14.01.2025 

Last week and the beginning of this week were marked by successful strikes by Ukrainian drones on a number of facilities in the Russian Federation, in particular, on an oil depot in Engels, Saratov Region. The high effectiveness of strikes on the rear of the aggressor country once again raises the question: what is Russian air defense? Where is it?

At first glance, the strike on Engels could be attributed to the systematic work of the Ukrainian Defense Forces behind enemy lines, and in general, this is, of course, true – if not for one significant “but”.

The fact is that even during the Soviet era, the airspace of this formation was never reliable and completely covered by an echeloned air defense. Yes, the Soviets did not have enough resources to provide a unified air defense system throughout the country – priority was given to the more western regions.

After the collapse of the USSR, the situation somehow did not change radically, in a positive way, and moreover, the possibilities for overlapping airspace in the Russian Federation decreased.

At the turn of 2021-2022, the Moscow region and Moscow were considered the most protected echeloned air defense region of Russia, in second place was the temporarily occupied Crimea, and in third place were a number of regions bordering EU countries and having objects of strategic importance on their territory. And one of these third-order regions was Saratov. And what about now?

As of today, a “controlled fuel burn” continues at the Engels oil depot, which was the result of a “fall of debris.” This “fall” destroyed at least three tanks of 120,000 cubic meters each, damaged six tanks, and left the strategic air fleet without 800,000 tons of fuel.

https://t.me/uaobozrevatel/149371

But how did it happen that one of the most protected regions of Russia is now allowing Ukrainian strike drones to pass through non-stop?

Air defense losses

As of the third year of Russia’s full-scale war with Ukraine, the aggressor country’s air defense suffered losses that became so critical for it that they affected the combat capability of this type of troops not only in the combat zone, but also in the rear of the Russian Federation.

According to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, during the period of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Russian occupation forces lost more than 1,040 units of air defense systems destroyed, damaged, and captured.

According to data from various monitoring and OSINT groups, the losses of DOV air defense systems averaged:

SAM 9K33 “Osa” – from 30 to 40 (verified), or about 60-70 (unverified);

SAM 9K35 “Strela-10” – from 50 to 60 or about 100;

Buk-M1/2/3 air defense systems – over 90 or about 150;

“Tor-M1/2” air defense systems – about 60 or about 100;

“Pantsir-S1” air defense missile system – about 30 or more than 50;

S-300/400 air defense systems – about 30 or more than 50.

In addition, the loss of about 100 radars of various types and functionalities has been confirmed, and according to unverified data, the ROV lost about 150.

At first glance, the losses in the air defense category of the Russian occupation forces are not the most catastrophic in terms of quantity. If, for example, we compare it with the losses of tanks – over 9,750 or ABMs – over 20,270. But the difference between the air defense category and the rest is that it is extremely difficult to compensate for it. On the other hand, most of the lost assets are complexes that are not produced in Russia.

While the ROV loses dozens of air defense systems every month, they can produce units. In the third year of the war, the air defense category has become one of the most scarce among the Russian occupiers, which they compensate for not so much through their own production or restoration, but by redeploying systems from distant rear regions of Russia to the combat zone in Ukraine or to the near rear zone of the Russian Federation.

The biggest problem in the Russian military-industrial complex is the production of radar stations, especially those that are part of the S-300 and S-400 complexes. Sanctions and the lack of components (mostly foreign-made) have led to the fact that the production of new radars has become the most labor-intensive compared to other categories.

The situation with filling the echeloned air defense with complexes is so complicated that to protect the Moscow region, the DOV command deployed the unique Pantsir-SA SAM system, created for the Arctic zone. Its difference from the usual Pantsir-S1 SAM system is that it is placed on the chassis of a two-link tracked DT-30PM transporter and has only a missile component of the 9M335 missile launcher in the amount of 18 units, in the absence of a cannon – two 2A38M.

In August 2024, a unique Pantsir-S1M anti-aircraft missile system for the Russian Federation was spotted on the Kerch Bridge, which is the only exhibition model that was offered mainly for export to “hot” countries.

And in November, a Tor-M2KM air defense system on a KamAZ wheeled chassis, which was intended for Armenia under a contract, was spotted in the Kursk region of the Russian Federation.

These are just a few examples that demonstrate how Russia is trying to strengthen its air defenses with at least something that can be used.

The story of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s request to Vladimir Putin to accelerate the delivery of the S-400 air defense system, the deadlines for which Russia has long since broken, is also very revealing!

In 2018, India ordered 11 divisions of S-400 air defense systems from Russia (equivalent to five regimental sets) with the contract closing in 2024. Russia delivered three regimental sets on time, but after the start of a full-scale war, the deadlines began to fall apart. And now Moscow promises to transfer the fourth and fifth regimental sets of S-400 air defense systems to India no earlier than 2026!

I think that this promise is not worth a damn, since the production of air defense systems in Russia has become completely inconsistent with both the needs of domestic customers and external obligations.

And on January 12, a video was published of a Russian FPV drone striking a North Korean short-range air defense system – the Pongae M-2020, an analogue of the Tor-M2 air defense system. Previously, there was no information about the supply of this equipment, and this was the first documentary confirmation of its presence in the DOV. But in addition to verification, this is also confirmation that Russia, experiencing a shortage of air defense, made appropriate requests to the DPRK and received the first samples of one of the “most modern” systems by North Korean standards.

https://t.me/zloyodessit/23482

In the third year of a full-scale invasion, Russian air defense is not in a phase of regular replenishment, but of shuffling what is becoming less and less every day. This has led to the fact that there is no longer a single, echeloned air defense in the Russian Federation, and raids on Russian territory by Ukrainian strike drones are becoming increasingly effective and painful.

But we are talking about the results achieved by strike drones in conditions of depletion of Russian air defense, because 2025 may become the year of active use of other means of destruction. Much more destructive ones.

Ukraine has actually not even started to get anything done, and Russia is already in a state of unpreparedness to fight back even the “little flowers.”

https://war.obozrevatel.com/ukr/visnazhennya-rosijskoi-ppo-ukrainski-udari-vglib-rf-stayut-efektivnishimi-i-bolyuchishimi.htm