23.09.2026
Thanks to Operation Vivaldi of the Third Army Corps, the city of Sloviansk, as well as the entire Slavyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration, was saved from an attack from the north. The defense forces effectively cut off the “pincers” with which the Russian occupation army tried to close the “belt of fortresses”. Does the aggressor have a plan B? There are at least two options for the development of events: to pass through Konstantinovka, conducting urban battles, which is extremely difficult, or to storm Slavyansk, which is no less difficult.
As for the situation on the battlefield, neither side currently has an advantage, and the front line is practically stationary. At the same time, the enemy will certainly not abandon attempts to actively operate in the Donetsk region, in particular, because it has the opportunity to supply its units from the temporarily occupied territory. Also, forecasts of mass mobilization in Russia look quite realistic .
This opinion was expressed by military expert Pavlo Narozhnyi in an exclusive interview with OBOZ.UA.
– Could you assess the significance of Operation Vivaldi, which is being conducted by the Third Army Corps in the Lyman direction? Can we say that thanks to these actions, the implementation of the enemy’s plans to capture the entire Donetsk region has been postponed in time?
– In fact, it is difficult to give any assessments. I can only state what is happening on this section of the front. The enemy used his standard tactics here – building “claws”. Because the Russians could not go head-on into Konstantinovka – they got bogged down in it. They could not take Sloviansk. Similarly – they passed through Siversk, and then got bogged down on the approaches to Sloviansk. And they began to build a kind of “claw”, to drive a wedge into our defense.
What happened? What happened was that the Third Army Corps cut off this “claw” and hit the flank from the Russian point of view. In this way, they essentially eliminated the danger from the north that was for Slavyansk, as well as for this entire agglomeration as a whole. At the moment, we cannot say that this agglomeration is completely secured, but it already looks like this enemy plan to bypass it from the north, to cut off our logistics, will not be implemented.
– Then what, in fact, remains? We understand that the enemy is not giving up on his main plan, on his minimum task – the capture of the entire Donetsk region. What other options does he have now? How can he act? Does he have a plan B?
– He continues to act. They still have the option of passing through Kostyantynivka through urban battles. This is the first option. But for the enemy it will be a very difficult task, if they can do it at all. And the second option is to try to storm Sloviansk. But very good fortifications have been built near Sloviansk, with which they obviously will not be able to do anything.
In Kostyantynivka, our Defense Forces are also holding defenses in the industrial zone. Therefore, it looks like the enemy’s plan, which was usually voiced among us, namely to completely capture the entire Donetsk and Luhansk regions by the end of the year, will obviously not be implemented.
At the same time, they will continue and try to operate here. Why is that? Because in the Donetsk region they have the best logistics, a very large number of roads, railways, they have warehouses in Donetsk and Mariupol, and this is the most convenient section of the front for them, where they can try to attack.
– The so-called elections were held in Russia. Previously, the issue of large-scale mobilization in Russia after the elections was actively discussed in expert circles, although, as is known, the decree on partial mobilization has been in effect in the Russian Federation since 2022. Do you think that the Kremlin can go the way of accumulating even more manpower, even more “cannon fodder”, in order, for example, to go head-on to one of the cities that today make up the “belt of fortresses”?
– The forecast, unfortunately, looks quite realistic – that mobilization will be intensified in Russia, essentially due to the existence of this decree. Because they simply have no other options.
Putin’s standard tactic is always to raise the stakes. For example, they sent 10,000 soldiers into battle, they were lost, but instead they send another 20,000 soldiers. By endlessly raising the stakes, they try to win.
Therefore, they will recruit even more people, even more personnel and throw them into battle, in order to try to break through our defenses. It seems that the Russians have no other tactics or strategy. And, of course, strike at the cities of Ukraine. After all, these endless drone attacks are an attempt to compensate, in essence, for the lack of any movement on the front, from their point of view.
– If we take the current situation, the current state of the confrontation, how do you assess the positions of the parties, whose side has the advantage on the battlefield?
– Now on the battlefield, no one has an advantage. I think we are close to equilibrium. Yes, we have progress, we can remember the Alexander offensive, we can remember Operation Vivaldi, but overall the front line has been more or less stable for at least a year. That is, there are no major advances, there is no significant advantage, neither technological nor in the human factor.
Why did this happen? Because we are in a blind defense, we are advancing in a very limited way, that is, these are the Oleksandrivsky and Lymansky directions that I mentioned, but in all other areas of the front we continue to be in a blind defense.
This deaf defense allows us to grind a large number of enemy personnel and equipment and strike at their rear. This includes logistics, deep rear areas, the destruction of refineries, etc. But we cannot say that we have any advantage now. If we really had such an advantage, we would have attacked. We would have attacked on significant sections of the front, and not on sections like Liman, like Sviatohirsk. Then it would have been a question of some kind of broad offensive. But we do not have such an advantage at the moment, and I cannot imagine where it could come from.
– And purely theoretically, in what case, under what conditions, can the Defense Forces of Ukraine launch a counteroffensive?
– “Counterattack” is the wrong term. A counterattack occurs when we are captured and we are hot on our heels in retaking our lost territory.
And what you are talking about is an offensive. In order for us to launch a massive offensive, we first need to neutralize those enemy assets that will destroy our personnel in the event of such an offensive. That is, we need to assess what will happen if we attack.
For example, you can imagine a classic offensive – the enemy’s defense is broken through by armored vehicles, then infantry enters the operational space, captures everything, etc. Why is this unrealistic to do? Because if we ask our allies for a hundred tanks and go on the attack with these hundred tanks somewhere in a certain area, nothing good will come of it. We will simply lose them because there are a large number of minefields, a large number of anti-tank weapons, drones, and enemy artillery, which will massively destroy all of this.
So, in order to prevent all this from happening, it is necessary to undermine the enemy’s economy and destroy its military-industrial complex. To make it so that they cannot produce all these means. This is the only way – first destroy the economy, the military-industrial complex, and then talk about some kind of offensive at the front.
– You have already mentioned that the enemy, despite the lack of any particular successes on the battlefield, is terrorizing Ukrainian cities by launching strikes from the sky. Of course, against the backdrop of these attacks, the news of a successful example of the use of a jet drone interception by the new SPYS interceptor looks very optimistic . In your opinion, will it be possible to increase the production of these drones in sufficient quantities to completely block Russia’s capabilities?
– We will be able to increase production, but the question is the price. Will we be able to pull it off from an economic point of view? Because such drones will be much more expensive than the drones that were there before. It is difficult to give estimates at the moment. If it is a drone with an electric engine, as is currently being shown, then the increase in cost will be insignificant. But if the drone is with a jet engine, then this will mean a significant increase in cost, it is many times more expensive. Such a drone will become 5-6 times more expensive. Therefore, it is still difficult to give any estimates and predict what exactly will happen and what drones we will use to strike.
Plan B for the potato generals is always the same as plan A; throw more meat into the meat grinder.