7.08.2026

In July, the aggressor country Russia launched 376 missiles at Ukraine, 126 of which were ballistic. This is more than twice the number of missiles used in June. According to intelligence estimates, about a hundred ballistic missiles are produced in the Russian Federation every month, and another 200 to 300 such missiles are in reserve. Given this, it is obvious that the enemy is not just launching all the missiles produced, but also “burning” the reserves. It is highly likely that it will try to increase production and also continue to purchase missiles from North Korea, but it is obvious that it is simply unable to increase the intensity of strikes on Ukraine many times over.

What should Ukraine do in this situation? First of all, ask allies to provide as much protection against ballistic missiles as possible, and in the medium term, acquire its own ballistic missiles in order to be able not only to strike the Russian Federation with drones, but also to deter enemy ballistic attacks through intimidation.

This opinion was expressed in an exclusive interview with OBOZ.UA by Israeli military observer David Sharp.

– Fresh data has emerged on the number of missiles launched by Russia at Ukraine in July – 376. This is more than double the number of missiles launched in June – 161. The main question is – where does Putin get so many missiles? And how can the situation develop further?

– Putin is using new missiles that have just come out of production. We are talking, first of all, about ballistic missiles. As far as I understand, cruise missiles have not been used very much. There have been months when Russia has used them much more.

Putin is making the most of ballistic missiles for a number of reasons. Because it is the most effective means of hitting targets, if we are talking about heavy missiles. In addition, Ukraine lacks air defense systems and interceptors capable of countering ballistics.

Where does Putin get ballistic missiles? It is mainly his own production. I do not know what their production rates are. Ukrainian and foreign intelligence agencies sometimes publish data, but we should treat them with caution. Perhaps the real production rates are even higher than what is being announced. Perhaps they shifted the emphasis in favor of the production of ballistic missiles, rather than cruise missiles, although these are different types of production, but they could have done this simply because they understood that it is more efficient.

In any case, they produce quite a lot – about a hundred Iskander ballistic missiles per month. In addition, they probably buy missiles from North Korea. There are also ballistic missiles for the S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems – simplified ones, which are more intended for firing at ground targets.

They understand that such missiles are what harms Ukraine, because Ukraine does not have enough means to respond. Perhaps in the near future they will try to expand production as much as possible, and also continue to purchase missiles from the DPRK. Perhaps they would also purchase missiles from the Iranians, but the Iranians have nothing to sell now.

We can assume that ballistic missiles, in the context of the escalation of the exchange of strikes on the rear and Russian plans, will be used by Russia to the maximum extent, although they will apparently not be able to sharply, several times, increase the number of strikes compared to the current pace, because they do not have such production volumes and huge reserves.

– I clarified exactly how many ballistic missiles Russia launched at Ukraine in July – 126. That is, this is actually the maximum they have, and there is no question of accumulation.

– If the intelligence estimates regarding the production of the S-400 and Iskanders, which are used for ballistic missile strikes, are correct, then yes, that is about the maximum. There are also estimates that Russia has small stocks of these missiles, 200-300 units. Let’s say production is about a hundred per month, but you can spend up to 120-140 per month, depleting stocks. Although this is usually considered impractical.

If the intelligence is not mistaken, then this is probably plus or minus the maximum figures at which they can stay for several months or a little less. If they shoot everything they produce, then this will be enough for quite a long time.

– In your opinion, what can be done for Ukraine in this situation urgently and in the long term? Besides, of course, Ukraine is already asking its partners to transfer missiles for Patriot systems to our country .

– In the short and medium term, it is insistent and convincing to ask for more missiles one way or another. But this is only a partial solution to the problem. Unfortunately, there will not be fewer missiles than interceptors. Here, at best, the situation can only be alleviated. This is the first.

The second is certain measures of a defensive nature, both active and passive. For example, certain measures to disperse important targets so that it is more difficult for the enemy to hit them. Something can be moved underground, camouflage can be used somewhere. These are local measures that can give results somewhere.

As for the medium and long term, in my opinion, the solution here is not to beg for more interceptors, but if the partners do not give what they want, to blame them for it and find them guilty.

In any case, in the long and medium term, the enemy will be able to produce more missiles. Moreover, they will be able to produce missiles with a longer range than the ones they have now. And then it will be even more difficult to shoot down Patriots. Then it will turn out that completely different interceptors are needed, for example, THAAD, which cost 10-12 million dollars apiece and are not being produced at all. There are only a few of them, and this is very problematic from all points of view.

The only relative solution here can be countermeasures, that is, attempts to strike at missile production in one way or another, to use sabotage in order to reduce production in one way or another.

It is very difficult to do this, but it should be a priority – Russian missiles. This is the first. And the second, and most importantly – is the deterrence and intimidation effect.

Ukraine has its own missiles and means to deliver parity strikes on Russia. Yes, the Ukrainians have burned down oil refineries, some of them in Moscow, they are delivering terrifying strikes on certain Russian cities. This is one thing. But it is another thing when Russia delivers strikes once every few days or once a week on Kyiv. Devastating strikes with ballistic missiles that explode all over the city, hitting certain targets.

Parity and intimidation are when you have the same opportunities, not when you will or will not receive 500 or even 300 Patriot interceptors in three months. This is when you will have the opportunity to launch not 120, but at least 50 ballistic missiles per month at Russia, including three times a month at Moscow and in addition to other places. In this case, Russia will suffer very significant losses, Ukraine will be able to destroy and disable the most important military-economic enterprises of Russia. And not like now, but much more effectively. And most importantly, it will make the Russian authorities think about whether the game is worth the candle.

Because if you shoot at Kyiv and the missile hits the underpass on Lukyanovka, and the next day – the roadway or the underpass on Tverskaya in Moscow, let’s say unintentionally, even in the case of a miss, then this is very bad news for the Russian government. Although history shows that this strategy of intimidation has not always worked. But, in my opinion, this is the most effective thing that can be and should be. And, as a rule, it works.

Today, this is working with Iran in the Middle East against the United States. If there were no fear that Iran would launch a ballistic strike on the infrastructure of Saudi Arabia and the Emirates and destroy a significant part of it, then they would act much more decisively against Iran. Israel would act in the same way, and the Americans are worried about this. That is, the Iranian strategy of intimidation against the United States has worked so far.

If Ukraine had its own ballistic weapons – its creation should have been a priority for all four years and should be now – the situation would be different. It would be more likely to hit Russian production facilities, including missiles, and intimidate and force the Russian authorities to restrain themselves. Interceptors alone will not be enough to fight back, especially since there will always be more missiles, and missiles will become increasingly difficult for interceptors to intercept.

– How could Israel’s experience help Ukraine in this context?

– Ukraine already has its own fairly good experience in countering ballistic missiles in Ukrainian conditions. In Israel, it is broader in terms of countering ballistic missiles, but here’s the thing. When we talk about using someone else’s experience to dramatically improve the situation, this can be appropriate in two cases: either when you don’t have your own experience – and in the case of Ukraine, this is not the case – or when you get some new means and capabilities that you didn’t have before.

But in this case, the issue is not that Ukraine is getting some new means and it urgently needs to get acquainted with someone’s experience. In general, there are, relatively speaking, early warning systems that work in Ukraine and its partners in one way or another. There is Patriot, and that’s it.

Maybe there are some nuances and details that would be interesting to Ukrainians, I don’t know, but these are not the nuances and details that would dramatically improve the situation under the current circumstances.

The situation could be dramatically improved by the appearance of a large number of certain high-quality means like Patriot and something else, but this is currently not on the agenda, as far as we understand, so Ukrainians are content with the scarce quantity that exists and the capabilities that are already quite familiar to them.

https://war.obozrevatel.com/ukr/kreml-spalyue-ostanni-zapasi-balistiki-v-ukraini-scho-bude-dali-intervyu-z-sharpom.htm