21 January, 2026
Facing critical shortages of armored vehicles and mounting battlefield losses, Russian forces have shifted to deploying small infantry units of 2-4 soldiers to infiltrate Ukrainian defensive lines—a desperate tactical pivot that has dramatically increased the proportion of killed-in-action casualties while yielding only limited territorial gains
Military observer Oleksandr Kovalenko stated this, Obozrevatel reports.
Since mid-2025, Russian military commanders have increasingly abandoned conventional mechanized assaults in favor of lightly armed infiltration teams that slip through Ukrainian defenses on foot, avoiding direct confrontation while establishing hidden forward positions in forests, ravines, and ruined buildings. The shift represents a stark departure from the tank-heavy offensives that characterized the early phases of the war, when Russian forces deployed armored columns in attempts to break through defensive lines with overwhelming firepower.
The transition stems from unsustainable equipment losses. Throughout 2022, Russian forces hemorrhaged tanks and armored vehicles at rates far exceeding production capacity, forcing commanders to deploy aging Soviet-era T-62 and even T-54/55 tanks into front-line combat. By early 2025, the shortage became so acute that Russian units began mounting assaults using civilian vehicles and motorcycles, culminating in a record 4,104 vehicle losses in April 2025 alone. The proliferation of motorcycle-mounted attacks and combat operations conducted in civilian sedans became a source of dark humor regarding the “world’s second-best army.”
The small-group infiltration tactics that emerged represent an even more extreme cost-cutting measure. These units, typically consisting of three or four soldiers, advance incrementally through terrain, often guided only by reconnaissance drones, with minimal fire support. Their mission is to penetrate as deeply as possible into Ukrainian-held territory without engaging in combat, establishing networks of concealed positions that can later be activated for coordinated attacks.
The approach has produced mixed results. In Pokrovsk, infiltration teams—some disguised in civilian clothing—successfully penetrated deep into the city, complicating Ukrainian defensive operations. Similar tactics yielded gains in Myrnohrad and other urban areas during summer and fall 2025. However, the Battle of Kupiansk proved disastrous for Russian forces, with infiltration groups becoming isolated and ultimately destroyed after Ukrainian units sealed off their supply routes.
The human cost of this tactical shift has been severe. While overall monthly Russian casualties declined from approximately 40,000 in late 2024 to around 32,000-33,000 in 2025, the proportion of killed-in-action jumped dramatically to 65% of total losses. In December 2025, Russian forces suffered over 22,000 deaths—the highest single-month total of the war. When infiltration teams are discovered, they are typically annihilated completely, with no evacuation attempts for wounded personnel.
The small-group tactics suffer from fundamental vulnerabilities. Teams carry limited ammunition and supplies, making them unable to sustain prolonged engagements. Weather conditions critically impact effectiveness, with winter conditions and snow significantly degrading operational success. The approach also requires substantial reserves of infantry and extended operational timelines—resources that become increasingly problematic as casualties mount.
Ukrainian forces have progressively adapted their defensive posture to counter infiltration tactics, implementing anti-infantry barriers and developing protocols for detecting and eliminating small units. The effectiveness of Russian infiltration operations has diminished markedly since their initial deployment, particularly as Ukrainian defenders gained experience identifying hidden positions.
Military analysts note that Russian commanders pursued this approach not because of its tactical superiority but due to lack of alternatives. The Russian military currently lacks sufficient armored vehicles to conduct conventional combined-arms operations across multiple sectors simultaneously. The small-group infiltration method represents an acknowledgment that traditional offensive capabilities have been degraded beyond recovery in the near term.
The tactical shift has failed to produce the strategic breakthrough that Russian political leadership demanded. In October 2025, Russian Chief of General Staff Valery Gerasimov prematurely reported to dictator Vladimir Putin that Pokrovsk had been encircled and captured, with Putin subsequently inviting foreign journalists to verify the claim. As of mid-January 2026, fighting continues within the city.
Russian forces are expected to continue deploying infiltration tactics despite mounting casualties and diminishing returns, as alternative approaches remain unavailable given current force capabilities and equipment constraints.
This isn’t the first time. How many times does this make, in which the potato generals are forced to use this ridiculous tactic?
I hope they keep using this tactic. It appears Ukraine are getting stronger on the battlefield, resulting in the only alternative left in the kremlin locker, which is to attack civilians.
Whatever helps to slaughter masses of roaches is fine with me.