Andrey Kaut11:50, November 25, 2025

We are talking about frozen Russian assets in Europe.

A joint US-Russian ” peace plan ” to end the war in Ukraine will earn US President Donald Trump a $300 billion bonus for signing the agreement.

This is what columnist and senior fellow for geoeconomics at the European Council on Foreign Relations Agathe Demarais writes for Foreign Policy .

Much of this “bonus” concerns frozen Russian assets. The question now is no longer whether the Russian central bank’s assets will be confiscated, but who will receive them.

The total value of Russian assets is approximately $300 billion, primarily held in European Union institutions. According to Trump’s “peace plan,” this money will serve as the equivalent of a signing bonus for Washington, which may explain the US president’s keen interest in a swift agreement.

The agreement stipulates that American firms will receive $100 billion in frozen Russian assets to finance Ukraine’s reconstruction, with the US government receiving 50% of the project’s profits. The remaining frozen funds, approximately $200 billion, will be used in a US-Russia investment vehicle. European taxpayers will cover another $100 billion in Ukraine’s reconstruction costs.

Ukraine needs Russian assets to invest in Europe

The International Monetary Fund estimates that Ukraine will face a budget deficit of $65 billion in 2026-27, excluding military equipment and ammunition, and no funding source has yet been confirmed. Including military spending, the funding gap could reach $155 billion over the next two years.

With the US out of the equation and Ukraine’s domestic revenues falling far short of war-related expenditures, Europe is taking on the responsibility of helping Ukraine fill its budget deficit.

To entice Europe, on November 17, Kyiv announced plans to purchase up to 100 French-made Rafale fighter jets over the next 10 years. Just a few weeks earlier, the Ukrainian government announced an agreement to purchase up to 150 Swedish Gripen fighter jets.

Ukraine is persistently demonstrating to EU countries that it is making good use of Russia’s frozen central bank reserves if the bloc finally fills Kyiv’s coffers with these assets.

Trump needs Russian assets because he loves money.

The United States owns only 1.5%—approximately $5 billion—of Russia’s frozen assets, while EU countries together own almost three-quarters. This means that the proposed scheme effectively allows Washington to acquire the EU’s rights to these assets.

Some experts hope this will make Trump’s “peace plan” unviable, but they may be overly optimistic. The US could pressure the EU, just as it did this summer with tariff threats, and Euroclear, where Russian assets are primarily held, to release funds.

There are precedents for such pressure. In 2012, the Belgian-based financial network SWIFT had no choice but to sever ties with Iranian banks under intense pressure from Washington.

From Ukraine’s perspective, the financial provisions of Trump’s “peace plan,” like the rest of the agreement, are catastrophic. A US takeover of Russia’s frozen assets would cut off Kyiv’s only reliable source of funding—the EU reparations loan secured by these assets.

If the US-Russia plan fails to bring peace, which is entirely possible given its weak or non-existent security guarantees, Kyiv will find it difficult to finance military spending.

Ironically, Ukraine has just begun negotiations for a new loan with the IMF—a critical step for international donors. However, the United States is the Fund’s largest shareholder, making a new loan unlikely without Trump’s support.

Moreover, the IMF can only provide loans to countries that have a reasonable chance of repaying their debt. Without a loan from the European Union, it’s unclear how Kyiv will be able to meet this criterion.

The fate of the US-Russia plan depends on the EU’s ability to quickly confiscate Russia’s frozen assets. If Belgium abandons its previous position and the European Union quickly provides the reparations loan—that is, within days rather than weeks—the bloc could render one of the key provisions of Trump’s plan irrelevant and significantly curtail his interest in this bad and dangerous deal for both Ukraine and Europe.

(C)UNIAN 2025