23.08.2024 – Translated from Ukrainian via Google and OFP

The ongoing operation of the Ukrainian Defense Forces in the Kursk region of Russia has shown how effective asymmetrical, non-standard, unpredictable actions for the enemy can be, even in conditions when the enemy has an advantage in manpower and equipment. The new strategy used by the General Staff in the Kursk region should be continued and expanded not only to other border regions of Russia, but also actively used in the enemy’s rear in the temporarily occupied regions of our country.

Taking control of one of the largest Russian nuclear power plants, Kursk, is impossible due to the nuclear safety obligations assumed by Ukraine. Nevertheless, this most important energy facility of the aggressor country, under certain conditions, can become a powerful trump card in the hands of Ukraine.

This opinion was expressed in an exclusive interview with OBOZ.UA by the head of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine in 2005–2010, General of the Army  Nikolai Malomuzh.

– The former commander of US forces in Europe, General Ben Hodges, said that the Ukrainian army has seized the initiative from the enemy. According to him, in terms of the quality of weapons, the aggressor country Russia has not demonstrated any success – the Russian military-industrial complex “is simply trying to do more and more of the same thing.” The general also drew attention to the fact that Ukraine managed to assemble a group for an operation in the Kursk region of the Russian Federation in secret from the enemy, which also makes adjustments to the theories that exist to this day. Do you agree with such assessments?

– I know Hodges well personally, and our positions coincide in many ways. But I believe that this is only the beginning of a change in the strategy of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Russia is imposing a strategy of long-term war, exhaustion of our resources and weakening support for our allies. But the leadership of our Armed Forces was offered alternative, non-standard models of asymmetric actions. This is striking at the territory of the Russian Federation, preparing strategic ulars in occupied territories. This is a real art of war – to act effectively with small means against a numerically superior enemy.

Finally, we have moved on to this comprehensive strategy. Its beginning is the Kursk operation. Of course, without continuation, without other operations on the territory of the Russian Federation, in the Bryansk and Belgorod regions, without strategic strikes on the occupied territories of the east or south of Ukraine, there will be no strategic change. But we have already begun this work and have shown that we are capable of implementing offensive operations.

The Russian leadership simply failed with the concept that it would not allow our troops to enter the territory of the Russian Federation. They showed weakness of a military nature – they could not create hotbeds of confrontation, but surrendered and fled. They could not protect their borders. Let me remind you that Russian volunteer units, as part of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, entered the territory of the Russian Federation without any particular problems before. We managed to disorient the enemy and convince him that we were expecting an attack in the Sumy direction and were allegedly preparing a group for this, but in fact we were preparing for an offensive on the Kursk region.

This is a success. Accordingly, the West’s assessments of Ukraine’s prospects not only to defend itself, but also to conduct offensive operations are changing. Therefore, Hodges’ support logically follows from this. I, like him, believe that this can provide the prospect of victory, but without continuing this strategy there will be no great successes. It is very important to continue to act in an unconventional and large-scale manner, including in the occupied territories, where the enemy does not expect it.

I agree with Hodges’ conclusions that Russia has not come up with anything new in terms of equipment or ammunition. Tens of thousands of tanks, armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, old-fashioned artillery systems. There is nothing new in mass production, the same T-90 tanks, of which no more than a hundred have been produced, in the Russian Federation. Yes, the enemy uses them very actively, but they are not as effective as Western models and as weapons produced by Ukraine.

The enemy can break through individual sections of the front by concentrating forces – when many servicemen continuously strike at one point, when lots of artillery, aviation, and KABs are used simultaneously. But this cannot continue for long. We’re destroying these forces en masse, which they throw into battle in large numbers. If we talk about manpower, the enemy’s losses are 1,200-1,700 per day, which is 72-74 thousand per month, an entire army. And it is impossible to replenish them quickly. And this is an obstacle to the development of large offensive operations.

If our forces act in an unconventional manner, according to a new strategy, and not only in the Kursk region, but also in other areas, then this is already a prospect for success.

– A question about the Kursk NPP. Do you think it is possible for the Russian Federation to lose control of this energy facility? Could Ukraine use the NPP as an important trump card, for example, in the context of attacks on energy facilities in Ukraine?

– First of all, it would be very tempting for us to take control of the Kursk NPP. Perhaps this could lead to an end to attacks on our energy facilities, perhaps to the transfer of the Zaporizhzhya NPP to us.

But we will definitely not seize the Kursk NPP, because this will lead to a serious confrontation with our partners, who are convinced that we must strictly adhere to all the conditions and agreements on nuclear energy safety, not encroach on specific objects on the territory of the Russian Federation and on other territories, if this poses a threat of catastrophic consequences in the nuclear sphere. For example, this is a threat of radiation leakage, which will occur not only on the territory of Ukraine or Russia, but also in third countries, in Europe. We must act as a civilized country that has taken on clear legal obligations not to commit military actions against nuclear weapons.

At the same time, if the advance of Ukrainian forces is successful, we can simply create a zone of remote control over the Kursk NPP, when the enemy is forced to turn it off, although the personnel will remain. And then it will be possible to conduct certain negotiations to create a security zone in the energy sector of Ukraine or transfer the Zaporizhzhya NPP under our control.

Thus, there can be no capture of the Kursk NPP, but it is possible to cover the adjacent territories, and then we can bargain. But today the conditions have not yet been created for us to take the Kursk NPP from the flanks or to encircle it remotely.

– It is known that the Kursk NPP supplies electricity to a huge region of the Russian Federation – 19 regions. It would be possible to simply disconnect this NPP from the power system without taking control of it. How do you view this option?

– We will not turn it off – this can only be done by personnel in conditions of safe operation of the station. We cannot interfere with the activities of the personnel of a specific station. This is their area of ​​responsibility. And even as an occupation authority, we must follow the principles of international law, especially in matters of nuclear safety.

The option of shutting down the nuclear power plant is indeed possible if all these conditions are met. But only when we have complete control over the entire region, when the nuclear power plant is completely surrounded.

https://war.obozrevatel.com/vsu-nachali-menyat-strategiyu-eto-mozhet-privesti-k-pobede-intervyu-s-generalom-malomuzhem.htm