27.05.2025 

The Russian occupation army has been advancing in Ukraine for over a year and a half, since the fall of 2023. Moreover, this offensive is taking place according to the same scheme with minor deviations, as was the case with the attempted offensive in the Kharkiv region. Today, the enemy’s main operational goal is to capture the agglomeration of Sloviansk – Kramatorsk – Kostyantynivka – Druzhkivka – Pokrovsk. The capture of regional centers, in particular Sumy and Kharkiv, is a desirable, but completely unachievable goal of the occupier.

If the aggressor country tries to attack Ukraine from Transnistria, it could end with the disappearance of this enclave. And what about a counteroffensive by the Armed Forces of Ukraine? Based on information from open sources, the Ukrainian army currently does not have the resources for such a move, but there is a possibility that the General Staff will surprise the enemy, as was the case with the Kursk region.

This opinion was expressed in an exclusive interview with OBOZ.UA by Israeli military observer David Sharp.

– Analysts from the Institute for the Study of War have concluded that the Russian occupation army is currently focused on three goals. The first is to push the Armed Forces of Ukraine away from the Belgorod region and approach Kharkiv at a distance sufficient for artillery. The second is to capture the rest of the Luhansk region, advance into the eastern part of the Kharkiv region, and surround the northern part of the Donetsk region. The third task is to try to advance into the Dnipropetrovsk region. How do you assess this? Do you allow that the enemy may set other goals for itself?

– Goals can be divided into global – strategic and operational – and local. For example, their most important operational long-range goal is the capture of the Donetsk region, in particular, the agglomeration of Sloviansk – Kramatorsk – Kostyantynivka – Druzhkivka. In this context, Pokrovsk can also be mentioned. And we see that most of their actions in the Donetsk region are subordinated to the implementation of this goal.

This is an attempt to bypass Pokrovsk and occupy it, to create threats from the flanks… The same applies to Kostyantynivka – from the north, from the side of Lyman and Siversk, towards Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. That is, this is some kind of single master plan. Of course, there is Novopavlivka and elements of access to the Dnipropetrovsk region. But, as it seems to me, this is the main task, and this is where the main efforts are concentrated.

As for Kharkiv and the Kharkiv region, I can’t say anything here. You can assume anything, but I prefer to assume things out of thin air. Only when they either start some actions. For example, to get to Kharkiv within a cannon shot’s range – though cannons come in different ranges – you need to operate in the Kharkiv region. What we saw a year ago – an offensive in the Vovchansk area with small forces – has stopped. Fighting in this area continues, but there are currently no attempts to expand this area or sharply deepen it. I do not have open data on the creation of groups in these places.

As for the Sumy region, we heard Putin’s words about creating a buffer zone in the border area. I don’t quite understand what he means. Perhaps this is an attempt to create a buffer zone in a narrow area, perhaps this is a cover for plans to simply seize this territory – I mean the Sumy region near Sudzha, where the fighting took place. But to create a large buffer zone, you need to attack on a large area of ​​the front. We don’t see anything here yet – the fighting is taking place on a fairly narrow area of ​​the front.

Putin’s plans, by and large, are global, but there are also plans of other degrees. First of all, we should not forget about the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. This is one of the specific geographical goals that Putin once voiced. This is what they call the “liberation” of the “DPR” and “LPR”. And these actions are literally on the surface.

– Based on what you said, is the danger of capturing regional centers, in particular those located near the front line – Sumy , Kharkiv, Zaporizhia, Kherson – small?

– We are talking about the short and medium term. To set the task of capturing the same Kharkiv or Sumy, you need to attract a very large group, gather it and attack in the appropriate directions that are relevant for such an offensive.

But, based on open sources, we do not see that such a grouping is being created. Several battalions in order to advance on a short section is not at all the same. And since we do not see such a grouping, the considerations about it are purely philosophical in nature.

I will say more: Russia has been attacking since the fall of 2023, for over a year and a half. It has been attacking in approximately the same pattern. Yes, sometimes there are some surprises. For example, a small offensive in the Kharkiv region was, although not a surprise, but a departure from the usual framework. Within the usual framework, they press, look for weak points, try to slowly advance and achieve a collapse of the front in some areas and then advance further. An example is Ocheretyne, Kurakhovo, Selidove, etc.

In order to attack the regional center with large forces, it is necessary to concentrate these large forces and act contrary to the logic that we have seen for a year and a half. So while we do not see any groups, this is a philosophical conversation. But there are enough problems and their real efforts on other sections of the front.

– A question about Transnistria. In September, parliamentary elections will be held in Moldova, on which the Kremlin is betting very heavily. Do you assume a purely theoretical danger that the Kremlin will try to kill two birds with one stone – on the one hand, to destabilize the internal situation in Transnistria on the eve of the elections, and on the other – to use its grouping that it has there to open a new front?

– As for the Kremlin’s desire to manipulate and have a serious influence inside Moldova, it is impossible to deny this. But purely pragmatically, mundanely using what they have in Transnistria, opening a second front and attacking Ukraine – this looks absolutely unrealistic and unreasonable, because the forces are very, very weak by all standards. If they try to attack Ukraine, this will most likely lead to the end of Transnistria as such. Because Russia cannot physically come to their aid – they are cut off, and their military potential is extremely small.

Note that when the great war first began, when Russian forces were on the right bank of the Dnieper, these risks were higher, but even then the Transnistrians did not open fire. Perhaps they were waiting for the Russian army to arrive in Odessa, etc. That is, if the war had been literally lost, they would have entered the battle.

But at a time when the Russian army is very far away, they are doomed in case of entering into hostilities. I would not rule out anything, but this is completely contrary to logic. If they sat quietly even in February-March 2022, when the prospects seemed to be greater, then today it is obvious that they could lose everything if they take such an unwise step.

– The Russian occupation army has been able to occupy approximately one-fifth of Ukraine’s territory since 2014, while Trump ‘s rhetoric makes it clear that the Kremlin presents this as an “incredible achievement” and makes us believe that Russia is about to win. How do you assess the prospects for a counteroffensive by the Armed Forces of Ukraine? How logical would it be to organize at least a limited-scale operation in the midst of the negotiation process?

– I don’t think Trump believes that Russia is about to win. His assessment and that of his entourage is that there is a tendency for Russia to win the war. At least he believes it and believes that Ukraine’s prospects in this regard are worse. I am sure that he does not think that literally in a month, two, three, Russia will win. This contradicts the facts.

As for the issue of the offensive, a successful offensive is always advisable. But this is desirable, and one must start from the possibilities and realities. Today, it is necessary to proceed from the fact that for many months now, Ukraine has been on strategic defense, and with great strain of forces and not always successfully, because the enemy is advancing – albeit slowly and with losses. This defense is given by a huge strain of resources, which are not enough, in particular, to close many problematic areas.

To attack, you must have significant resources. This refers to both the quantitative factor and the qualitative one. Because, for example, if you have prepared a reserve of freshly mobilized, a new brigade that, for objective reasons, is not very effective even in defense, throwing it into the offensive is suicide. In any case, it will not bring success.

Theoretically, I cannot rule out that somewhere the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine will try to deliver a “surprise” with relatively small forces. To some extent, such a “surprise” was the offensive in the Kursk region in 2024. However, what this offensive led to raises questions.

So, the main thing is the availability of resources. If you have the capabilities for a successful offensive operation, of course, you cannot refuse it. But today the main task of the Ukrainian army, without connection with the negotiation process, is the most successful defense. Most likely, there are no resources for anything more.

https://war.obozrevatel.com/ukr/armiya-rf-zavzhdi-nastupae-za-odnieyu-shemoyu-zsu-mozhut-prigotuvati-ij-syurpriz-intervyu-z-izrailskim-ekspertom-sharpom.htm