15.11.2026
The main effect of Ukraine’s campaign of long-range strikes on Russia’s oil infrastructure is the simultaneous pressure it puts on production, domestic supplies and exports.
That is according to the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, Ukrinform reports.
Ukrainian strikes on Russia’s oil infrastructure are having an impact that goes far beyond individual refinery fires, the ministry said. It stressed that Russia is losing refining capacity, facing disruptions to its domestic market and being forced to protect key routes for energy exports.
In late October and November 2026, Ukraine significantly stepped up its campaign of long-range strikes on Russia’s oil infrastructure. Major oil refineries, storage facilities, pumping stations and export terminals came under attack. It is becoming increasingly clear that these are not isolated tactical incidents but a sustained effort to put pressure on an entire production and logistics chain, the ministry noted.
According to Reuters data published on November 10, Ukrainian attacks disrupted the operations of nine of Russia’s 35 largest oil refineries in a single week. Industry sources cited by the outlet estimated that actual oil refining volumes had fallen by approximately 30%, to 200,000 tonnes per day.
This is a significant figure for a country whose economy depends heavily on energy exports and whose petroleum products are essential not only to the civilian market but also to military logistics, the ministry said.
The first tangible effects of the campaign are becoming apparent inside Russia itself.
On November 9, reports emerged that Rosneft had reintroduced restrictions on fuel sales at its filling stations. In several regions, customers were allowed to purchase no more than 30 liters of gasoline in cities and 50 liters on highways. Sales of fuel in canisters were also restricted.
Similar problems were reported in Karelia, Buryatia, Zabaykalsky Krai, Krasnoyarsk Krai, and the Novosibirsk, Arkhangelsk and Penza regions.
Significantly, the previous restrictions had only begun to be lifted in late October. This means that Russia’s fuel market had not had time to fully stabilize before a new wave of attacks once again exacerbated the situation, the ministry said.
The problem, the ministry explained, is that having its own crude oil does not guarantee Russia sufficient supplies of finished gasoline or diesel. This requires functioning oil refining units, storage facilities, transport infrastructure and stable supply routes.
According to Financial Times estimates published on November 10, between 20% and 35% of Russia’s oil refining capacity may have been offline. The outlet also reported that Russia had begun importing gasoline by sea, including from Turkey, Morocco and Egypt.
The ministry noted that this is a telling symptom for one of the world’s largest oil producers: the country is being forced to seek finished fuel abroad to keep its domestic market supplied.
What matters is not only how many refineries have been hit, but also which specific technological units have been damaged, the ministry said.
An oil refinery is a complex facility in which primary crude oil processing is only the initial stage. Producing market-ready gasoline, diesel and aviation fuel requires secondary processing units, including catalytic cracking, hydrocracking, reforming and hydrotreating.
According to the International Energy Agency, minor damage to primary processing units can be repaired within one to two weeks. By contrast, repairs to complex secondary processing equipment can take an average of six to eight months.
This means that even after a fire has been extinguished, a refinery does not necessarily return to its previous production levels. And if several facilities are damaged at the same time, the remaining operational capacity has to bear the additional load.
Volgograd is an example of this kind of pressure. On the night of November 13, fires broke out in the city’s southern industrial zone following a drone attack. One of Russia’s largest oil refineries, LUKOIL-Volgogradneftepererabotka, is located there. It has an annual capacity of approximately 14 million tonnes of oil, or around 5% of Russia’s total refining capacity.
At the same time, as of the time of publication, Reuters had no official confirmation that the refinery itself had been hit in this attack. It is therefore important to distinguish this from the confirmed facts of the attack and the fires in the industrial zone.
Another important focus of Ukraine’s campaign is the infrastructure Russia uses to sell energy resources abroad, the ministry said.
On the night of November 11, Ukraine’s Defense Forces struck the port of Ust-Luga in the Leningrad region. According to preliminary information from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, five oil product storage tanks with a combined capacity of 150,000 cubic meters, a hydrocracking unit, a pumping station and a tanker loading berth were damaged.
The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) also reported hitting infrastructure at several enterprises and the Luzhskaya railway station.
Ust-Luga’s strategic importance lies in the fact that it is more than just a port for shipping cargo. It combines energy storage, processing and transshipment facilities. According to estimates cited by New Voice of Ukraine, based on oil market data, approximately 1.15 million barrels of oil and petroleum products passed through the port daily in 2025, accounting for around 20% of Russia’s seaborne oil exports.
Together with Primorsk and Novorossiysk, Ust-Luga forms the backbone of Russia’s maritime export infrastructure.
Therefore, the ministry said, damage to storage tanks is only part of the problem. If pumping equipment, railway access routes or berths are disrupted, it becomes harder for Russia to deliver products to tankers and fulfill scheduled export shipments. At the same time, the actual volume of petroleum products lost and the duration of disruptions to the terminal’s operations require separate confirmation.
Russia has reserves, alternative refineries, pipelines and the ability to redistribute production between regions. It would therefore be inaccurate to claim that the strikes automatically halt fuel supplies to the Russian army or deprive the Kremlin of oil revenues, the ministry said.
However, every major facility damaged increases the burden on the rest of the system. Additional supply routes, equipment repairs, imports of finished fuel and adjustments to export logistics all require time and money.
This is the main effect of Ukraine’s campaign: simultaneous pressure on production, domestic supplies and exports. While an individual refinery can be restored and certain volumes of products redirected, the combined impact of these problems is much harder to offset, the ministry said.
Gasoline purchase limits at Russian filling stations, reduced oil refining and damage to export infrastructure are different manifestations of the same problem. Ukraine is steadily increasing the costs Russia must bear to keep its oil industry running, an industry that helps finance both its economy and its war.
Most importantly, the consequences of these strikes do not necessarily end when the fires are extinguished. Some of their effects may accumulate over a period of months, the ministry said.