Such attacks, if they can be sustained, have major strategic implications. 

Crimea fuels burn: Simferopol depot ablaze

In occupied Simferopol, the Krymnaftozbut oil depot erupted in flames after reported Ukrainian drone strikes overnight Nov. 6. Ukrainian Special Ops released a video of hits on oil/logistics targets across Crimea. (Kyiv Post)

“The Oil depot near Simferopol on fire after a drone attack.” – Ukrinform, Nov. 6, 2025

Why it matters: Crimea remains a logistics spine for Russia’s southern front; repeated depot hits raise supply risk for air, naval, and ground operations.

Deep strike in the east: Bashkortostan petrochemicals (agidol/aviation fuels)

Ukraine’s military intelligence (HUR) said long-range drones hit the Sterlitamak Petrochemical Plant (over 1,000 km from the border), targeting a workshop producing agidol, an aviation-fuel additive. (Nov. 7) The Kyiv Independent could not independently verify all damage claims, but geolocated footage showed a fire. (The Kyiv Independent)

Why you care: Aviation-grade additives are linchpins for high-performance fuels. Disrupting niche chemicals multiplies pain across Russia’s military-industrial output.

Rail sabotage: Partisans torch locomotives

Ukraine’s HUR credits Russian anti-Kremlin partisans (Freedom of Russia movement) with burning dozens of locomotives supplying the front. Even if numbers are contested, the video-verified pattern of railway sabotage has grown through 2025. (Nov. 6, Kyiv Post)

If you haven’t seen it, the videos are dramatic, of burning Russian train rolling stock. The strategic effect is lower rail capacity, and more pressure on the network, as well as the need to tighten security across a vast rail network. In a war of logistical tonnage, transportation attrition can be as lethal as a destroyed brigade on the battlefield.

Ukraine secures winter molecules: ORLEN to deliver U.S. LNG in early 2026

To stabilize winter energy security, Poland’s ORLEN and Naftogaz signed terms for ?300 mcm of gas sourced from U.S. LNG, with three cargoes slated for Q1 2026 – regasified in Poland and piped to Ukraine. (Nov. 7, orlen.pl)

“ORLEN will deliver over 300 million cubic metres of gas to its Ukrainian partner.” – ORLEN press release, Nov. 7, 2025 (orlen.pl)

As Russia steps up grid attacks, import flexibility via Poland and the so-called “Vertical Corridor” initiative becomes a life-support line through the heating season. (naftogaz.com)

What Ukraine hits-and why (the strategy piece)

Zooming out, Kyiv’s deep-strike doctrine has matured: drones and precision missiles aim at oil refineries, depots, petrochemicals, rail power, and drone hubs – systems that have intense and lengthy repair times, low mobility, and big budgetary implications. This is “distributed attrition” at scale, rather than a single doomsday blow. Even a Yamal Cross strike is not a magic bullet but could have impact when combined with numerous other targets. Recent expert work (CSIS; industry trackers) frames this as modern operational art across domains.

On the ledger: Shuttered refinery units (Reuters), constrained product exports, periodic fuel rationing, and growing defence-industrial friction. Meanwhile, Russia’s own mass strikes on Ukraine’s grid aim to invert the pain – forcing blackouts, slowing industry, sapping morale.

What to watch out for: 

Watch for follow-on strikes against power nodes in Russia’s border oblasts (Belgorod, Kursk, Voronezh) as Kyiv pressures air defences and energy logistics. (The Moscow Times)

Expect refinery repair windows to lengthen as repeated hits compound – Volgograd is a case in point. (Reuters) this same logic will start applying to electricity and thermal infrastructure. 

Track LNG intake routes (Poland, Lithuania, Greece) that keep Ukraine’s gas-fired generation and industry on life support this winter. It’s now strategically vital. (Polskie Radio online)

“Ukraine’s energy attrition play is working because it’s cumulative and targeted. The Yamal ‘doomsday’ option? Some analysts suggest it’s more a PR exercise than a strategic end game. But it would only come once so many other energy targets have been hit and eliminated, that it would be a powerful signal that Russia has decisively lost the attritional energy war. It would also be a tremendous blow for Russia’s future hopes of restarting its continental gas trade with Europe. A way of crippling Russia as a military and economic threat for many years.

© 2025 Jonathan Fink