Oleg Davygora19:28, 04.12.23
Ukraine’s failures on the battlefield have led to disagreements with the United States over how best to penetrate deep Russian defenses.
As winter approaches and front lines freeze, Ukraine’s most senior military officials acknowledge the war has reached a stalemate , according to a Washington Post investigation into miscalculations and disagreements in planning for the Ukrainian counteroffensive.
This analysis of preparations for Ukraine’s counteroffensive is based on interviews with more than 30 senior officials from Ukraine, the United States and European countries. It provides new insight and previously unreported details about America’s deep involvement in military counteroffensive planning and the factors that contributed to its disappointments.
During the planning of the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ offensive, disagreements arose between the Ukrainian military and their allies, in particular regarding the time and place of the operation.
The Ukrainian, American and British militaries played eight large board war games to develop the campaign plan. But Washington miscalculated the extent to which Ukrainian forces could be transformed into a Western-style fighting force in a short period of time—especially without making Kyiv’s air force an integral part of the modern military.
U.S. and Ukrainian officials at times disagreed sharply over strategy, tactics and timing. The Pentagon wanted the offensive to begin in mid-April to prevent Russia from continuing to strengthen its position. The Ukrainians were hesitant, arguing that they were not ready without additional weapons and training.
US military officials were confident that a mechanized frontal attack on Russian positions was possible with the troops and weapons that Ukraine had. The modeling concluded that Kyiv’s forces could, at best, reach the Sea of Azov and cut off Russian forces in the south in 60–90 days.
The United States favored a focused offensive along this southern axis, but the Ukrainian leadership believed that its troops should attack at three separate points along the 600-mile front: towards Melitopol, Berdyansk and Bakhmut.
The U.S. intelligence community took a more pessimistic view than the U.S. military, believing the offensive had only a 50-50 chance of success given the robust, layered defenses Russia had built over the winter and spring.
Many in Ukraine and the West underestimated Russia’s ability to recover from battlefield disasters and use its long-standing strengths: manpower, mines and a willingness to sacrifice lives on a scale that few other countries can match.
As the expected start of the offensive approached, the Ukrainian military feared that it would suffer catastrophic losses, while American officials believed that without a decisive attack, casualties would ultimately be higher.
Seventy percent of the troops in one of the counteroffensive brigades, equipped with the latest Western weapons, entered the battle without combat experience.
Ukraine’s failures on the battlefield have led to disagreements with the United States over how best to penetrate deep Russian defenses.
The commander of U.S. forces in Europe was unable to contact Ukraine’s top commander for several weeks early in the campaign due to tensions over the American’s lack of confidence in battlefield decision-making.
Each side blamed the other for mistakes and miscalculations. U.S. military officials concluded that Ukraine did not master basic military tactics, including the use of ground reconnaissance to determine the density of minefields. Ukrainian officials said Americans do not seem to understand how attack drones and other technologies have changed the battlefield.
(C)UNIAN 2023