26.10.2026
Source: screenshot from video
Ukrainian strike drones once again covered thousands of kilometers in the airspace of the Russian Federation and struck the most important enterprises in Omsk. Russian air defense
again failed to guarantee the safety of its enterprises even in such a deep rear. On the eve of the Ukrainian Defense Forces and in general destroyed one of the workshops of the Proton enterprise, directly related to the production of air defense. It is obvious that the ability of the Russian army to defend itself from air strikes is decreasing every day more and more.
During the Soviet era, air defense did not cover the entire airspace of the Soviet republics, but was mainly concentrated in their European part. After the collapse of the Union, Russia’s ability to close its airspace from penetration was significantly reduced, but this, nevertheless, did not affect the availability (number) of short-, medium-, and long-range weapons.
However, the protracted full-scale war in Ukraine has made serious adjustments to this category as well, creating a real air defense crisis in the Russian occupation forces, which is noticeable even to non-professional observers.
But the degradation of Russian air defense is due to a number of factors. And we will talk about each of them today.
Air defense losses
According to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, during the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russian troops lost more than 1,725 air defense systems.
The General Staff does not specify by name and function which types of air defense systems are in question, nor how many of them were destroyed, damaged, or captured as trophies. However, the rate of losses suffered in wars and conflicts throughout the existence of the Russian Federation and even the USSR is not just the highest – it is generally a record for losses in any other wars and conflicts in modern history.
If we talk about verified losses (i.e. recorded with photos or videos of destroyed/damaged/captured equipment), then monitoring resources report the loss of over 580 anti-aircraft and missile systems, over 150 radar systems, and over 110 electronic warfare complexes.
I would like to note that the ratio of verified losses to real losses is within 2-3 times, which is a completely acceptable value for assessing the reliability of information published by official sources. This is precisely evidence that the data of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is as accurate as possible.
As for the nomenclature of verified losses of air defense systems in the army of the aggressor country, it looks something like this:
ZU-23-2 – over 45 units; ZAK S-60 – over 25 units; ZSU-23-4 “Shilka” – over 15; BTR-3D “Skrezhet” – over 5; 2K22 “Tunguska” – over 20; SAM 9K33 “Osa” – over 45; SAM 9K35 “Strela-10” – over 60; SAM “Buk-M1/2/3” – over 160; SAM “Tor-M1/2” – over 90; SAM “Pantsir-S1” – over 55; SAM S-300/400 – over 60.
In addition, among the verified losses in the DOM there is a category of unidentified systems or single foreign samples, such as the North Korean Pongae M -2020.
Of course, the real loss figures are much higher, but even these clearly indicate that the problem with the lack of systems to cover the sky (due to losses) is more than obvious.
In addition, the Ukrainian Defense Forces significantly intensified the hunt for Russian air defense systems in 2026. This led to the fact that in September an absolute record was set for the destruction of these systems – 86 units. In total, more than 460 ROV air defense systems have been neutralized since the beginning of 2026, which is also the largest number since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
But the air defense crisis in Russia is not only caused by the quantitative shortage of complexes.
Destroyed “Pantsir-S1”.Source: “Spy Dossier” Telegram channel
Ammunition shortage
In 2026, Russian Z-military units began to openly talk about the lack of ammunition in the air defense units of the Russian Armed Forces. It is not uncommon for Ukrainian strike drones to fly in the air defense system’s range, and the complex does not work out the targets because it simply does not have anti-aircraft guided missiles. This is a completely expected result in the conditions of a protracted war and Ukraine’s scaling up of production and raids on Russian territory.
At first, Russia’s air defense managed to cope, primarily thanks to accumulated ammunition stocks, but their rapid consumption led to a shortage. And Russian enterprises producing ammunition for anti-aircraft missile systems were no longer able to ensure the necessary production volumes.
The turning point in the issue of BC overspending in the DOM itself occurred from 2024 to 2025. During 2025, the situation worsened, and it turned into a crisis in 2026, which even the most ardent Z-patriots can no longer remain silent about.
But in addition to the shortage of systems and ammunition for them, a serious problem for the Russian air defense is also a factor such as technological backwardness.
Technological backwardness
If we talk about the most obvious thing – the backwardness of air defense systems technologies- then it is worth mentioning the brightest representative in this category, the Pantsir-S1 air defense system. It was conceived as a replacement for the 2K22 Tunguska, and initially it had a good development vector, but later, having turned in the wrong direction, it turned into the most incompetent complex in the arsenal of the Russian Air Defense Forces.
In June of this year, in the article “Moscow Will Burn and Not Only: What Happened to the Russian Air Defense and Why the Pantsir-S1 SAM System Became a Big Problem for the Enemy,” I described in detail how the Pantsir-S1 became the most massive serial complex in service with the Russian Armed Forces, while at the same time being the least effective system in its class.
In addition to the obsolescence of the systems themselves, another problem for Russia is that its air defense production enterprises cannot fully compensate for the losses suffered by the occupation forces every month.
For example, the Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant “Kupol” produces an average of 2-3 units of finished products of the “Tor-M2” air defense system per month. The Ulyanovsk Mechanical Plant (UMZ) similarly delivers 2-3 “Buk-2/3” air defense systems per month. The Shipunov Instrument Design Bureau also delivers 2-3 “Pantsir-S1” air defense systems per month.
Above, I pointed out the monthly losses of DOM, and as we can see, they are several times, or even almost 10 times, higher than the pace and volume of production of new products by Russian enterprises.
For example, in September alone, the destruction of more than six Buk-M2/3 air defense systems was confirmed. That is, 2-3 times more than UMP can afford to produce to compensate for these losses.
Moreover, since 2022, Russian enterprises producing air defense equipment have only slightly increased the volume of finished products, which is insufficient given the current intensity of both the need to cover airspace and to compensate for losses.
But, as we see, another factor is emerging that affects the combat capability of Russian air defense – strikes on production sites.
Production strikes
On October 23, the Ukrainian Defense Forces launched a missile strike on the Proton enterprise in the city of Orel. Proton is known for producing optoelectronic equipment and micromodules that are actively used in the production of such Russian missiles as the S-71 Kover and the 9M723 Iskander-M. This enterprise is also part of the supply chain, which is critical for maintaining the production of products necessary for the Pantsir-S1 air defense missile system.
https://t.me/uaobozrevatel/250925
Earlier, strikes were carried out on the Iskra plant in Ulyanovsk, which produces semiconductor devices and electronic components used, in particular, in the 72V6 Pantsir-S1 air defense missile system and its modifications.
Strikes were also carried out on Kremny-El in Bryansk, the Azov Optical-Mechanical Plant in Azov, Rostov Region, and a number of other enterprises that are part of the production chains of air defense systems in the Russian Federation.
That is, for deep strikes on Russia, Ukraine is not simply eliminating its air defense systems through targeted hunting, but is also targeting enterprises that participate in production – which is already extremely limited given current needs.
Conclusions
In the fifth year of a full-scale war, we clearly see the effect of the impact on Russia: the destruction of its seemingly endless anti-aircraft potential – both inherited from the USSR and developed in rather hothouse conditions over the past 35 years.
Today, Russia loses on the battlefield and even in the rear of air defense systems many times more than it can produce. At the same time, the complexes that are produced in emergency mode cannot meet all the needs for airspace protection not only quantitatively, but also qualitatively. And the enterprises that produce them are unable to sharply increase the production of finished products. The SOU has moved to systematic attacks on the supply chains of critically important components for air defense.
The air defense crisis in Russia is not just that Ukrainian drones fly thousands of kilometers deep into the rear of the aggressor country and strike strategically important enterprises. The crisis is that with every day, week and month, the number of air defense systems in Russia is getting smaller, not the other way around. And this is not just a temporary phenomenon, but an irreversible plunge from which the Russian Federation will never be able to recover.