07/27/2026

The aggressor country Russia has begun using depleted uranium munitions against Ukraine. Its main danger lies not so much in radioactivity as in the chemical toxicity of uranium, which turns into dust during an explosion and can cause toxic poisoning and kidney damage. The enemy uses such munitions because they have an extremely high density and greater penetration ability. However, for a number of objective reasons, the use of nuclear weapons against Ukraine is unlikely. In particular, because the technical condition of nuclear warheads remains a critical issue, as they have not been tested for two decades.

The coming winter may be no less difficult than the previous one, but not only for Ukrainians, but also for Russians. However, the good news is that Ukraine already knows what to prepare for and how to act. In addition, the aggressor’s capabilities regarding missile attacks are limited – the number of launchers allows using no more than 25 missiles at the same time. Therefore, one-time “giant salvos” of ballistic missiles should not be expected.

This opinion was expressed in an exclusive interview with OBOZ.UA by the director of development of the defense enterprise, Air Force officer in the reserve, Anatoliy Khrapchinsky.

– The SBU, together with the State Emergency Service, recorded the use of ammunition with depleted uranium elements by the enemy army. Such components were found in the Geran-2 drones, with which the Russian forces attacked the Chernihiv region during April-June 2026. How dangerous is such ammunition?

– The use of depleted uranium in the R-60 series of aircraft missiles, with which the occupiers are retrofitting the Geran-2 UAVs, is based on Soviet technologies of the 1970s-1980s. In the manufacture of rod-type warheads, depleted uranium alloys were used due to their ultra-high density: this made it possible to significantly increase the kinetic energy of the striking elements for piercing the power elements and skin of aircraft. Today, the Russians are artisanally mounting these decommissioned aircraft missiles on strike drones, trying to use the existing stockpile of obsolete ammunition against Ukrainian interceptors.

The key danger of such elements is not in large-scale radiation damage, but in the chemical toxicity of uranium as a heavy metal. Depleted uranium has a weak alpha and beta background, but when a warhead explodes or burns, it turns into finely dispersed aerosol dust. The entry of this dust into the body through the respiratory tract or microtraumas causes severe toxic poisoning and kidney damage, so the main risk at the sites of such UAV crashes is associated with the need to use respiratory protection during inspection and removal of debris.

– How do you assess the danger of the enemy using tactical nuclear weapons as a “last resort” in a situation where the Kremlin absolutely needs to achieve its minimum goal – the capture of the Donetsk region within its administrative borders?

– I assess the probability of using tactical nuclear weapons as extremely low, because the Kremlin is restrained by powerful external safeguards, primarily from China. Even in the event of an attempt to use air attack means or intercontinental ballistic missiles, the issue of the technical condition of the warheads themselves remains critical – Russia has not even conducted laboratory tests of its existing nuclear resources for over 20 years. In addition, Ukraine has already significantly unbalanced the architecture of the Russian nuclear triad, having successfully struck elements of early warning systems, space communication centers, and consistently reducing enemy aviation capabilities.

– What exactly are the means of tactical nuclear destruction? Does Ukraine have the means to counter them?

– The range of Russian tactical nuclear weapons primarily includes ballistic and cruise missiles of the Iskander-M complex, aeroballistic Daggers, air- and sea-launched cruise missiles – Kh-102, Kh-22/32, Caliber – as well as special artillery shells for large-caliber systems – 2S7 Pion, 2S4 Tulip.

Formally, we have already learned to intercept most of these carriers, but in the case of a nuclear warhead, the principle of destruction changes radically. Classical air defense is not enough here – only modern missile defense systems, such as the Patriot PAC-3 or SAMP/T, are needed. If for a conventional missile, an explosion of an anti-missile near the target is sufficient, then for a nuclear warhead, only a direct kinetic hit, hit-to-kill, is needed, which physically destroys the nuclear block itself in the air. Otherwise, a missile damaged by fragments will fall and detonate from the initiation of conventional explosives inside the warhead, which will cause large-scale radiological contamination of the territory due to the effect of a “dirty bomb”. In addition, we still do not have enough missile defense systems to create a solid dome over the entire country.

– The strikes on the warehouses of Russia’s largest marketplace Wildberries caused considerable panic among Russians. How does the destruction of these facilities affect the occupation army? What purely military goods pass through this network?

– Due to tough international sanctions, Russia is forced to circumvent restrictions through retail purchases around the world under the guise of ordinary buyers for household needs, and civilian marketplaces – primarily Wildberries and Ozon – have become the main logistical routes for legalizing and quickly delivering such “gray” imports. This network is massively used for dual-purpose and purely military goods: from civilian and FPV drones and components for microelectronics to portable electronic warfare equipment, thermal imagers, protected walkie-talkies, and tactical equipment. Accordingly, the destruction of the warehouse complexes of these retailers not only provokes panic among the civilian population, but also directly destroys the decentralized logistics of the occupation army, creating an acute shortage of critically important equipment directly on the front line.

– Can we say that the strikes on Wildberries warehouses are also strikes on the logistical routes of the Russian occupation army?

– Yes, this is certainly one of the elements of the defeat of military logistics, but it is important to understand its overall scale. The Russian supply system is extremely extensive: it extends from the cover of civilian marketplaces for “gray” imports to entire railway trains from North Korea, massive container deliveries from China and large-scale internal logistics between key enterprises of the Russian defense industry. The destruction of civilian retailers’ warehouses hurts the efficiency of the supply of scarce technologies and equipment, but this is only one of many links in a large chain that requires comprehensive and systematic defeat.

– The Ukrainian leadership has repeatedly warned about the danger of intensification of enemy attacks on our country’s infrastructure in winter. Moreover, President Zelenskyy stated that winter could be a turning point. “We have two paths in winter. The first path is for us to find an opportunity and sit down at the negotiating table with Russia and end this war. This is a priority. The alternative to this, which is always sought not by Ukraine, but by Russia, is the expansion of the war, increased mobilization.” How do you assess the degree of danger as of now? How can the forecast change as winter approaches?

– It is worth starting with the fact that the coming winter will be no less difficult for the Russians themselves, but, unlike the enemy, Ukraine already has a clear understanding of what and how to do. Our main guideline is to increase our own independence and internal defense capabilities, as well as active interaction with those partners who, like us, realize the seriousness of the threat and act pragmatically.

With the approach of autumn and winter, the threat assessment is significantly tied to changes in weather conditions, which directly affect the effectiveness of detection means. Low cloud cover, fog and precipitation significantly complicate the work of visual and optical observation channels, which are used, in particular, by mobile fire groups. That is why we are once again returning to the critical need for various sensors and classic radar stations (RAS). Only a developed network of radars and radio equipment is able to ensure round-the-clock detection of low-flying UAVs and missiles, regardless of meteorological factors.

– The enemy’s use of ballistics at the most difficult time for Ukraine – in winter: how large-scale can the attacks be, given the restrictions on Russian missile production and the assistance of Ukraine’s allies in the issue of ballistics protection?

– When assessing the potential scale of winter ballistic attacks, it is worth considering not only the accumulated reserves or the pace of missile production in the Russian Federation, but primarily the technical limitations of the means of their application. The number of active launchers for the Iskander-M complexes and their North Korean counterparts KN-23, as well as combat-ready carriers of the Kinzhals – MiG-31K – is quite specific and limited.

That is why we are already seeing the enemy’s real capability for a simultaneous salvo: physically, the Russians are not capable of launching hundreds of ballistic missiles at one time. The practical limit of one massive attack is usually an average of 10 to 20-25 ballistic and aeroballistic missiles, after which the launch complexes need a long time to reload, service, and change positions.

So in winter, the enemy will not rely on a one-time “giant salvo”, but on combined waves – when ballistics are used pointwise at critical nodes in combination with cruise missiles and massive swarms of UAVs to reload our surveillance system and deplete ammunition. In this context, the key factor of defense remains not only the presence of missile defense systems – Patriot PAC-3, SAMP/T – but also the uninterrupted supply of anti-missiles from partners to repel these mathematically calculated enemy salvos.

– Is it possible for the Armed Forces of Ukraine to strike Russian strategic aviation airfields just as effectively?

– Such an opportunity exists and is being systematically increased at the expense of the Ukrainian defense industry. In particular, the Fire Point company has publicly announced plans to reach production capacity of over 100,000 FP-1/2 series drones per year – over 8 thousand units per month – and this is without taking into account the FP-5 cruise missiles, which have already demonstrated successful combat use. Such a scale is capable of creating a critical and constant load on the Russian military infrastructure and strategic aviation airfields. At the same time, the main restraining factors remain not the technologies themselves, but the ability of the state and partners to financially contract such volumes, the systematic logistics of mass use and the availability of a sufficient number of experienced operators.

– Do you see any way to force the aggressor country Russia to make peace? If so, what is it?

– Transferring the war to the aggressor’s territory is an extremely important step, but without a change in the military-political leadership in the Kremlin, it will be extremely difficult to force Russia to peace. Russian society remains deeply apolitical and inert, it still refuses to understand the causes and consequences of this war, and therefore will not become a factor in internal pressure on the regime.

At the same time, it is worth realizing the strategic reality: in its current geographical dimensions and imperial matrix, Russia will definitely not stop of its own accord. Accordingly, the only path to a stable peace lies in such military and economic exhaustion of the enemy that it will inevitably lead either to the internal political collapse of the revanchist regime or to the fragmentation of the imperial system itself.

https://war.obozrevatel.com/ukr/yaderna-zbroya-rf-u-kritichnomu-stani-vorog-zastosovue-zbidnenij-uran-hrapchinskij-poyasniv-nebezpeku.htm