14.11.2025

Despite the fact that the resources of the aggressor country Russia are being depleted – Soviet equipment stocks are running out, production is not keeping up with the needs of the front, there is a shortage of personnel – the balance of power in recent months, as before, remains in its favor. After all, the Ukrainian army is also experiencing a number of problems. Moscow continues its slow advance, hoping to capture the Ukrainian-controlled areas of the Donetsk region.

The future of the war depends on Ukraine’s ability to resolve its internal mobilization problems and obtain faster and larger-scale Western support. Effective military assistance, combined with increased economic pressure on the aggressor, could deprive the Kremlin of any hope of success and push it to negotiate.

Russia is theoretically capable of opening a second front in Europe, but in reality this is extremely unlikely. Although a hybrid war against the West is already underway, real combat operations against NATO countries would be a suicidal step: all the Kremlin’s resources are concentrated in the Donbas. Russia throws everything into the fight – from old equipment to prisoners and mercenaries from exotic countries. At the same time, even limited operations, such as the assault on Pokrovsk, stretch for a year and a half. In this situation, an attack on a stronger enemy, which is NATO, looks unwise.

This opinion was expressed in an exclusive interview with OBOZ.UA by Israeli military observer David Sharp .

– President Zelenskyy stated: it is possible that Russia will open a second front in Europe, without waiting for the end of the war in Ukraine. In your opinion, does the aggressor country Russia really have the resource capacity to fight on two fronts at once, to open another front against one of the NATO countries in Europe?

– First of all, both in politics and in world history, there are things that did not look very predictable and seemed illogical. Therefore, I cannot guarantee anything one hundred percent, that would be ridiculous. But in the current situation, as I see it, hostilities could theoretically break out, such a possibility exists.

Putin and Russia are waging a hybrid war against Europe, there is a Cold War atmosphere, there are actions that could theoretically lead to escalation. But it is worth distinguishing between the Cold War atmosphere, hybrid war, various kinds of sabotage, actions, etc. in different planes, and the actual intention to start a war.

But to start another war in the current situation, when all the efforts of Putin and Russia are thrown at capturing the Donetsk region and little things in other regions… In addition, literally all resources have been thrown at it, starting from old tanks from the Mosfilm film studio and ending with extracting criminals from places of detention, attracting third-rate foreign mercenaries from strange countries.

In a situation where the city of Pokrovsk has been under attack for almost a year and a half , this is not exactly a good time to attack a stronger enemy, and a much stronger one than Russia, if we are talking about the NATO bloc. They literally have nothing else to do now, although excesses, incidents, etc. may occur.

As for what might happen next, in my opinion, the situation is about the same, except for one exception: if Putin suddenly becomes sure that no one will provide assistance to Lithuania or Estonia, that is, NATO will violate its duty and not provide assistance, and then Russia will be able to achieve easy territorial success without a major war. But I think that would be a big mistake.

– Do you believe that a Russian attack on one of the European countries could be a plus for Ukraine in terms of support from allies? President Zelenskyy often emphasizes in his addresses to Western partners that Russia is much more dangerous than it appears in the West.

– It is necessary to understand that in international relations, in matters of war and peace, everything happens cynically, and everyone takes care of themselves first of all. This is normal and understandable. Therefore, theoretically, if Russia were to attack NATO countries now and a war between NATO and Russia began, of course, it would be in Ukraine’s hands, and what else. This is obvious from other similar examples from history. But the thing is that such a situation looks extremely unrealistic.

As for other statements that Western countries take the Russian threat less seriously, I partially agree. On the one hand, the perception of Russia as a threat has clearly increased in recent years. On the other hand, a number of countries do not perceive it acutely enough. For their own security, based on a cynical, pragmatic approach, in addition to moral considerations, it would probably be more correct for European countries to provide more assistance to Ukraine. But they do not perceive the situation particularly acutely and, in fact, a significant part of European countries, understanding the need for this, do not proceed from the principle that this is our war, that this is a direct threat. Rather, the Baltic countries, perhaps Poland, also proceed from such a principle to a greater extent, but not everyone else. Accordingly, there is a motivation to help Ukraine, but this motivation is ultimately not high enough.

As a result, the assistance provided is very large-scale, but it is stretched over time. If this assistance had been provided in a shorter period of time, the result would definitely have been better. And what is interesting: it could turn out that less assistance would have to be provided, because if you help very significantly for a year and a half, it may turn out to be better than helping less significantly for four and a half years.

– You have already said that today Russia is throwing all its resources, tanks from the Mosfilm film studio, criminals, etc., just to achieve its goal. And what resources does the aggressor country actually have today? Do you think that, for example, the same human resources will be enough to completely occupy the Donetsk region within its administrative borders? Do you see signs that the resource is running out?

– All resources are the complete subordination of the economy to the needs of war and complete mobilization or something like that. Russia does not take these cardinal steps, but it is spending a lot of resources, in particular, the accumulated Soviet potential. The stock of equipment, weapons and ammunition is largely spent, production is not keeping up with the needs of a number of key areas. Without mobilization, they are experiencing serious problems with human resources.

The recruitment of third-rate mercenaries, which has been going on for many months, is a clear sign of the problem. And the fact that they lack the strength to attack more actively and on more fronts is also a clear sign.

For example, the pressure at Dobropillya proved insufficient, and the Russians were unable to build on the success they had achieved in August.

But the problem here is that you have to compare both sides. They face problems, and it is often difficult for them to replenish their losses, although, obviously, in the medium term they replenish more than they lose. The problem is that Ukraine is also experiencing very serious difficulties with personnel and replenishment. There is an acute shortage of personnel and other problems. And this balance in favor of Russia, despite all the Russian problems, has been maintained for many months.

If the size of the Ukrainian army, especially combat units, decreases in parallel with the Russian one or increases in parallel, but the balance does not change, then the Russians can afford to continue attacking as they have been doing for the last two years since the fall of 2023. We see that during this period the negative dynamics persist, sometimes more sharply, sometimes less sharply. Sometimes the Russian army captures something very slowly, sometimes there are some local collapses of the front, for example, as near Avdiivka, the breakthrough near Ocheretyn, Selidov, Kurakhov, when they manage to advance further, and, accordingly, this trend does not change.

If we assume that the trend does not change, and the war lasts a long time, then we can conclude that they are gradually “biting off” territory, but this may take a long time. On the one hand, here is an example of Chasovy Yar and Pokrovsk, which are being stormed for a very long time. On the other hand, there is a breakthrough near Ocheretyn.

But overall, I think Putin hopes that the Ukrainian Armed Forces will at least partially collapse, that in the next six months or so he will at least be able to capture a significant part of the minimum he wants, the rest of the Donetsk region plus some other territories. If he decides that he has “had enough”, then he can afford to go to negotiations.

And here the question is in two aspects. The first is more effective actions of the Ukrainian army on the front, and for this it is necessary to solve problems with mobilization, manning, combat training. This would lead to the fact that Putin would have less hope for success. And, of course, more large-scale assistance from the West is needed. This would add assets to the Ukrainian army in another aspect and would create more problems for Putin. And, of course, economic pressure is important. We see hints of it, the Trump administration has introduced certain significant sanctions against Russia. The general meaning is this: powerful economic pressure leads to the fact that Russia has less money left to wage war, the standard of living in the country decreases. Theoretically, but not necessarily in practice, this should lead to the fact that the enemy will have fewer resources, he will be more compliant.

Accordingly, if all these levers and moments were implemented to a noticeable extent, then the same complaisance and willingness to make certain compromises would be more likely to manifest.

But for now, there are still worrying trends. Despite the fact that the Russian advance is very slow, it is still there. It is worth analyzing what happened over these two years, what territory the enemy managed to capture, where there were breakthroughs and where there were successes, and drawing conclusions, for example, for two years ahead.

https://war.obozrevatel.com/ukr/v-armii-rf-velichezni-problemi-chomu-vona-dosi-zdatna-voyuvati-intervyu-z-izrailskim-ekspertom-sharpom.htm