Russian attacks on the Odesa region have become more systematic than has been seen in a long time.

Consistent and highly effective attacks on energy infrastructure, ports and ships, and the transport system (bridges)…

It seems the enemy has deliberately withdrawn its weapons from other areas and concentrated them on our region.

However, this has long been expected—no surprise there. It’s strange they haven’t done this before.  

The goal is disintegration, demoralization, and widespread economic damage across the country.

Indeed, if they manage to maintain this intensity long enough, Ukraine’s problems will snowball. Simultaneous attacks on the ports of Greater Odessa and alternative logistics tied to the Danube region, plus energy, are a very successful move.

It creates problems with grain exports and fuel imports, for example. Reports suggest that 60% of the latter goes through Danube ports. Quite likely.

Previously, the occupiers couldn’t or wouldn’t concentrate their resources on one point for long.

They had to terrorize Kyiv, fire at the railroad, and not forget Starokostiantyniv, the training centers, and much more. Ukraine is vast, with many targets.

To shell everything at once and for a long time, they would have to produce many times more missiles and drones than they currently have.

So they operated like this: hit a little bit at a time, occasionally launching a serious attack here and there, depending on the current political situation or purely military objectives.

Now, it seems, the strategy has changed: the goal is to specifically target the Odessa region. To make sure. The entire country must feel the consequences.

By the way, they fired a cluster bomb at the bridge—that was just to heighten the effect, a kind of banditry display.

They wanted to kill more civilians (repair workers, people in cars, who were allowed through anyway), and make life more difficult for the soldiers, who would now have to search for unexploded submunitions.

Well, that’s war. The enemy is the enemy, there to terrorize, kill, and invent new ways to get at your throat. Naturally, they learn from their mistakes and try to be unpredictable. And you thought those guys were idiots? Alas…

Something else bothers me. All the videos from Mayak, Chornomorsk, and Odessa (unfortunately, air defense operations are easily filmed and posted on Telegram) show a depressingly low fire density.

A sizable “shahed” flying in broad daylight at an altitude of 300-500 meters at a speed of 200 km/h at most is easy to shoot down.

And they’re constantly shot down with conventional heavy machine guns like Browning or Degtyarev-Shpagin, or even old Maxim machine guns. But for some reason, we don’t see this now. What happened?

I think several factors were at play here. Specifically, in Odesa, there was the liquidation of “Munvarta” and the associated volunteer territorial community formation.

As a result, a significant portion of the mobile fire groups disappeared.

They haven’t been replaced (the new mobile fire group currently exists only on paper). The military, National Guard, and police remain, but they’re performing their tasks, protecting their facilities.

There aren’t hundreds of thousands of them in Odesa, either: the air defense forces are regularly diverted to the front, where infantry is in short supply. Even one mobile fire group is a problem, but what if there are five or six? Ten?

The second point is that some “shahids” are controlled by operators in real time and specifically attack the MHGs.

There are known cases of air defense groups being hit. Consequently, the latter have a new concern and problem, which greatly complicates their primary mission.

Third, the Russians have improved their aircraft to deceive or destroy air defense drones and counter-drones.

They deceive and destroy. The Ukrainians are taking many measures in response, but their solutions don’t always keep up with the challenges. That’s precisely the situation now.  

Fourth, it’s very difficult to protect large infrastructure facilities. Sometimes, it’s impossible.

It’s important to remember, however, that the attack on the bridge wasn’t a complete surprise.

The military had been preparing for this scenario since 2022. From the start of a full-scale war, it was clear that the enemy would sooner or later attempt to target key logistics.

Therefore, alternatives were discussed and developed in advance—including the pontoon bridge option.

Conclusion: the war continues.

Ukraine is squeezing out Russian oil exports.

The Russians, understandably, don’t like this; they’ve decided to seriously terrorize the Odessa region.

It’s a very important and convenient target: how can they avoid hitting two bridges when all communications depend on them?

Well, I think we just need to grit our teeth, learn from what’s happened, strengthen our defenses, including air defenses, and continue to strike the shadow fleet. Fight on.  

This is no longer a sprint, but a grueling marathon. The price of defeat for us is terrible. I believe that Ukraine will win. I believe in Ukraine!

Author: Victor Bosnyak

P.S. President Zelenskyy stated that personnel changes are possible among those responsible for the air defense of the Odessa region.

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