9.07.2026

How severe has the fuel crisis become in Russia?

Ukrainian drones surprised the world and the Russians: a total gasoline shortage has emerged in the “gas station country”. What’s next? Read about it here New Voice.

On the night of July 8, units of the Special Operations Forces’ (SSO) Deep Strike group struck two oil refineries in the Russian city of Nizhnekamsk (Tatarstan), as well as a refinery in Saratov. These strikes marked the latest episode in a months-long campaign of Ukrainian attacks on gasoline and diesel fuel producers in Russia, which in recent weeks has pushed the “gas station nation” into a full-blown crisis.

A few days before the strike on Nizhnekamsk, the American newspaper The New York Times spoke with residents of Irkutsk, Russia, located nearly 5,000 kilometers from the Ukrainian border. One of them, 26-year-old Alena Sadovnikova, said she got in line for gas at 11 p.m. but didn’t fill up until 5 a.m. the next day. In other words, for eighteen hours straight, she, her husband, and their one-and-a-half-year-old child waited for the chance to fill up their car.

Sadovnikova first encountered a fuel shortage back in mid-June, when gas stations were only dispensing fuel with ration coupons. “I was horrified: are we really back in the Soviet Union, where you need ration coupons for sausage?” The New York Times quotes her as saying.

By the summer of 2026, such lines had become a common sight across Russia—from the Far East to Moscow. At the same time, there wasn’t a single major oil refinery left in the aggressor country that the Defense Forces’ drones hadn’t reached: the “friendly” UAVs even made it to the plant in Omsk, located 2,500 km from the Ukrainian border.

In the first half of the year, experts estimate that drones struck Russian oil refineries at least 194 times. (11 times more often than last year) and put out of commission between 20–25%—according to the most conservative estimates—and up to 42.7% of Russia’s oil refining capacity, as stated by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. As a result, fuel distribution is already being rationed in most regions of the “gas station nation.”

However, as experts explain, the 42.7% figure cited by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine refers to the share of capacity at the affected refineries, not a drop in output volumes; the actual reduction in refining capacity is about 25%.

The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine estimates the total losses of the Russian oil refining industry over the past year—from the summer of 2025 to the summer of 2026—at $13.5 billion. Insurance broker Mains, for example, puts the figure at more than 1 trillion rubles ($13.12 billion) for last year alone.

About one-third of Russia’s oil refining capacity has been taken out of service, said Chris Weifer—CEO of the international consulting firm Macro-Advisory, who has worked in Russia for many years—in an interview.

Alexander Kolyadr, a senior researcher at the U.S.-based Center for European Policy Analysis (SERA), quoted by the Russian exile publication “Meduza,” called the fuel crisis in Russia a strategic achievement of Ukraine, rather than a side effect of the war. He is more outspoken.

The Drone Race and Repair Crews

As recently as last year, airstrikes on oil refineries in Russia were isolated incidents: one drone per plant, with repairs taking weeks, and the market remained calm. Everything changed in the summer of 2025, when Ukraine shifted to attacks using massive “swarms” of UAVs and follow-up strikes that disrupted repair efforts.

According to Bloomberg, Ukraine carried out 120 attacks on Russian energy facilities last year, 81 of which targeted oil refineries. By October, according to the BBC, 21 of 38 major Russian oil refineries had been hit. And in the first half of 2026, as an analysis by the Financial Times and Rochan Consulting shows, the number of strikes on Russian oil refining facilities reached at least 194, with a record 16 successful attacks carried out in May alone.

The climax came in Omsk: On July 6, FP-1 drones struck the local refinery. This facility, as explained by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, was the last of Russia’s 11 largest gasoline producers to be struck by Ukrainian forces.

The Omsk refinery accounts for approximately 11–12% of all Russian gasoline production (one in every eight liters).

The list of targeted refineries reads like a complete map of Russia’s oil refining industry. “The scale, coordination, and repeated waves of drone attacks are preventing Russia from repairing the refineries before the next strike,” stated independent analyst Boris Aronshtein.

Modern refineries in Russia were built using Western technologies and catalysts. (UOP/Honeywell, Axens, Shell, Haldor Topsoe), and after 2022, sanctions made it impossible to quickly repair complex units: cracking, reforming, hydrocracking, and isomerization.

“The resilience of the Russian oil industry is stretched to a dangerous limit,” stated Sergey Vakulenko of the Carnegie Russia Center. He is one of the analysts who is most cautious in his assessments; according to him, following the strikes on the Kapotna refinery in Moscow and the TANECO complex in Tatarstan, the loss of capacity “could amount to 28% compared to previous years.”

In June, Russia processed about 3.95 million barrels of oil per day—a quarter less than a year earlier, — and this figure was the lowest in more than two decades, according to calculations by Gary Peach of Energy Intelligence. Gasoline production fell by 17% (from 1.03 million to 850,000 barrels per day), which is significantly less than domestic market demand.

Russia is trying to close the gap by every means possible. Its government has imposed a complete ban on gasoline exports by producers, plans to ban the sale of diesel fuel abroad as well, and has reduced jet fuel exports to zero for the first time in many years.

Russia has begun importing fuel. According to industry publications, during the first 25 days of June, Belarus supplied a record 141,000 metric tons (141 times more than a year earlier); Kazakhstan may deliver 50,000 metric tons in a single shipment; shipments of 60,000–80,000 metric tons are arriving by sea from India, with plans to reach 400,000 metric tons per month.

In addition, the Russian government has legally authorized refineries to sell “Euro-3” gasoline under the “Euro-5” label, even though its sulfur content may exceed the standard by 15 times.

Ukrainian military analyst Konstantin Mashovets estimated in a Facebook post that the monthly gasoline shortage in Russia stands at 700,000–1.2 million metric tons, even accounting for imports.

Independent experts, taking into account Russia’s spare capacity, cite more modest figures: about 0.3–0.7 million metric tons per month, with import needs at 300,000–400,000 metric tons.

Diesel is a different story. On paper, Russia has twice as much diesel as the domestic market requires. However, the main production facilities are now concentrated in the Urals, Siberia, and the Far East, while the primary consumers are located in the west and south of the country. The Russian publication “Important Stories” explained that the railway should be handling fuel deliveries, but it is overloaded with military trains: Russian Railways (RZD) transports about 87% of non-military cargo; freight volumes have fallen to a 16-year low, and there is not even enough serviceable railcars. As a result, the nominal surplus of diesel fuel translates into an actual shortage in the European part of Russia—approximately 300,000–600,000 metric tons per month. “By the time a train is assembled and added to Russian Railways’ schedule, and by the time it’s transported to Nizhny Novgorod, the blow has already been dealt to Volgograd,” is how experts from “Important Stories” explain the mechanism of the “paper surplus.”

The harvest is already behind schedule: as of early July, only about 3% of the crop area in Russia had been threshed (roughly one-third of last year’s figure), according to estimates by the consulting firm Neo.

Fuel deliveries, which usually take one to three days, have stretched to five to ten days, and diesel prices in agricultural regions have risen by 40–90% compared to the spring. The crisis, as Chris Weifer emphasized, is unfolding “at a very critical moment, when the agricultural season—and especially the harvest—is just gaining momentum.”

Meanwhile, the authorities are paying lip service to control. Speaking on June 28 at his party’s convention, Russian dictator Vladimir Putin, as noted by the ISW, “tried to create the appearance of stability”; he himself acknowledged the existence of “a certain shortage,” but called the price spikes “non-critical.” Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak described the situation as “difficult but manageable,” while Finance Minister Anton Siluanov flatly denied the spike in gasoline prices.

A Sense of Misunderstanding

In early July, residents of occupied Crimea began salting meat in barrels: due to constant power outages, refrigerators are not working. Gasoline for the civilian population on the peninsula is scarce: sometimes it is distributed using special codes, but more often than not, the fuel goes only to utility services, the military, and representatives of the occupying authorities. This is how the independent Crimean Tatar publication CEMAAT Media describes life on the peninsula. Fuel is “released” for open sale in one city per day: on Monday—Feodosia; on Tuesday—Dzhankoy. The price is 220 rubles per liter, compared to the official price of 70 rubles, and no more than 20 liters are sold to any one person.

On July 7, Ukrainian drones disabled thermal power plants around Simferopol, plunging the peninsula into a blackout: according to CEMAAT Media, milk went bad in stores, traffic lights went out in cities, the price of chicken soared from 260 to 380 rubles per kilogram in just a few days, and farmers began slaughtering their livestock en masse.

However, Russians are also feeling the crisis. In Irkutsk, according to local media reports, lines at gas stations are so long that regional authorities have promised to install portable toilets for those waiting along the road; in Transbaikalia, garbage collection was suspended and bus routes were cut back due to fuel shortages.

According to estimates by Russian opposition economist Vladislav Inozemtsev, more than 300 independent gas stations have closed in Russia since May.

The problems have even been felt in the Russian capital. “I am deeply frightened by the uncertainty and the lack of understanding of where all this is heading,” a woman named Irina told Al Jazeera while waiting to fill up in Moscow. Another Muscovite, Igor, noted: “I think things could spiral out of control if the crisis leads to the shutdown of major manufacturing facilities.”

According to a Gallup poll, at the end of June, 60% of Russians believed that economic conditions were deteriorating—the highest figure in two decades of surveys.

Three Scenarios for the Future

Attacks on oil refineries have a powerful psychological and domestic political impact, but they do not, by themselves, destroy the Russian economy. “Russia does not make its money from petroleum products on the domestic market, but primarily from crude oil exports,” explains energy expert Vladimir Omelchenko of the Razumkov Center.

A real turning point, he emphasizes, will come when strikes target export infrastructure—ports and oil pipelines—along with domestic logistics.

Omelchenko advises “destroying Russia’s export capacity by November–December” by striking at four vulnerable points: Crimea, Moscow, oil refineries, and the petroleum products export system.

According to experts surveyed by NV, there are three possible scenarios for how events might unfold. The first is a managed crisis, such as the one currently observed in Russia: chronic shortages in the regions, lines, rising prices, and the imposition of limits—but without an economic collapse—while the army, which primarily consumes diesel fuel, remains virtually unaffected. The second is an escalation of the problems: Ukrainian strikes are partially shifting to export ports and rail hubs; the diesel shortage is hitting farmers in the midst of the harvest season; export revenues are falling; and food inflation is accelerating. The third scenario—the most severe for the Kremlin—is a systemic breakdown: fuel rationing via coupons, a black market, regional supply crises, and simultaneous direct pressure on military logistics and the planting season.

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