Fact: Russia Is Losing The Ukraine War—Badly
Contrary to those Western analysts who believe the Russo-Ukrainian War has reached a stalemate, pro-regime Russians admit that they are losing—badly.
Published Sept 23
HE EMBASSY
Fact: Russia Is Losing The Ukraine War—Badly
Contrary to those Western analysts who believe the Russo-Ukrainian War has reached a stalemate, pro-regime Russians admit that they are losing—badly.
Published7 hours ago
Ukraine AZP S-60 57mm AA gun in Ukraine. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
Contrary to those Western analysts who believe the Russo-Ukrainian War has reached a stalemate, pro-regime Russians admit that they are losing—badly.
Two pieces of evidence make a convincing case.
On September 15, Major General Andrei Gurulyev, a combative Duma deputy of markedly illiberal tendencies who in recent months has argued that Russia should “burn” Ukraine, bomb Great Britain, and reintroduce the Stalinist terror, suddenly had a change of heart and described conditions on the front lines as being near-catastrophic. He even had the temerity to call the war a war, eschewing the prescribed official terminology (“special military operation”) and thereby engaging in a criminal offense for which many Russians have been punished.
According to Gurulyev’s Telegram posting, the Ukrainians are resilient, adaptive, and resourceful, and have succeeded in pushing back the Russians, imposing high casualties, evading Russian artillery, neutralizing Russian helicopters, deploying huge numbers of virtually limitless drones, and dealing effectively with the minefields. Indeed, “the enemy has seized some of our defensive positions.” Naturally, concludes Gurulyev, “we will win,” though “only one serious problem keeps us from Victory.” What might that be?
It’s lying.
Gurulyev’s answer is shocking, considering that he’s spent much of his career doing just what he now denounces. “Mendacious reports, unfortunately, lead to incorrect decisions on a variety of levels.” The major general is right, of course, though what he fails to see is that the problem is inherent in the very nature of the overcentralized political (and military) system created by Russia’s illegitimate president, Vladimir Putin. Mendacity, to put it simply, is the best way to survive and thrive in today’s Russia, just as it was in the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire.
The lying begins at the lowest levels and then proceeds upwards. By the time it reaches the corridors of power, Russia’s decision-makers, Putin included, have a false, sugarcoated picture of actual events on the ground. Hence his belief that invading Ukraine would be a cakewalk. Fixing the problem requires more than stopping to lie. The only effective solution is to dismantle Putin’s top-heavy fascist regime and replace it with something approaching democratic accountability.
Gurulyev paints a depressing picture—for Russia, that is—but just how bad conditions are on the front was made crystal clear in mid-September by the Ministry of Labor and Social Development, which ordered 230,000 death certificates for family members of deceased combat veterans. Back in May 2023, it ordered 23,716 such certificates; in 2022, the number was 5,777.
The last two numbers—23,716 and 5,777—look like accurate tabulations of war dead, though keep in mind that they probably do not include the thousands of Russians left to rot on the battlefield, the approximately 50,000 dead Wagner mercenaries (of whom many were inmates), and the tens of thousands of fighters from the occupied Donbas territories. The first figure—230,000—may reflect the actual number of dead or an estimate of how many will die or both.
Now, let’s engage in some conservative “guesstimating.” We know that 29,493 definitely died. Add 10,000 left to rot, 50,000 Wagnerites, and another 50,000 Donbasites, and we get approximately 140,000 dead Russians. Let’s assume that of the 230,000 just-ordered death certificates only half are intended for actually killed Russians and the rest are intended for future use. That comes out to 115,000; add that figure to 140,000 and you get 255,000 dead Russian soldiers. Significantly, the Ukrainians estimate that about 274,000 Russians have been killed.
Whatever the exact number of Russian fatalities, it’s obviously very high—probably no fewer than 150,000 and no more than 275,000. These numbers are decidedly not evidence of Russian battlefield success or even of a stalemate. And viewed in tandem with Gurulyev’s lamentations, they convincingly demonstrate that Western analysts and policymakers who see no chance of a Ukrainian victory are simply dead wrong. In fact, victory may be closer than we suspect. All Ukraine needs to do is to continue doing what it’s already doing: degrading Russian military infrastructure, incrementally liberating territory, killing Russians, and demoralizing survivors.
Small wonder that the Kremlin wants to introduce a second, much larger mobilization. Russian soldiers are dying at alarmingly high rates, and reserves are lacking. Putin and his comrades face a dilemma. On the one hand, they need more soldiers, whom they regard as little more than cannon fodder. On the other hand, presidential elections are scheduled for March 2024. Although the outcome is preordained, it would be embarrassing for the regime if Russians decided to develop a backbone and resolved to save their fathers and sons from near-certain death in the fields of Ukraine by destroying their ballots, refusing to vote, or—Heaven forbid—demonstrate for their right to live.
About the Author
Dr. Alexander Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers-Newark. A specialist on Ukraine, Russia, and the USSR, and on nationalism, revolutions, empires, and theory, he is the author of 10 books of nonfiction, including Pidsumky imperii (2009); Puti imperii (2004); Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires (2001); Revolutions, Nations, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities (1999); Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism (1993); and The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919–1929 (1980); the editor of 15 volumes, including The Encyclopedia of Nationalism (2000) and The Holodomor Reader (2012); and a contributor of dozens of articles to academic and policy journals, newspaper op-ed pages, and magazines. He also has a weekly blog, “Ukraine’s Orange Blues.”
Well folks, it’s another of those “putler’s finished” articles. The prof produces quite a few of them. Could he be right this time?
Thoughts?
Given that the Moskali population have lived and learned to be compliant with whatever the current regime wants from them for hundreds of years, I didn’t hold much hope for a back bone to develop for many generations to come. Unfortunately I won’t be around to see it but perhaps God willing I’ll see it along side my fore fathers when I eventually see them in the here after. In the meantime…
Слава Україна
At this point, it is a serious dose of hopium. Not something to place any reliance on.
Say it loud, say it clear :
https://www.facebook.com/reel/2227680034095707?fs=e&s=TIeQ9V&mibextid=0NULKw
God bless her and her spirit.
“Canada will always support Ukraine.”
📸 Watch this video on Facebook https://m.facebook.com/groups/1234192877360462/permalink/1469419447171136/?mibextid=kn5nL5
Good words sir. Now please provide the level of support that is commensurate with the wealth of your fine country and the size of your Ukrainian diaspora.
Unfortunately I don’t trust Trudeau any more, perhaps less, then I trust any politician.
Trudeau is of the same class as Putin. Biden is no better.
Tecla Squillaci, from We Stand By Ukraine:
“📌 The chaotic structure of Russian forces in Ukraine and the amount of time and resources Russia devotes to secondary objectives should always be interpreted in light of the Russian art of deception: the maskirovka. The Maskirovka is so deeply ingrained in the Russian military psyche that it makes it necessary to periodically reconsider Russian plans and resources.
📌 The prevailing idea today is that Russia has lost the organization, resources, or trained manpower needed to do more than hold its own position or perhaps advance with very limited objectives. This view is based on the command confusion in which the Russian armed forces find themselves. This would explain the long battle in Bakhmut, not to mention Russia’s general failure to cripple Ukrainian forces and penetrate deeper into Ukraine.
📌 Considering it, the three lines of fortifications already mark a “Russian stalemate”; a sort of dividing line due to the inability to penetrate more deeply; what is militarily called “strategic projection capability”. The three Russian fortification lines are the demonstration of a defense approach but also of a lack of dynamics in the ability to define a conquered territory and defend it. The defense of the occupied territories is therefore attributed to static, therefore passive, defense lines. On the other hand, in the political field, they claim to legitimize a military occupation with annexation referendums which constitute a logical contradiction.
📌 Supponing that Russia constructed the Battle of Bakhmut to drag the Ukrainians into a more vulnerable position. A crushing defeat for Ukraine would create a major crisis in the Ukrainian leadership and fuel serious tensions with allies.
If the disparity in forces were sufficient, Russian forces could move decisively towards Ukraine’s western border. The aim of the battle, therefore, would be to convince Ukraine to launch a broad attack in the hope of breaking Russia’s will. For Russia, the real goal would not be to quickly end the battle, but to significantly weaken the defense of the Ukrainian heartland and encourage forces planned for the offensive to gather in large units. The next step would be massive airstrikes on the concentrations using drones.
This would be the most militarily reliable hypothesis.
📌 But in practice, the strategy remains inevitably compromised by Russia’s inability to deploy large numbers of trained fighters, to protect transport with rapid and surprise deployment, and to hide the concentration of forces from Western intelligence. The US and British succeeded in Normandy, and the Germans in the Ardennes, although detection capabilities in World War II were obviously more limited than they are now. In fact, the Russians do not possess these capabilities.
📌 The process of advancing and creating a unified force under coherent Russian command would be the key and main stage; but the fact that it does not happen, and most likely cannot happen due to the absolute lack of “a coherent Russian command” as demonstrated by the continuous replacements at the top Russian military leaders…
The Russian command is simply dysfunctional and highly vulnerable to Ukrainian action.”
Tecla Squillaci again:
“‼️Among the arguments most used by Russian propaganda is the attempt to compare the invasion of Ukraine to the Cuban crisis of 1962.
Russian propagandists claim that Russia launched a pre-emptive attack on Ukraine which was preparing to host NATO missiles in its own territory, exactly as Cuba was trying to do with Soviet missiles in 1962.
But at this point we have to focus necessary clarifications. Cuba, after the Castro revolution, tried to invade the following countries: Dominican Republic (1959), Venezuela (1964), Congo (1965), Israel (1973), sent military contingents to Algeria (1963, to protect the Algerian regime), Guinea Bissau (1964, to foment the insurgents), Yemen ( 1972, in support of a faction in the civil war), Chile (1973, to support the insurgents), Angola (1974, against South Africa), Ethiopia (1977, against Somalia), Grenada (1983, to support the insurgents)…
On the other hand, the following elements do not appear: 1) Ukraine has not invaded or tried to bring sedition into other countries more or less linked to the Russian Federation 2) The United States neither invaded nor bombed Cuba either in 1962 or after 1962. Consequently, the comparison supported by Russian propagandists does not hold up.”
Comment from Wojtek Nawrocki:
“You forgot to add that before a full-scale war, Ukraine had zero chance of joining NATO. After 2014, many countries (including Poland, the USA and Great Britain) helped train the Ukrainian army. But these were trainings financed by Ukraine and did not differ from the same bilateral agreements with other countries.
Last year’s attack by Russia on Ukraine resulted in an influx of countries willing to join NATO and a change in NATO’s approach to new members. Finland, Sweden, Ukraine and Moldova are the result of Russia’s thuggish attitude, not the other way around.”