02/06/2026

Is a “bad peace” possible for Ukraine, who actually guarantees our security, and why no country in the world is ready to fight for us? In an interview with “Orestokratiya”, the deputy commander of the 3rd Army Corps, Maksym Zhorin, explains how technology, initiative from below, and the harsh reality of war are changing the Armed Forces of Ukraine right now. And how the reform of the Armed Forces of Ukraine can affect Ukraine’s position at the negotiating table.

The 3rd Army Corps is the youngest and at the same time one of the most effective in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Its experience is not about “reforms on paper”, but about ground robotic complexes, air defense, reducing casualties, and commanders who earn authority on the battlefield.

On the best guarantees of Ukraine’s security: not the US army and definitely not NATO…

– I will start with the most relevant: what should the price of peace be? In your opinion, as a military man, should we go for a “bad peace” to save people’s lives? Or vice versa: do we have the resources, and should we defend Ukrainian lands to the end?

– First, we need to focus our efforts on immediately stopping this war… but we cannot do it “at any cost”. This is also absolutely obvious, because a very high price has already been paid. Moreover, the world is quite cynical in itself. I am sure that both the USA and the Russian Federation look at this process exclusively from the point of view of their own interests. They are not interested in how the end of the war will look for us, what consequences it will have.

Therefore, our task is to defend our own national interests. Therefore, we cannot, of course, blindly accept these blind compromises that we are being pushed into. No one in Ukraine can give up any of our territory; there is simply no such right, neither moral nor legal. But this is hardly of interest to the Americans, who want to end this war as soon as possible and go about their business, including economic matters, both with Ukraine (that is, with the part that remains) and with Russia, with which it will be possible to formally change the status of relations.

Accordingly, we must gather ourselves and concentrate on obtaining acceptable conditions at the negotiating table: at the very least, a halt along the line of combat contact. After that, we can consider how to shape our policy further.

But no one can give up territory today.

– So, in your opinion, Zelensky is right in not agreeing to “peaceful” conditions from Trump, and the country will be able to defend its interests on the battlefield if it fails at the diplomatic table…

– Objectively, the president has no other option. This is the only scenario for us: to seek conditions under which we will be confident in security guarantees that will fit into the format of a conditional truce or peace, or whatever it will be called.

Everyone understands that this story with “peace” will be temporary, whatever it may be. If we give the aggressor territory, new claims will appear. If we don’t give it, it will be a conditional break until they return to the idea of ​​a forceful attempt to capture it again. We have few options. The most important thing is to do our homework, not to work out the foreign track. It is important, but by doing our homework on the very modernization of the army, defense, etc., we will be able to significantly strengthen our negotiating positions.

– In your opinion, what should be the security guarantees? We see that Trump is not ready to “join in” with his troops for Ukraine. The EU is also in no hurry… What other guarantees could there be then?

– Maybe it’s a secret for someone, but no one in this world is ready to fight for Ukraine.

Many Americans openly sympathize with us, but this does not mean that they are ready to give their lives for someone else’s Ukraine.

– Allow me to counter-argument. The Americans were ready to fight for “democracy” in Afghanistan. The US fought for conditional democracy in Iraq… And in Vietnam… I’m already silent about Korea… Were there such cases?

– These wars are not for democracy… At that time, the US considered that starting such a war was profitable, that the lives of their soldiers were worth the oil they would fight for. In the case of Ukraine, this miscalculation does not work. Moreover, it is unrealistic to compare the war in Ukraine with any other, starting from World War II. Neither in terms of dynamics, nor in terms of the number of forces and means used, nor in terms of losses in general. This is a war of a different level. Even Vietnam itself was not close to what is happening here today. Therefore, I am sure, the Americans are not ready for such a level of events and do not even want to check themselves. It is not about stealing Maduro with one special forces unit…

This special forces unit in our war could end in just two minutes, nothing would be left of it.

– What guarantees can we expect from the USA then?

– The main guarantees are the Ukrainian Defense Forces: their modernization, their strengthening, etc. This will be the greatest guarantee of security for Ukraine. Before that, we need to talk about certain guarantees from our partners: we are talking about military and economic support.

But first and foremost, I would still focus on all the support and strengthening of the Ukrainian Defense Forces. Because I would never rely on any other forces of any other country, NATO, the United States. Because there are already so many examples where it doesn’t work. This is the first.

And secondly, if the United States is still in some form ready for today’s war, I am sure, then, for example, other NATO countries are already, to put it mildly, having a difficult time. They had a huge problem with four Russian drones that flew into the territory of Poland. And what will happen to them if they get into the conditions that Ukraine is in today, when there are thousands of these drones every day, every hour. In parallel, missiles are still flying, and there is a ground component, in which there are constant assaults that never end. I am not very sure that NATO soldiers would cope with this.

Therefore, our partners could help build a normal Ukrainian army, which would be a guarantee of our security. It is about providing the army, its modernization, transition to a new absolute level. This applies in particular to the exchange of technologies, the exchange of intelligence capabilities, etc.

Well, and of course, we also need to look at things soberly. Today, the Ukrainian economy will not be able to independently provide for its army.

Mobilization should be decided by first reducing losses.

– What changes does the Ukrainian army need today?

– It is important to realize that there are changes in the Ukrainian army: technological changes, introducing modern approaches to warfare. But you know what the point is? All this happens from the bottom up. And when an initiative somehow makes its way up, then it is somehow implemented and scaled up. But there are a huge number of situations when it remains unheard, shoved back into the unit and when it is ignored due to misunderstanding.

This barrier prevents the Ukrainian army from moving to a completely new level faster. There is a lot of initiative at the bottom. Of course, you can’t blindly take and scale everything at once. But you need to react, check, analyze and scale. The best example of this is actually the 3rd Assault Brigade and the 3rd Army Corps.

Why do we have the largest number of cargo transportations due to ground robotic complexes (GRC)? Because this allowed us to significantly reduce the losses that occur during logistics in today’s war. The 3rd Army Corps transports the largest number of cargoes in its zone due to GRC, where it does not use military personnel, they no longer risk their lives. To do this, it was necessary to hear, support and scale up to the level of the brigade, and today the corps, all the initiatives and ideas that came from people who understood this. Why does the 3rd Army Corps allow the air defense to keep the sky in its zone of responsibility almost completely clear?

But it is extremely difficult to get through. In the army, the issue of paperwork is still often more important than the issue of efficiency. Sometimes this simply kills any initiative when a person resists once, twice, and then may even receive a reprimand for doing something that he did not prescribe or approve. Therefore, it is very important that the desire to reform, to rise to a new technological level is met with understanding at the top. To do this, unfortunately, it will probably be necessary to change a certain number of managers.

– Do you think that the newly appointed Minister of Defense, Mykhailo Fedorov, will be able to change the system?

– I am optimistic about the changes, at least those that the new minister has publicly declared. I hope that they will really happen. The issues of technology, support, etc. are now on his shoulders.

– From which side did you and Andriy Biletsky approach the solution of these traditional army problems – in the same 3rd Assault Division, and now – in the 3rd Army Corps? You started with the same realities as the rest of the Armed Forces of Ukraine: restrictions from above, responsibility, papers, lack of funding.

– In fact, for quite some time, probably since 2014, when Andriy Biletsky created and developed Azov, our internal history has hardened, when we rely only on ourselves. In these matters, a lot depended on our commander, who built these teams inside, who heard the initiatives, who supported them. And at the same time, he defended these decisions that were born inside the unit… Because they had to be defended every time in the literal sense. Somewhere, some virtuoso manipulations with the staff had to be done in order to hide the people who were developing something that cannot be developed in the army according to the charter. But then this team becomes a regular unit.

The same NRC units or drone units: they originated at the level of proposals… But from above, they traditionally said that such things cannot be pushed through the narrow throat of a military defense order… Instead of the opposite, seeing that it works, getting involved, finding a solution, you start being teased with this “there is no such thing” and “go think further”. Much here depended precisely on the approaches and principles of the commander and command, and the brigade, and the corps. And again, as I said, this is supporting healthy initiative within.

Everything must be in the complex: an internal atmosphere is built, the internal correct authority of commanders, which is formed exclusively due to their deeds on the battlefield. For example, in the 3rd assault brigade, you cannot become a commander of any echelon if you have not earned it directly by your actions on the battlefield, in the performance of your tasks. It cannot be that you simply studied somewhere, were given a rank and that’s it. Even an unfired officer will never be appointed as a platoon commander until he passes this school and until he earns authority among his subordinates. All this forms such a healthy atmosphere inside the unit, when these ideas appear, are implemented, scaled up and give their result.

– Can this experience be replicated in other units?

– Of course, this is already happening today. The experience of the 3rd Army Corps is already being scaled up at the level of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Let’s take at least the patronage service project, which worked for a very long time in our country and received resistance within the army system for a very long time, because no one understood who these people were and why they were doing this. The patronage service is a service that accompanies a soldier from the moment of injury or illness, a curator assigned to your unit immediately contacts you, and he is with you until the end of your treatment. In the event of death, he is next to your relatives, helping with absolutely everything, starting from some papers that need to be completed, ending with the household needs of this family.

Treatment takes place in modern clinics, prosthetics – with modern new prostheses, etc. And people feel all this. The 3rd Assault Brigade has the highest percentage of return to service after injury, and this indicates that there is not only a practical component in this (we helped), but also a moral, psychological one, people trust this team.

In addition to the patronage service, we have an entire NRC academy, which on its base trains not only servicemen of the 3rd Army Corps, but also servicemen of other units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to work with NRCs, drones, wings, etc. We have deployed a whole complex of training, including recruiting, working with SZCH, or former prisoners. Today, all this experience that the 3rd Army Corps had is already being scaled up in one way or another, either within the Armed Forces, or there are even requests from the Ministry of Defense asking to involve our people in order to share this experience, for further scaling up.

– Is that why the “three” shows greater stability on the battlefield? Sometimes it even seems like the hull is not moving at all…

– This is also a complex. All units that entered the corps have a single personnel training system, the same system and principles of support. Earlier, when some brigades “entered” the corps, well, we were, to put it mildly, surprised at how the processes were going in 2025. Some didn’t even have front-line observation: what do you think, how do you manage the battle today? There were headquarters in which we saw billiards instead of cards, for example. But today we are leveling the units – both in terms of support, and in terms of training, and in terms of experience in using forces and means, that is, managing the battle directly. We are introducing mandatory analyses of any actions, whether defensive or offensive. They are always analyzed with the maximum number of commanders and participants in these actions in order to immediately see mistakes, if any, so that others do not repeat them later.

Of course, a modern approach to the front line of combat is still being cultivated, because the front line as such has not existed for a very long time.

– That is, there is no clear front line, no trench that separates our troops from the enemy…

– This no longer exists. Today’s LBZ looks like a set of scattered positions. If they are scattered correctly, then you can effectively hold this conditional line. There must be a kill zone, a safety zone in front of it, to control the enemy’s approaches. In fact, an echeloned observation of the front line is being built, and you can see the enemy in advance.

Extremely important in the work of the corps is electronic warfare or electronic reconnaissance, due to which we understand quite well, we hear almost through the enemy that we have. This is also such a strong component that we have in the corps. And all this in the complex, of course, gives the fact that, as you said, the 3rd Army Corps is not moving at all today.

It stood as it did, as it got its position as a corps, and that’s how it remains today. At most, we can allow the enemy to advance somewhere in order to destroy him there and that’s it.

But this tactical approach of the enemy is gradually approaching such a dead end. That is, these assaults are constant, daily, and never-ending, and in which representatives of African countries have recently begun to take an active part.

– Have the defenders of the “Russian world” turned black?

– Yes, considering everything. There have been a lot of them in the last few months. They are even less prepared and are just trying to run to our positions.

None of them are making it, and none of them are returning to Africa either. The Russians have found a new resource, they have opened recruitment centers in Africa, they are recruiting people from there, but no one is returning there, so no one knows the real conditions.

But this tactic is already not working. Our defense is built in such a way that the enemy infantryman cannot even approach our positions. In general, today, under normal circumstances, the infantryman should not even enter into direct fire contact. All the crews that are standing with the FPV, drop tanks, bombers, which ensure the destruction of the enemy, are working on this.

What is very important: most of our UAV pilots are former infantrymen. This is very important, because the pilot who was an infantryman yesterday has a completely different attitude towards performing his tasks. He understands what is happening on the ground. He understands how the soldier who is there now feels. And this pilot, if, for example, his shift has just ended, will not get up and leave at this time… because there are active actions taking place there now. He will not leave the point until he is sure that the infantry is protected. In reality, the top and best pilots are yesterday’s infantrymen.

– How did this knowledge “come” to your brigade (now corps)?

– Training. In 2014, we really invited a lot of Western consultants, in particular American ones, who taught us, showed us how to build everything in the army, and this experience was really extremely important. Today, the weight of this consulting is much less, because our own experience is much greater. One of the principles in the “troika”, both in the 3rd assault and in the 3rd army corps, is constant training. Starting from the infantrymen, ending with the corps commander, we are constantly learning.

The dynamics of war today are high, there are many changes, technological steps, so training takes place absolutely every day, both at the tactical level and at the operational level. There is no one who knows absolutely everything. But there are those nearby who can give advice, there is experience that can be relied on, that can be scaled.

– In your opinion, why is a significant part of the Ukrainian army, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, technologically backward?

– I must say that there are really still very cool units, both separate UAV units, and linear units, mechanized, etc. This is the same 95th, 80th brigade, 3rd assault. These units are at a good level, which are constantly developing, they treat their personnel normally. And not only them, there are many more of them.

But at the same time, of course, most of these are units that live in the rules of existence that are hammered into them by the statute, where commanders see no point in development, because something needs to be done. New ideas need to be defended, they need to be explained. It is much easier to execute and then say: give us more people.

I don’t know how he will sleep with this later, considering that this attitude is actually killing his personnel. But, unfortunately, such units still exist. For the most part, these are the units where people and commanders try to live without falling out at all, without taking on any unnecessary responsibility.

– If, relatively speaking, you had the opportunity to influence the General Staff, how long would it take to completely change this military paradigm?

– Of course, it is impossible to do this in one or two days. But I think that in the long term, in six months or a year, the result would be 100% visible. I am sure of that.

– Do you understand what you are doing with mobilization? As one of the creators of the ideology of Ukrainian military recruiting, do you know how to change the approach to mobilization in this way?

– Honestly, I would start a little differently. Because the issue of mobilization is already a symptom of the processes that are taking place. I would focus on making sure that we suffer fewer losses to begin with, I would focus on training personnel, on their provision, on the reputation of the military and the army in general.

I am sure that after this the mobilization process would go much easier. This is firstly. And secondly, we need less personnel. We would have less need if people were better prepared for those war conditions. This is also a question about training centers, etc.: when soldiers are brought from them, they need to be trained again, even though they spent two months there. It takes time, instructors… if you are a normal commander, you will not send them “raw” into battle.

This would affect, I am sure, the mobilization process. And a separate issue here is the mobilization state of society, how it feels.

That is, not direct mobilization, but rather the mobilization state within society, which I would also influence through the training of the civilian population. We have our own experience working with civilians and their training. There is a National Resistance Center in the Kyiv region, which we, with the help of the 3rd Assault Brigade, also helped to create and train people. So, from our own experience, I can say that the people who graduate from there already have a different attitude to all events. They have already received answers about what is happening, why it is happening, and where they belong. And if they do not even approve of the decision to join the army on their own, at least they clearly understand what is happening today and what they should do. In parallel, almost every graduation class also has those who independently decide to join the army.

This shows that working with people properly would make the issue of mobilization easier. Today, people often don’t understand “why,” but “why,” and “how is this happening to me?”

– It would be fair to ask how much the losses in your unit differ from the general army losses?

– They differ significantly. It is difficult for me to voice the data, because I only know the total figure approximately. But if we are talking about logistics, then we have almost completely reduced losses during transportation. And these are the largest losses in the units today. In general, in the army, even at positions, fewer people are injured and killed than during movements to them. Because today you usually have to walk not 1-2 km, but 7, 10, sometimes 15 km.

For comparison, I can give other figures: the example of the brigades that joined our corps. In two months of our officers leading these brigades, losses decreased threefold. And this is only two months. In two months, it is impossible to even implement all the plans that they come with. These are usually completely simple, primitive things that commanders immediately implement.

The enemy is currently experiencing stagnation.

– You have already mentioned the situation at the front: they say it has begun to change not in favor of the occupiers. I would like to ask you to elaborate…

– We can return to the information that the enemy has begun to massively, at least in our zone, attract representatives of African countries. This probably indicates that they have a problem with people. And the issue will become more and more acute.

But an even bigger problem is their tactics on the ground. At first, the tactic of working in small groups was really effective: when two or three enemy soldiers simply ran through our positions, without even entering into battle, a very deep infiltration took place, which destroyed the front line. And it worked for a while. But today we have already found a countermeasure to this: this is normal observation and normal work of the forces of unmanned systems, awareness of the infantry of the front line, and their support – all this, in principle, makes it possible to mostly repel these daily assaults.

Assaults are taking place every day, along the entire front line. However, the effect they had six months ago is no longer there. And they are suffering even greater losses. The enemy is currently experiencing stagnation, a stalemate at the tactical level. That is, they continue to put pressure on resources, but the results are getting smaller and smaller.

We can look at Pokrovsk, Mirnograd, Liman, not to mention Kupyansk, where a catastrophe has occurred for them: everything, there is almost no advancement. They will capture some bush somewhere, but what does it cost them anyway? Their losses are absolutely not commensurate with their advancement. And so far, everything is coming to one thing: if the enemy does not change tactics, he will find himself in a deadlock.

– In many previous interviews you said that the situation at the front is critical. Are you more optimistic now? What is happening at the front, what awaits us in the near future?

– The situation has really changed in recent months. At least within the area of ​​responsibility of the 3rd Army Corps.

It has changed, as I said, due to the fact that the enemy is not modernizing its tactical approaches on the battlefield. Meanwhile, we have learned to react correctly and build our defenses in such a way that the enemy does not achieve the desired result.

Today, the situation continues to be difficult. All our positions are under attack every day. All our positions are being stormed every day. But we have adapted, we have learned to restrain ourselves. I am confident that with the right approach to the modernization of the Ukrainian army, we can further deepen the crisis for the enemy on the battlefield… Which, accordingly, would give us grounds to speak in a completely different tone at the negotiating table.

https://war.obozrevatel.com/ukr/vorog-u-taktichnomu-gluhomu-kuti-zhorin-pro-zmenshennya-vtrat-mobilizatsiyu-garantii-bezpeki-i-reformi-zsu-video.htm