May 02, 2026

In late March, the Russian Ministry of Defense awarded several medals to soldiers in recognition of their role in the capture of Chasiv Yar. This follows a series of Russian claims throughout 2025 that their military had successfully taken the key city in Donetsk Oblast. However, the Institute for the Study of War has assessed that while Russia controls the eastern and central parts of the city, Ukraine still controls the western portion. These assessments are supported by numerous images and videos on social media showing Ukrainian forces still disrupting Russian offensive operations in and around Chasiv Yar. While Russia’s inability to capture Chasiv Yar may appear to indicate a shortcoming in its military, it more accurately reflects the inherent difficulty of modern urban warfare. In particular, the widespread use of drones makes the already challenging task of seizing and holding urban terrain even more difficult.

The Current Situation in Chasiv Yar

Chasiv Yar holds significant operational importance for both sides in the war. For Russia, capturing the town would help rupture Ukraine’s defensive “fortress belt” and open approaches to Kostyantynivka and Sloviansk, enabling further offensive operations to the west. For Ukraine, Chasiv Yar is a key part of its defensive network, helping to block Russian advances beyond Bakhmut. The city’s elevated terrain adds to its importance, providing advantageous positions for artillery and drone operations that enhance observation and strike capabilities for whichever side controls it.

Russian assaults on Chasiv Yar began around April 2024, following the fall of Bakhmut. The initial Russian attacks focused on breaching the Ukrainian defenses along the Siverskyi Donets–Donbas canal, with Russian forces committing substantial manpower, including airborne units and reinforcing elements. These assaults were supported by artillery, glide bombs, and drones. Despite this concentration of combat power, Russia has made only slow, incremental gains against a staunch Ukrainian defense and has yet to fully capture the city after two years of fierce fighting.

The Russian military had originally assessed that it would rapidly seize Chasiv Yar, given its small size and prewar population of around 12,000. Instead, the fighting has unfolded block by block, as Russian forces attempt to push from the eastern districts through the city center into the western areas. Throughout 2024 and into 2025, Russia repeatedly claimed to have captured the city, including several high-profile announcements of full control. These claims have been consistently disputed by Ukrainian officials and independent assessments, which indicate that Ukrainian forces continue to hold the western portion of the city and contest Russian advances.

Russia’s Key Challenge In Fully Capturing Chasiv Yar

Following military doctrine, urban terrain generally favors the defense and presents significant challenges for an attacking force, as demonstrated in Chasiv Yar. Buildings create a three-dimensional environment that provides ample concealment and enables strong defensive positions. Movement is canalized along roads, creating chokepoints and exposing armored vehicles to ambush and direct fire. As a result, the traditional method of capturing a city relies on deploying large numbers of dismounted infantry to seize the town street by street and building by building. Each position must be cleared and then held. Securing terrain requires a persistent physical presence, which in turn demands substantial manpower, a requirement that has proven difficult to sustain in Chasiv Yar.

This approach has been standard in major urban battles from Stalingrad to Fallujah, but those engagements did not contend with the widespread use of drones. In Chasiv Yar, the troop concentrations required to clear and hold a street are highly vulnerable to drone strikes. The Ukrainian Armed Forces’ 24th Mechanized Brigade has exploited this vulnerability by using drones to disrupt Russian assaults. Early Russian attacks relied on military vehicles, which were quickly destroyed through a combination of drones and artillery. Russia then shifted to using small commercial vehicles, but these too were destroyed. In both cases, canalized road networks made movement easy to monitor, while limited maneuverability reduced their ability to evade drone strikes. More recently, Russian forces have adopted the use of small teams of approximately three soldiers to seize forward positions. Although these dismounted troops attempt to use damaged buildings for cover, drones are able to follow them inside and detonate.

Beyond targeting the assault elements, the 24th Mechanized Brigade has also focused on Russian command posts, counter-drone air defenses, and resupply networks around Chasiv Yar. These strikes are often coordinated with artillery and missile fires, increasing their overall effectiveness. Counter-drone systems are particularly vulnerable, as they are often positioned in open areas to maximize range. The brigade has recently released footage showing several of these systems being destroyed. Additionally, the brigade has emphasized targets deep behind Russian lines, enabled in part by fiber-optic drones with ranges up to 60 kilometers.

Drone operators can work from a range of concealed positions within and around Chasiv Yar. While they often remain relatively close to maintain control, they do not need to be exposed, making them difficult to detect and target. Small teams can operate from buildings, using upper floors or basements for concealment. Although some operators are likely positioned within Chasiv Yar itself, others appear to operate from nearby towns within range of the city. The drones typically do not follow predictable flight paths, further complicating efforts to trace them back to their launch points.

Russian Path Forward For Chasiv Yar

For Russia, the path forward in Chasiv Yar is increasingly uncertain. While capturing the city would provide a tactical and symbolic victory, its operational value may be diminishing relative to the cost required to take it. Russian forces have at times shifted focus to other areas along Ukraine’s defensive fortress belt, suggesting that Chasiv Yar may no longer be the primary effort. At the same time, the city still offers potential avenues for future operations deeper into Ukrainian defenses.

To capture Chasiv Yar, Russia will need to combine manpower, technology, and tactical adaptation rather than rely on any single approach. Increasing troop numbers could generate local mass and sustain pressure on Ukrainian defenses, but without changes in how those forces are employed, this would likely lead to higher casualties without substantive gains. Russian forces also need more effective tactical counter-drone capabilities to reduce Ukraine’s advantage, with these systems tailored for urban environments. These capabilities must be integrated into a layered defense to reduce their vulnerability to Ukrainian strikes. At the same time, Russia will need to adapt its tactics. One likely approach is to attempt to envelop Chasiv Yar, isolating it from resupply and limiting the ability of Ukrainian drone operators to sustain operations. Cutting off access routes could gradually degrade Ukraine’s defense, similar to the approach used in the capture of Avdiivka in 2024.

The battle for Chasiv Yar highlights a broader shift in urban warfare. While the requirement to seize and hold terrain remains unchanged, the methods for doing so are being reshaped by drones. Traditional approaches that rely on massed infantry and methodical clearing operations now face constant exposure to precision strikes. As a result, even a small, heavily damaged city can resist sustained assaults for extended periods. Chasiv Yar is not simply a tactical fight over terrain, but a case study in how technology is redefining the balance between offense and defense in modern urban combat.