06/26/2026
Panic has flared up in the Russian information space due to the fact that Ukrainian drones began to attack mobile fire groups of the enemy in Crimea. But the most interesting thing is that these events date back to the end of 2025, when the Unmanned Systems Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine intensified the hunt for Russian air defense systems both in the temporarily occupied territories and directly in the Russian Federation. And in the spring, they already switched to a full-fledged format of “shooting” MVG, which now caused a snowball effect.
It is no longer possible to hide this; the enemy’s losses are steadily increasing – that’s why the Z-military corps is falling into hysteria. And to a large extent, this hunt was catalyzed by the logistical lockdown.
More details about this can be found in the material of the joint project OBOZ.UA and the group “Information Resistance”.
Logistical lockdown and suicidal decisions
Since around March, the Ukrainian Defense Forces began to scale up strikes on the enemy’s middle rear area in the temporarily occupied territories, starting with limited missions in the Donetsk area and then expanding the zone of influence to Mariupol, Berdyansk – including the Sea of Azov.
The command of the Russian occupation forces was unable to find quick and effective solutions to reduce risks on the M-14 highway and prevent strikes by Ukrainian medium-range drones. Therefore, traditional methods were used – camouflage of cargo, use of civilian vehicles to transport military cargo, and escorting them with mobile fire groups.
The classic Russian MVG is not much different from the Ukrainian one, and even to counter drones it is armed not only with small arms, but also with interceptor drones (most often, this is the “Yolka”). We can talk a lot about the effectiveness of such a solution, as well as about the “Yolka”, which is sensitive even to weather conditions, but numbers will speak louder than a thousand words.
So, in January and February 2026, the ROV lost 4,021 and 4,071 units of road transport, respectively. In March – 6,068 units, and in April – 6,431. In May, the occupiers lost 8,612 units, and it was from the second half of last month that the Russian command began to introduce convoy escorts – MVG.
As of today, for the incomplete month of June, losses already exceed 10 thousand, and on June 22, an absolute record was set for a day – 626! This figure looks especially blatant against the background of the fact that in June 2022, the ROV lost 320 units of road transport per month. Per month!
That is, mobile fire groups not only did not help in the matter of protecting enemy columns, but also provided, so to speak, a disservice: after all, if a column of trucks is accompanied by armed guards, then the cargo has value. Only this already becomes a reference point for Ukrainian drones to strike.
In addition, the MVGs themselves became targets for strikes. That is, the DOV command made a decision that not only did not solve the problem of logistical lockdown, but in a certain sense deepened it.
However, this is not the only threat that has recently loomed over Russian MVGs, as the hunt for them is taking place not only on land, but also from the sea!
Restless Black Sea
In order to increase the level of airspace coverage of the temporarily occupied Crimean peninsula, as well as the coastal cities of the Russian Federation, the Russian command is deploying mobile fire groups along the coastline – in the format of both mobile and stationary firing points. The idea is quite logical and, it would seem, rational, if not for one significant “but”.
Ukrainian naval drones, which patrol the Black Sea and have a variety of modifications (including as repeaters-carriers of fpv drones), approaching the coastline of the same Crimea, hunt for MVGs, which are waiting for the main groups of middle-strike and deep-strike drones to fly in. In fact, in an attempt to reduce the risks from the main strike component of Ukraine’s SBS, the enemy’s mobile fire groups find themselves in the risk zone of strikes by swarms of fpv drones flying from the sea.
While the Russian command continues to consistently use the same tactics against the MVG, the Z-military units are sounding the alarm due to the level of losses of mobile fire groups, which are constantly being put under attack. But the dilemma is that the occupiers do not have any other effective solution today. And therefore, as they were driven to the slaughter, they will be driven, increasing the statistics of losses in both personnel and equipment.
Conclusions
The Russian occupiers were never able to adapt to the conditions of the logistical lockdown that the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces created for them. Both on the mainland and on the peninsula. And the decisions of the ROV command regarding the MVG did not so much complicate the tasks of the defenders of Ukraine, but simplified them and increased the effectiveness of their work.
Starting with the hunt for SAMs, SAMs, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, radars and other radar systems, the SBS moved to the tactical stage of hunting and gradually destroying small enemy air defenses. And its important and most numerous component is precisely the mobile fire groups.
In just a few months of systematic work by our military, the average Russian MVG has turned not into a means of protection, but into an ordinary target.
“And the decisions of the ROV command regarding the MVG did not so much complicate the tasks of the defenders of Ukraine, but simplified them and increased the effectiveness of their work.”
The destruction of the enemy’s logistics cannot be overemphasized. No army can survive without supplies. And we can thank our lucky stars that the pandemic corruption in mafia land created potato generals who screw up all the time.