08/22/2025

Bilateral relations between Azerbaijan and Russia deteriorated significantly after an Azerbaijani airliner operated by AZAL was shot down by a Russian Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile system , for which Moscow refused to apologize. But the events of July-August have escalated so much that Russian propagandists are calling for a “special military operation” against Baku . But how big is the threat of a Russian invasion really, and what could it mean for Azerbaijan?

More details about this can be found in the material of the joint project OBOZ.UA and the group “Information Resistance” .

Black January

Before analyzing today’s threats to Azerbaijan that come from Russia, it makes sense to take a brief historical excursion – after all, Russian troops had already invaded the republic when it was experiencing the formation of its independence.

The invasion of Azerbaijan by Soviet/Russian troops took place on the night of January 19-20, 1990. This was a period when the USSR, in futile convulsions before its complete collapse, tried to forcefully contain the crumbling empire.

Russian propaganda called the reason for the military operation in Baku the protection of the Armenian population, but in reality Moscow was afraid that the Azerbaijani Popular Front had become a serious rival for the Communist Party of Azerbaijan at that time. Only years later, when internal documents of the Communist Party were declassified, it was confirmed that the forceful operation had been prepared since the second half of 1989. That is, the bloody terror was exclusively political in nature and was planned in advance.

On the night of January 19-20, 1990, Soviet troops, in accordance with the decree on a state of emergency, stormed the capital of Azerbaijan, Baku. A group of over 26,000 people took part in the assault, consisting of:

-106th Airborne Forces;

-76th Airborne Forces;

-56th Rifle Brigade;

-21st ODShBr;

-22nd MP;

-8th MP.

The assault on Baku began with sabotage, the explosion of a power unit at AzDerzhteleradio, which deprived the country’s residents of access to information in an operational mode. In Baku, the aforementioned formations advanced in the Sumgait-Khirdalan directions, with a twist through Binagadi; Lokbatan-Patamdar; Turkan – and with a wide reach through Mardakan and Binu, with an exit from the eastern side of the capital.

These tragic events, which claimed the lives of hundreds of civilians, are known in Azerbaijan and in world history as “Black January” (Azerbaijani: Qara Yanvar). And in the historical context, they did not happen so long ago – thirty-five years ago. Is such a repetition possible, given the hostile and extremely aggressive statements of the regime’s Russian mouthpieces? Let’s try to understand this in detail. But let’s start with the background of the current confrontation in order to fully understand the essence of the events taking place.

Good neighborliness that is diving

It would also be quite appropriate to provide a chronology of how relations between Russia and Azerbaijan entered a stable peak, although they could never be called friendly, at least for the above reason, as well as because of Russia’s support for Armenia during the occupation of Karabakh.

After the collapse of the USSR, Azerbaijan could not boast of a strong modern army, nor sufficient support in the international arena to openly confront the Russian Federation.

Friendly and good-neighborly relations have always been an imitation for the stable and secure formation of a republic that emerged from the “empire” that was collapsing and gradually emerging from the influence and pressure of Russia itself. And the decisive factor was the 44-day war of 2020, during which a significant part of Karabakh was liberated .

In fact, this became the starting point for Azerbaijan to become a leading regional player, and today – to a level beyond the region. The 2020 liberation war became an impetus for Baku to popularize itself as a strong player , and today we can see how the Republic of Azerbaijan is building a new foundation for relations with the countries of Central Asia, covering issues not only of a military-technical nature, but also of a cultural, political, economic, humanitarian, technological, etc.

Azerbaijan has become a bridge for the countries of Central Asia, allowing them to more intensively move out of the orbit of influence of Russia, which is weakening. And this only catalyzes Moscow’s irritation.

The latest reason that greatly agitated Russian revanchists was the conclusion of an agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia under the auspices of the United States, designed not only to resolve the long-standing conflict, but also to open the borders for a transport route from Azerbaijan through the Armenian city of Meghri to the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhichevan – the Zangezur corridor.

The essence of the corridor is that, although it is under the jurisdiction of Armenia, it will be serviced and operated by Azerbaijani and American companies, and the presence of US interest in the region that Russia has historically considered its sphere of influence completely puts an end to its semi-imperial ambitions.

Azerbaijan’s more independent, confident domestic and foreign policy is driving the Kremlin crazy, and as a result, the Kremlin’s chain dogs are starting to raise the topic of conducting a kind of “SVO” against the Republic of Azerbaijan in the information space. But does Russia have the strength for this and what are the scenarios for such an operation?

Invasion of Azerbaijan

Above, I did not just provide a historical reference mentioning the tragedy of January 20. It was also a reference from a tactical point of view to what directions and routes Russia might consider when preparing such an operation.

But one important point should be understood: Azerbaijan of the 1990 model is not Azerbaijan of the 2025 model. Just like Russia: the one it was before 2022, it is not in 2025. But, I think, both options should still be considered for the maximum adequacy of the assessment of the capabilities of the Russian Federation.

So, in the high offices of the Kremlin, a decision is made to conduct a punitive operation in Azerbaijan. What could contribute to this? First of all, the feeling of impunity that settles in the environment of totalitarian warlike regimes against the background of meetings in Alaska and the lack of responsibility for their crimes. And here, in the military section, a small geopolitical offtopic should be made.

The consequences of the meeting in Alaska

The fact is that the 47th President of the United States, Donald Trump, received in the territory of the country, which until recently was considered the so-called beacon of democracy and the world’s policeman, a person who is wanted by the International Criminal Court. A war criminal with the blood of hundreds of thousands of people on his hands. And he received with honors, a red carpet, applause, smiles and treats in the form of Alaskan halibut.

In essence, a war criminal was legitimized in Alaska – without condemnation, without a demonstration of contempt for his actions, but on the contrary: the reception was held in an encouraging, respectful manner.

Of course, this approach can be seen as an attempt to appease and distract Putin on the eve of important decisions, but why? The United States is a country that has in its arsenal a full set of political, economic, legal, technological and other tools with which it is able to put pressure on Russia until its complete and irreversible exhaustion. But strangely, Donald Trump has not yet used any of these tools, and even the previously promised sanctions against Russia have been postponed again for two weeks.

This moment is both depressing and revealing, but more on that later.

A vulnerable and extremely negative moment of the meeting in Alaska was that Vladimir Putin was received with honors, and this could once again convince him that he can get away with any evil. And not only him. This is an example for other rogue countries, dictators, such as Kim Jong-un (DPRK) or Nicolas Maduro (Venezuela): any of their actions can go unpunished. And, conversely, attract attention that they actually do not deserve among civilized countries.

In other words: destroy the world order, the sovereignty of borders no longer plays any role, seize neighboring territories – they will negotiate with you later, but not punish you.

This situation can be called the opening of Pandora’s box, or, taking into account modern realities, “Trump’s box.” With all its demons. One of them recently tried to break out in the Kashmir region, when India made a forceful attempt to put pressure on Pakistan, but, having received a worthy rebuff, very quickly brought the confrontation to naught.

Unfortunately, the Alaska meeting in the format in which it was held may lead to the awakening of more demons in Trump’s coffin that he opened. Although everything is not so fatal.

And now we return to the risks and threats for Azerbaijan – taking into account the fact that after such a meeting, Putin can be confident in his absolute impunity for any crimes.

Prerequisites for the invasion

A point of tension in relations between Azerbaijan and Russia can be called the attack on an Azerbaijani civilian aircraft of the AZAL company and the reluctance of the Russian side to officially admit its guilt and apologize.

On July 19, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev announced that documents were being prepared for submission to the International Court of Justice in the case of the strike on flight AHY8243 , and on the night of July 21, during a missile strike on Kyiv, one of the Russian missiles exploded near the Azerbaijani embassy . This was an unambiguous hint, a forceful reaction to Baku’s position. Then a series of hybrid strikes on Azerbaijani facilities in Ukraine began.

At the end of July, it was announced that the Ukrainian company Naftogaz Group and the Azerbaijani SOCAR Energy Ukraine had signed an agreement on the supply of Azerbaijani natural gas via the trans-Balkan route Bulgaria – Romania – Ukraine. A week later, on the night of August 6, the Russian occupiers carried out a massive raid with Shahed-136 kamikaze drones on a gas distribution station in the Odessa region, which is part of the Azerbaijani gas transit route.

On August 7, it became known that the Romanian Petrobazi refinery received “dirty” Azerbaijani oil – with a high concentration of chlorine – via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline. But the Romanian side suspected the contamination of the Azerbaijani oil, which could have caused equipment failure, of the Russians, who were trying to sabotage and discredit Azerbaijan as a reliable supplier of high-quality oil products.

Then, on the night of August 8, the Russian occupiers again struck an oil depot of the Azerbaijani company SOCAR, also in the Odessa region, and on the night of August 18, another SOCAR facility was hit .

Against the backdrop of such hybrid strikes in Russia, the warming of anti-Azerbaijani sentiments in society is being catalyzed : from the persecution of representatives of the diaspora to direct threats from the so-called “SVO”. And here it is important to understand that these threats do not come from some no-names and bots on social networks or cheap pocket chatterboxes, but from the highest-ranking relays of the Kremlin agenda. That is, the threats to Azerbaijan are not their own initiative or position, but rather the current policy of the Kremlin.

Course of events

Russia is now more weakened than ever by the war in Ukraine to conduct such operations – especially against a country whose army can rightly be considered the most combat-ready and high-tech in the region and, in a number of parameters, even surpasses those forces that can oppose it to the Russian Armed Forces.

To conduct a combined-arms offensive campaign against a country like Azerbaijan, with the minimal goal of taking control of the capital, Baku, Russia would need to ensure the presence of a 200,000-strong strike force in the region. Therefore, the accumulation of a large group of troops near the borders with Azerbaijan would already be a sign of a growing threat, and it is simply impossible to conduct it unnoticed.

Many may ask the question: how is it that during “Black January” the Soviet troops had enough of 26 thousand to enter the capital, and now they need a group almost 10 times larger? The answer is simple, and it sounded above: Azerbaijan in 1990 was practically defenseless, found itself one on one with a collapsing empire, and now it is a country of a completely different weight category. An updated army, a systematic increase in defense capabilities, reforming the armed forces, which reaches a much higher quality level than the Russian Armed Forces of 2021, etc.

At the same time, 200 thousand people are not just a bare group, but a set of equipment that no unit of the Russian occupation forces currently has. To walk on foot, or ride motorcycles or electric scooters 150 kilometers to Baku is suicide.

The geographical position of Azerbaijan has both advantages and disadvantages. The advantages are the relief and landscape features of the mountainous terrain, which creates a protective natural barrier in the north of the country along the border with the Russian Federation. The main logistical arteries leading to Baku run from Dagestan to the south along the M1 highway through Khachmaz. From the border with Russia to Baku, along the highway itself, there are about 150 km of direct route, but with a large number of small towns, as well as the possibility of controlling the area along a narrow front. In fact, choosing such a route for invasion, the enemy will find himself squeezed from the west by the mountainous terrain, and from the east by the Caspian Sea.

The disadvantages are that Azerbaijan is a country washed by the sea, and the enemy can use all branches of the military, land, air and naval components. The coastline is over 550 km long, and providing its cover is not an easy task, given the lack of highly effective coastal defense means in the Republic of Armenia. On the other hand, the Caspian Sea and the proximity of the Russian port infrastructure make it possible to use naval drones with a greater surprise factor than in the Black Sea.

Another disadvantage is that the ROV will have the ability to deliver dominant strikes on Azerbaijani cities with all of its air assets. Azerbaijan’s echeloned air defense is one of the best in the region, but Russian forces can focus on attrition through mass strikes with combined categories from kamikaze drones to subsonic, ballistic, and hypersonic missiles.

From this, an unambiguous conclusion can be drawn.

Azerbaijan in the current conditions can stop the land threat, not allowing the Russian occupation forces to go deep enough into its territory. Azerbaijan can also ensure the security of its coastline with cheap means of destruction – naval drones, much more successfully implementing the Black Sea scenario of Ukraine in the more closed Caspian Sea and against the more limited in its capabilities Russian Caspian flotilla. The main thing is that this aspect needs to be thought out and accumulated not only today, but also yesterday.

Azerbaijan’s most vulnerable point is its air, its air defense, which Russia will try to exhaust as much as possible, and then engage in terrorizing the civilian population , forcing Baku to make ultimatum concessions to Moscow.

So, a ground operation against Azerbaijan will most likely be a limited border raid with a maximum coverage of the controlled area within 600-800 km2. If, of course, a full-fledged defensive “ridge” is established along the border with Dagestan. But it is obvious that the Khachmaz region will become an insurmountable barrier for the ROV. Numerous settlements, extensive logistics, relief and landscape features in the form of mountains and rivers – all this and much more will turn any operation of the Russian occupation forces into a fire bag with extremely limited maneuver.

In other words, with all their current capabilities and even if they concentrate the maximum resources, the ROV will not be able to reach Baku, but will have large-scale losses and numerous natural and artificial obstacles on their way . The only way Russia can influence the RA during the fighting today is through terror of the civilian population. This is the only possible tool of pressure from Moscow. But…

But if the production of long-range strike drones in Azerbaijan is scaled up ahead of schedule, even this threat can be neutralized by no less large-scale retaliatory strikes.

That is, naval drones and long-range strike drones may not become an inevitable panacea, but an argument against Russian means of aggression and terror, which Azerbaijan will find difficult to resist. In matters of the land component, Russia has an exclusively quantitative factor on its side, which under current conditions will have a limited effect.

And from all of the above, one very simple conclusion can be drawn .

If Russia decides to conduct a “SVO” against Azerbaijan, it will end in serious losses and small achievements for it – with the prospect of not only getting bogged down in a long-term conflict that drains the Russian Federation’s meager resources, but also another geopolitical catastrophe in the form of reputational losses.

But given the likelihood of such threats, Azerbaijan should already be preparing for such a (possible) confrontation by forming a fleet of naval drones, squadrons of long-range aerial drones, an analogue of the Ukrainian Forces of Unmanned Systems, and also by building its “Mannerheim Line” on the border with Russia.

The Khachmaz district has all the properties of an impregnable bastion, and the Samur River is a natural obstacle that greatly facilitates defense during an invasion. The limited logistical arteries in the form of the M1 and R1 highways through Khanobu allow for clear control of the directions of the attack.

“Black January” will not happen again, but if Russia still wants to “organize” it, it will clearly be a black day for it.

https://war.obozrevatel.com/ukr/u-rosii-zagovorili-pro-shvidku-peremozhnu-svo-proti-azerbajdzhanu-naskilki-visokij-rizik-vtorgnennya-i-do-chogo-tse-mozhe-prizvesti.htm