03/2/2025
In February 2025, the Russian occupation forces continued their offensive operations with a number of features, including the wave-like use of equipment and human resources. All this affected the loss rates, which in some categories were the lowest in the last six months of the war, and in others they set new absolute records.
Personnel losses
In February, the Russian occupation forces suffered their lowest personnel losses since August 2024 – 36,570. However, this is still a very high figure, which is barely compensated by mobilization measures in Russia.
After several months of absolute records in losses (namely: in November 2024 – 45,720, in December 2024 – 48,670, in January 2025 – 48,240), the February figures are due to a decrease in the intensity of infantry attacks. Peak rates of assault operations were recorded not throughout the month, but in waves, on certain days. They especially accompanied international events – such as the Munich Security Conference and the meeting of representatives of the United States and the Russian Federation in Saudi Arabia.
There is also a sharp increase in the loss of enemy troops in proportion to 1 km² of the territory being captured. Given that in February the Russian occupiers captured 188 km² of Ukrainian territory, their average loss rate was over 190 people/1 km². Let me remind you that in 2024 this figure was 128 people/1 km², and in January 2025 – 150 people/1 km².
The obvious increase in losses, even with a decrease in intensity, is due to the low number of units and the crisis in providing enough enemy troops, which makes it impossible to effectively use units in the offensive and leads to high losses of personnel.
Tank losses
In February 2025, Russian occupation forces lost 331 tanks, which remains within the average statistical figure since mid-2024.
As I have repeatedly noted before, the low loss rates of main battle tanks are due to both a drop in quantitative deliveries to the front, as well as the economy of the russian command of this equipment and their extremely limited use.
It is possible that in 2025 the last and largest central tank reserve bases – 349 and 769 CBRT – will be emptied, which will lead not to a crisis, but to a catastrophe in terms of providing the Russian army with MBTs.
Losses of armored combat vehicles
No records were set for the loss of armored vehicles in February, which is understandable due to the decrease in the intensity of hostilities and the reduction in the component in service as such. However, the loss rate of 596 armored vehicles remains quite high, as before.
Unlike tanks, Russia’s military-industrial complex has a relatively large-scale production of armored combat vehicles and can partially compensate for losses with new products. However, this is not enough even to compensate for losses such as those in February through production alone, so the main share continues to be the restoration of Soviet heritage from warehouses and storage centers.
Artillery losses
In February 2025, enemy artillery was sharply activated, which led to an intensification of counter-battery combat and an increase in losses in this category in the russian occupation army – 1,415.
This is a very high figure, but the russian occupiers simply cannot avoid such losses now due to the lack of full fire support for assault operations by armored vehicles, as a result of which these tasks were assigned to artillery, which is inferior to Ukrainian artillery systems in range and accuracy of fire.
MLRS losses
For the first time since 2024, the Russian occupation forces have lost a fairly high number of multiple launch rocket systems – 38 units.
As in the case of barrel artillery, the activation of MLRS is due to the lack of full-fledged fire support for the advancing infantry forces of the occupatiob forces by armored vehicles, so artillery plays a major role in this matter – with all the consequences.
In addition, the MLRS category is now increasingly featuring not the classic 122-mm BM-21 “Grad”, 220-mm BM-27 “Uragan” and 300-mm BM-30 “Smerch”, but homunculi in the form of naval bombardment guns RBU-1200, RBU-6000 mounted on the chassis of the MT-LB, BMP-1, T-72, T-80, Ural-4320 and the mounts of ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft guns.
Air defense losses
In February 2025, the air defense of the Russian occupiers lost 38 complexes.
This is an average indicator, which indicates that the systematic work to hunt down enemy air defenses is continuing successfully.
Vehicle losses
But in this category, an absolute record was set – 3,472.
The category of vehicle losses consistently shows records, due to the fact that the shortage of tanks, armored personnel carriers and armored vehicles in the ROV, which is moving from an acute state to a critical one, leads to the use of non-specialized civilian vehicles for assault operations. Accordingly, the indicator of losses in this category will continue to show records – consistently and stably.
Losses of special equipment
In February, the number of destroyed special equipment was one of the lowest since February 2023 – 36 units.
The answer to the question of why is extremely simple – the need for evacuation has decreased due to less use of armored vehicles, and the special equipment itself has become significantly less numerous over the three years of full-scale war due to its own losses .
Conclusions
The command of the Russian occupation forces is forced to walk a tightrope between limited resources for conducting a combined military offensive campaign and the need to demonstrate to Western countries the appearance of unlimited possibilities for attacking and seizing the territories of Ukraine.
“The command of the Russian occupation forces is forced to walk a tightrope between limited resources for conducting a combined military offensive campaign and the need to demonstrate to Western countries the appearance of unlimited possibilities for attacking and seizing the territories of Ukraine.”
Only the militarily naive still believe that the mafia army can still be a grave danger.
They can’t produce the number of combat vehicles and artillery that they need for maintaining the current level of fighting, much less for a grander offensive. They are still relying on refurbished Soviet junk, and it is junk. The longer the war lasts, the more they have to pull out material that’s in third-rate or fourth rate condition. The first-rate and second rate stuff has already been sent through the metal grinder. It’s the nature of the beast that the longer something sits around, the more difficult it is to refurbish. The overhauling also takes longer and gets more expensive, but still with only mediocre results. I can imagine that those vehicles break down soon after their delivery or even during transport.
The mafia army is all but finished. The AFU only has to eliminate the few remaining items that still dare to show themselves on the battlefield.