07/28/2025


Since the end of 2023, the war in Ukraine has actually become different – it has turned into a war of attrition . This was stated by the former commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Valery Zaluzhny. Both sides of the conflict hope that the enemy will be exhausted earlier. The aggressor country Russia openly declares its readiness to fight for decades. A comparison of the formal indicators of the military power of the two countries is also not in favor of Ukraine. But is the advantage of the Russian army really undeniable?
Despite the significant advantage in human and material resources, the situation is not unambiguous. The enemy is faced with the depletion of mobilization potential, a decline in motivation, and the need to use repressive methods to keep soldiers at the front. The forecast of the possible duration of the war until 2034 should be perceived as one of the scenarios, and not as a fait accompli. The President of Ukraine, as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, must openly and often talk about mobilization, because the issue of the country’s defense is his key responsibility.
This opinion was expressed in an exclusive interview with OBOZ.UA by the co-director of foreign policy programs, coordinator of international projects of the Razumkov Center, military expert Oleksiy Melnyk .
– Do you agree with Mr. Zaluzhny’s assessments that from the end of 2023 we will have a different war than the one that existed at the beginning of the full-scale invasion?
– I not only agree, but have repeatedly emphasized in my articles and speeches that the nature of the war, precisely after the completion of the unsuccessful counteroffensive, has entered the stage of a war of attrition. This is not news, this is a fact that has really been observed, one might say, since the end of 2023 or 2024.
I also agree that the nature of a war of attrition is that each side at this stage, continuing the war, is convinced that the opposing side will be exhausted sooner. Thus, there is hope of achieving better conditions for concluding a peace treaty or victory.
Currently, Russia confidently demonstrates this belief in official statements, starting from Putin and ending with those who bark at him that Russia is ready to fight forever, for decades. They proceed from the fact that Russia’s resources are objectively much greater than Ukraine’s, and that at some point Europe will refuse to support Ukraine, lose its appetite, and then Russia will finally achieve the set prices.
– I am not sure that the enemy will be exhausted earlier, but if we take objective indicators, objective circumstances, what conclusion can we draw? After all, we understand that the aggressor country is indeed very resourceful, in particular resourceful due to its large human potential. However, technologically, Ukraine still surpasses its enemy. How do you assess this balance and can we really hope that the enemy will be exhausted earlier than the Ukrainian army?
– There is such a thing in military theory as the balance of power. And even the very respected international institute IISS publishes a large annual, which is called Military Balance. It is not the only institution that deals with this. Even if you look at Wikipedia, the relevant UN encyclopedias or even the CIA, they provide basic things, starting from the state’s GDP, the size of the armed forces, the number of tanks, aircraft, mobilization resources, etc. And many analysts draw conclusions from this.
That is, if the left column contains the indicators of one side, and the right column contains the indicators of the other side, then it is very easy to conclude that the balance of power is not in favor of one of the opponents. Accordingly, the one who has this plus in the balance has a much greater chance of winning if this imbalance is too noticeable.
Actually, this was the basis for the predictions of the first days of the large-scale invasion. We remember that Ukraine was given 72 hours, 2 weeks, 3 weeks, and so on. But the further development of hostilities showed that all this is quite relative. There are a lot of other factors that influence the course of the war and how it can end.
Therefore, if we now make such a table with the balance of forces, then Ukraine has a chance of 1 to 3, if we take into account human resources. If we take into account missiles, aviation equipment, then, as at the beginning of the war, the imbalance was 1 to 10, or in terms of artillery 1 to 12. But this again confirms that this is a rather simplified approach.
This advantage of Russia, both in material resources and in human resources, has not disappeared. But, as you mentioned, one of the moments is the technological factor. And this is only one of the moments. There are tactics, there is strategy, there is political will, there is the readiness of society, if we are talking about Ukraine, or the readiness of the population under Putin’s control to endure war. These are a lot of factors that need to be taken into account, that need to be influenced. Therefore, even if at first glance the final outcome of the confrontation seems obvious, in reality it is not entirely so.

– Mr. Zaluzhny also emphasized that Ukraine needs not just to negotiate a ceasefire or a temporary truce, but also to think about changing its defense strategy and approaches to resource mobilization. In your opinion, what is a change in defense strategy?
– I would like to make one more remark not so much about what General Zaluzhny said, but about how his statement is interpreted. Some media outlets ran a sensational headline that the war will last until 2034. But what I saw in his speech is not a forecast, but rather a scenario or one of the scenarios. Therefore, it should not be perceived as a perfect forecast by an experienced general.
Whether the war will last another 10 years, or whether it can end in six months or a year, largely depends on what Ukraine does.
As for the part where he gives recommendations, it is true that he practically lists priority things that should have been done yesterday. And when we mention Russia’s superiority in human resources, we are talking only about numerical superiority. But when assessing the combat potential of the army, a lot of factors related to personnel are taken into account. This includes motivation, training, and management. That is, the mass of people is not necessarily an unambiguous guarantee of superiority in combat capabilities.
What is happening in our enemy’s camp? Russia has practically exhausted the resource of the scheme that has been operating since the fall of 2022, when large-scale mobilization was announced – for some reason it was called partial, and it has not yet been canceled in Russia – and has switched to a scheme or a number of different schemes that involve mainly coercive financial motivation. And this resource in Russia is not infinite.
There were reports about how many colonies in Russia were closed. The resource of convicts was probably exhausted even when Prigozhin was alive. The scheme, according to which criminal cases began to be formed and a person was given a choice: a contract or prison, also has limited potential. The financial potential is also obviously decreasing, because fewer and fewer people are now willing to take advantage of the bonuses that were offered a year or two ago. Increasing this entrance bonus is also problematic, especially since it is taken from the local budget, and the vast majority of Russian regions are subsidized.
In addition, the motivation to simply avoid prison or somehow close your loans, debts, escape from some other life problems is a kind of motivation. Therefore, Russian commanders are forced to resort to repressive methods to send soldiers into battle and keep them on the front line. And therein lies the positive.
If we talk about our situation, then, in my opinion, the most important thing, if we talk about Ukraine’s resources, is human resources. Because this is something that cannot be replaced at the expense of partners. We already clearly understand that there will be no soldiers from our partners, Western countries, here. They will not fight here instead of Ukrainians or next to Ukrainians. A foreign legion – I can’t even estimate in percentage terms what it is, but this is also not a solution.
Alternative solutions, recruitment based on business approaches, in particular “18-24” units – these are also quite controversial things. Especially “18-24”. I do not have objective data on how many young volunteers signed this contract, but I know firsthand that this caused dissatisfaction among those of our defenders who have been at the front for more than three years. This caused a feeling of social injustice and additional tension in military collectives.
Therefore, the only and main source for the Ukrainian Defense Forces remains mobilization. What should the Ukrainian authorities do, first of all the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the President of Ukraine? He should make this a priority.
What to do about mobilization? Indeed, there should be responsibility, there should be punishment for evading duty, but this will not achieve much. The first thing that should start is communication. In these daily addresses of the president, at least once a week, he should talk about this topic. No matter how inconvenient it may be for him, uncomfortable, he should talk about it. Because he is the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, he is the President of Ukraine, this is his key responsibility under the Constitution. Not the economy, not anti-corruption bodies or corruption fighters, but the defense of Ukraine. This is the direct responsibility of the president and what he should do.
Do not shift responsibility to the CCC or the Ground Forces, or the Armed Forces in general. Because the CCC is only the last link in this long state chain, which is responsible for mobilization. And the first link is the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Mobilization is not only about personnel. If you look at our legislation on mobilization, it applies to all spheres of life in Ukraine. This includes business and the work of local administrations. It clearly states who should do what. That’s where we need to start.

As a reminder, the original Hitler, Adolf, also thought he could win, even as the enemy was encroaching from all directions. Baseless fantasies is a trait common to all dictators.
Post on LinkedIn from Jaques Quigley, a Software Developer in the UK :-
July 26
“According to Ukrainian intelligence, russia is forming an assault battalion from captured Ukrainian soldiers…
🔷 Reports indicate that the occupiers are threatening Ukrainian POWs with execution if they refuse to join, in order to create a propaganda-friendly narrative.
▪️ The occupiers reportedly plan to dress these soldiers in russian uniforms and send them to the hottest front-line zones on suicidal missions. To prevent any retreat from the battlefield, so-called “blocking detachments” (zagradotryads) will be stationed behind them, ready to open fire on anyone who tries to flee.
International Committee of the Red Cross – ICRC why, after nearly 4 years, have you still not gained access to the conditions Ukrainian POWs have to endure yet you constantly slander the undeserved hospitality that Ukraine shows to the ruski tourists. Perhaps the United Nations would like to comment. I think not.
The thing is, we act surprised but this was just a digression of what the ruski main aim was which was to use Ukrainians in the first echelon invading Poland. Hungary and Slovakia have already willingly capitulated. Looks like the same plan is working with Belarus though. Forget 2027. Within a year. russia produces around 60 Iskander missiles a month with only around 10-15 being used on Ukraine. So, the question arises where are these missiles going to be used? The window to show force by closing the sky (which should have been done on day one) is closing rapidly.”
Post was endorsed by internationally recognized Ukraine experts Glen Grant and James Sherr.
They have done this before :
“They did the same with Romanian POWs in WW2, the “Tudor Vladimirescu”* and “Horea, Closca and Crisan”** divisions. There was a choice between joining and staying in the GULAG for years, with slim chance of survival. Survival rate was about 50/50 for those who didn’t join, some returned home as late as 1955.”
Alexandru Nicolin.
Nice to hear from you again, old chap!