7.09.2024 – Translated from Ukrainian via Google and OFP

The group of Russian occupation troops in the south of Ukraine is experiencing considerable problems with logistics and supplies. Due to the destruction of the ferry crossing, the enemy is rebuilding supply routes from Crimea to the Russian Federation to the temporarily occupied territories. This increases the delivery distance several times and makes the process of transporting cargo quite dangerous. In addition, part of the enemy group from the south was transferred to Kursk region.

So, is it time for the Ukrainian Defense Forces to begin an operation to liberate territories in the south? In fact, it is not that simple. No matter how complex the enemy’s logistics are, we are still talking about a powerful group. In addition, effective air cover is needed to transfer Ukrainian forces to the left bank of the Dnieper. At the same time, if the Ukrainian Armed Forces have the resources, it would be advisable to take control of the city of Belgorod.

This opinion was expressed in an exclusive interview with OBOZ.UA by the reserve officer of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, military expert Andrey Kramarov .

– Terrorist Girkin stated that the operation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in Kursk region is aimed at distracting enemy forces in this direction, as well as discrediting the central authorities of the Russian Federation. According to him, in the fall the Ukrainian army may launch a counteroffensive in the south of our country. Do you think that the operation in Kursk region can provide such an opportunity?

– In fact, there are no prerequisites for this yet, even from the point of view of the redeployment to Kursk region of certain units of the occupation army that were in the south of Ukraine. For us now, the priority issue is to effectively consolidate this bridgehead in Kursk region, so as not to spend a lot of effort and resources to hold it further. Otherwise, it will have no benefit or meaning.

But still, the main vector in our defense is the Donetsk direction. This is Pokrovsk, Ugledar and Chasiv Yar. These are the places where the enemy is pressing the most. Accumulating some resources for the upcoming operation in the south, given that we are openly retreating in Donbas, in my personal opinion, is inappropriate.

– If we talk about long-term plans for the deoccupation of our country, could you say what is the main problem with the operation on the left bank of the Dnipro – is it the water barrier, the river? Are there at least theoretical options for facilitating this task?

– At the moment, it is not so much the Dnipro River as the possibility of effectively establishing crossings there in order to be able to transfer heavy equipment and artillery to create a bridgehead there not only with manpower, but also with support from material and technical resources and the possibility of replenishing them. The same ammunition, food, etc.

To do this, first of all, we need to have effective air support to counter Russian aviation, which will demolish any of our bridgeheads.

So, the Russians have huge problems with supplying their southern group, they are forced to restructure logistics for deliveries to a greater extent not from Crimea, but from the territory of the Russian Federation and the temporarily occupied Donetsk region. That is, the communication arm has increased, this is more dangerous, but they have no other options. After the last ferry sank, they had huge problems with logistics in Crimea.

At the same time, the Russians still have a fairly serious group in the south. If you cross the Dnipro, for example, to the south of Kherson and continue the operation, the terrain there is flooded, swampy, and it is quite difficult to advance. There are not so many key transport routes there.

So, if there are only a small number of communication routes, if it is difficult to move and maneuver, then the enemy’s main task is to block a certain route for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and then he will be able to effectively restrain us in the future.

Yes, we tried to create a bridgehead in Krynki, held it for a certain time, but eventually partially withdrew from there. That is, at that time we did not have the potential to move further. Any offensive operation requires large-scale reserves and forces that can strike. And the main thing is to have the ability to at least drive away Russian fighter-bombers with guided bombs from there.

– In fact, we are now seeing an asymmetric situation, when the Ukrainian Armed Forces are conducting military operations on the territory of the Russian Federation, while the enemy is actively operating in the east of our country. The question arises about the further actions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the north. If we take Kursk region, do you think that this is more of a potential threat to Belarus or, on the contrary, an opportunity to draw even more Ukrainian forces to this direction? What actions near the border with Belarus would be most preferable?

– I don’t see any threats from Belarus in the context of defending the northern border. Defensive fortifications have been built there, we still continue to hold a certain number of forces there. There is a rotation going on, the defense is holding. There is no need for any additional actions there yet.

For example, now the Ukrainian Armed Forces have driven the Russians back beyond the Seim River, have consolidated their positions there and are holding them. I believe that if there are opportunities to further seize any positions, we will certainly do so. By the way, we need to move away from the term “occupation”. We are not occupying anything in Kursk region, we are temporarily holding the territories. In accordance with international military law, a military commandant’s office was created there, and not some kind of conditional “local authorities”. When our troops leave there, this commandant’s office will hand over the affairs to some local administration.

Therefore, there are questions about continuing the movement deep into the Kursk region. Perhaps, given the complete expulsion of Russians from the Kharkov region, it would be advisable to create a similar zone in the Belgorod region. Especially since the distance from the border to Belgorod is about 45 kilometers. Taking control of the regional center is a serious problem for the Russian Federation.

But it seems that the military-political leadership of Russia are eccentric people with obvious mental problems. Allegedly, it would be nothing for them to lose several of their regions, if only to reach the administrative borders of the Donetsk region. This is an obsession for them.

https://war.obozrevatel.com/ukr/armiya-putina-mae-velichezni-problemi-na-pivdni-zsu-pidut-u-nastup-intervyu-z-ofitserom-kramarovim.htm