10.04.2026

Deputy Head of the Presidential Office Pavlo Palisa stated that Russia is planning an offensive from a new direction, namely – the Kremlin wants to create a “buffer zone” in Vinnytsia from the side of Transnistria. Even though the brigadier general noted that the enemy does not yet have the resources for this, this has created a certain panic in society. But let’s analyze the probability of such a threat in more detail.

About this – in the material of the joint project OBOZ.UA and the group “Information Resistance”.

The last time we heard about threats from Transnistria from officials authorized to make such statements was in December 2025, when a source in the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine informed the media about the growing activity of Russian special services agents in Transnistria. In particular, then there was talk of increased mobilization measures, the call-up of reservists, the decommissioning of weapons in warehouses, as well as the organization of UAV production and the opening of training centers for drone operators on the territory of the so-called “PMR”.

Meanwhile, no serious changes in the concentration of enemy forces and assets capable of posing a real threat at least at the operational-tactical level have been observed in this isolated metastasis of the “Russian world” recently.

In turn, Transnistria, like Belarus, should be regarded as a hostile territory for Ukraine – regardless of the number of Russian troops stationed there, which always pose a potential threat.

But in the case of the latest statements made by Brigadier General Pavlo Palisa, we are talking about the creation of some kind of buffer zone on the territory not so much of the Odessa region, with which Transnistria has a large border, but rather of Vinnytsia.

Most often, when we talk about threats from the so-called “PMR”, we automatically mean the threat to the Odessa region, but not to the Vinnytsia region, which is rarely mentioned at all as a potential target for the illegal armed formations of the unrecognized quasi-republic. And this is actually both quite logical and could have been a misconception about potential threats from the “PMR” all this time.

But before assessing the degree of danger, it is necessary to analyze the potential of the forces and means at the disposal of the “republic’s” IAF.

The potential of “PMR”

The question of assessing the potential of Transnistria is quite easy to answer, since it has not changed radically compared to the potential before 2022 and after. It can be conditionally called preserved and degrading in conditions of complete isolation. But, nevertheless, it poses a certain situational danger.

Today, the number of Russian troops in the “PMR” is about 1,700 people, who are constantly serving in an intensified mode at the following facilities:

– 1411th artillery ammunition storage warehouse (village of Kovbasna);

– “Tiraspol” airfield;

– 82nd OMSB (Bender city);

– 113th OMSB (Tiraspol);

– 540th separate battalion of management and MTZ (Tiraspol);

– 450th Military Hospital (Tiraspol);

– Department of the Russian Military Prosecutor’s Office and the Military Counterintelligence Department of the FSB of the Russian Federation (Tiraspol).

Illegal armed formations in Transnistria have also not undergone any fundamental changes over the past years, and their number is about 7.5-8 thousand people .

Both, so to speak, groups are armed with the following equipment :

– tanks – about 11 combat-capable MBTs of the T-64B/BV and T-72 modifications. About 30 T-64B/BV, T-72 and T-55 tanks are in a non-combat condition;

– ABM – about 150 combat vehicles of the BMP-1/2, BTR-60\70\80, BRDM-2 and MT-LB types, some of which are in a non-combatable condition and cannot be repaired;

– gun artillery – about 60 units consisting of 122-mm D-30 howitzers, 85-mm D-44 divisional guns and 100-mm MT-12 anti-tank guns.

– MLRS – about 20 units as part of the 122-mm BM-21 “Grad”/VV-21.

In the realities of a dynamic war, in which the Ukrainian army has the best experience in the world, such a complex group has a chance in the event of a direct invasion to hold out in the offensive for no more than a week, and perhaps even sooner will be wiped out. But the thing is that it is not so much about a direct invasion with an attack on Odessa, but the formation of the so-called buffer zone is mentioned. And this indicates rather the possible hybrid nature of the aggression than an attempt to cut a corridor to Odessa.

Buffer zone

The Russian military-political leadership has repeatedly stated its intention to create so-called buffer zones since 2024, after the Ukrainian Defense Forces conducted the successful Kursk operation. But behind these statements lies an attempt to justify the invasion and seizure of the territories of Sumy and Kharkiv regions.

The invasion in May 2024 in the Volchansky direction took place in the ROV under this justification for hostilities, which represented a failed attempt to break through to Velykyi Burluk. Subsequently, these sections of the front along the border expanded with multiple raid operations of the tactical level, which did not penetrate into the territory of Ukraine more than 3-5 km from the border.

In general, the Russian occupiers justify almost all their aggressive raids by creating a buffer zone, the essence of which is completely different by definition. Namely, a neutral territory not controlled by any of the parties, created to prevent conflicts, reduce tension, or ensure security.

That is, according to the rules of terminology, the entry of enemy troops, the same Transnistrian IAF, into the territory of Ukraine is not the creation of a “buffer zone”, but an invasion .

Invasion of the “PMR”

The border of the “PMR” with the Vinnytsia region is a little over 30 km long and stretches conditionally from Velyka Kosnytsia to Chervona Polyana. The concentration of forces and means of the Transnistrian IAF in this zone cannot be carried out unnoticed, and any redeployment, especially along the M-4 highway, will be observed by Ukrainian troops .

In turn, the concentration of the above-mentioned units and equipment may indeed be sufficient to carry out an advance to a depth of up to 5 km on a 30 km front with control of a number of settlements. But in the future, the Transnistrian army, unprepared and lacking experience in conducting combined-arms offensive operations, and the Russian “peacekeepers” will be stuck in a small area of ​​combat operations, giving Ukraine the right to retaliate.

In particular, if we consider the border with Vinnytsia region, then the expected response of the Ukrainian troops could be a counterattack in the direction of Katerynivka, along route 1611, in order to cut off logistics along the M-4. The “PMR” IAF will find itself closed and isolated from the south by Ukrainian troops, and from the west by the Dniester.

The suicide mission will collapse faster than the occupiers can even imagine.

In addition, Transnistria is a gut stretched for more than 200 kilometers, with a maximum depth of 27 km from the Ukrainian border. A large part of the territory of the “PMR” is not just shot through with cannon artillery, but also with mortar fire. Not to mention the complete dominance of fpv drones at such distances – both conventional and fiber-optic.

In the event of a threat from the “PMR” and an attempt by enemy troops to enter the territory of the Odessa or Vinnytsia regions, remote fire influence on this quasi-republic will have the character of complete control over the entire area of ​​Transnistria.

But most importantly, such an act of aggression will give the Ukrainian side the full right to clean up this hostile entity. The only question is political determination, with or without regard to the position of official Chisinau.

Conclusions

“PMR” poses a threat to Ukraine, as does Belarus. These territories are used by Russia to carry out provocations and sabotage against Ukraine, and pose a potential terrorist threat to border regions. But in general, for our country, they pose only a situational military threat, which can be quickly neutralized.

The only nuance is that no buffer zone will be created in the event of aggressive actions by the “PMR” – this will be an invasion itself. The meaning and significance of the buffer zone is completely different, and in this case this terminology, which Russia very often uses to justify the occupation of the territories of Ukraine, cannot be applied.

In turn, the Ukrainian troops have every opportunity to respond to such threats by completely clearing the problematic region of hostile elements, which will depend solely on the will of the country’s top leadership.

https://war.obozrevatel.com/ukr/vtorgnennya-rosii-z-novogo-napryamku-naskilki-realnoyu-e-zagroza-bufernoi-zoni-na-vinnichini-ta-chim-tse-vidguknetsya-pridnistrovyu.htm